What is the way forward in a war where advancing is so difficult? (Part 4)

Looking at the shell situation and the Russia-Ukraine War

Hi All,

This will be (I promise) the last in this series. It will also be a little different. I’m not going to give much of another example of how damaging/cutting the supply of material to the front is a better way to break a stalemate/contend with a numerically larger enemy—because it seemed too repetitive after last week. I thought of a number of examples, and they basically repeated the basic story of the Greeks and Persians. I debated between a few:

1. Nathaniel Greene (you might remember him from an earlier Substack I wrote). He takes over command of the US Army of the South during the American Revolution. He doesnt win a single battle by the definition of the time, but eventually forces the British Army of Lord Cornwallis to retreat Northwards to Virginia, by running it ragged and constantly threatening its supply. Eventually Cornwallis, frustrated by Greene’s way of fighting, heads to Yorktown Virginia, where he then loses total supply when the French Navy cuts him off. Cornwallis’ defeat in Yorktown basically ends the American Revolution.

   

   British forces surrendering in Yorktown VA, 1781

2. Napoleon getting cut off in Egypt (soon to be a major motion picture). In 1798, Bonaparte invades Egypt and seizes it from Ottoman rule—however he is eventually forced to flee to a large degree because the British cut off his ability to be supplied. Think Nelson’s other great victory, the Battle of the Nile.

   

   The Battle of the Nile, 1798

3. The Battle of Dienbienphu. Vietnam 1954. The French put a modern military force with air support deep into an isolated part of the jungle in northwest Vietnam, thinking that superior western weaponry would be able to destroy the Vietnamese forces who would come to attack. However the Vietnamese befuddled there plan by rendering the air strip the French used for supply and support, leaving the garrison cut off and forcing it to surrender.

   

   French Airstrip at Dienbienphu: https://www.cheminsdememoire.gouv.fr/index.php/en/battle-dien-bien-phu

What I didnt want to do is repeat what I say in 250,000 plus words in How the War was Won—which basically shows (I hope) how destroying German and Japanese equipment before it reaches the battlefield in World War II (in phases from pre-production, through production and on to employment) causes the Axis far greater losses than the famous land battles themselves—and its not even close. I could have talked about numerous examples (destruction of aircraft before battle probably being the most important)—but that would be just repeating the book.

Eventually what I decided to do was try and show just how a supply based campaign would be the most effective thing for Ukraine, by talking about the issue of ammunition supply for Russian artillery—which has received a great deal of coverage lately. Long story short, if Ukraine could damage/destroy even a relatively small percentage of the ammunition heading to Russian guns, it would make an outsize difference in the war in 2024.

This is because Russia is not actually a great economic power and is generating relatively little new force (this is also true for tanks and other armored fighting vehicles and artillery pieces). Basically Russia is using and losing far more equipment than in can replace on an annual basis. Take tanks for instance. It seems that the Russians (being kind to them) might be able to generate around 500 new/refurbished tanks a year (250 or so new, 250 or so older ones taken out of storage). The figure of 250 new builds could be on the high side as some sources say the real figure is actually 200—however to be safe its always better to use the higher figure.¹