Weekend Update #172: Is Ukraine Causing More Russian Losses Than Putin Can Replace?
Rubio, Russia, Ukraine And The European Reaction: A Notable Ukrainian Reaction To Developments In The War
Hello Everyone,
It has been a busy weekend of writing, with the piece I released yesterday about Marco Rubio’s speech to the Munich Security Conference (more on that below). The reaction so far has been fascinating and I will address that below. However, I am starting the update with reports this week on the horrible calculus of war, losses versus replacements. These usually, if maintained and following the same trend over a long period of time, tell us a great deal about the course of the war. Basically a trend of the last two months is showing the Russians losing a statistically significant number of soldiers more than they have been able to replace. It is worth noting and watching.
The third story is a very recent addition, a Ukrainian commentary on the state of the war and the peace negotiations someone you almost certainly have not heard about, but who is worth noting.
Before that, just a quick announcement. After the great success of the Substack Live that I did with John Sipher a week and a half ago, I thought it would be great to have another very experienced American IC voice join in another conversation. I am delighted to say that Marc Polymeropolous and I will be co-hosting a talk this Wednesday, February 18, at 7pm CET/6pm UK time/1pm EST. Invites will go out Tuesday. Many of you might know Marc from his regular contributions to MSNBC or have read his book. However before that he had a decades long career in the CIA, rising up to senior positions in Europe and the ME. We will cover a range of issues from the war in Ukraine, to Trump and Iran to something of which he has had detailed personal experience—Havana Syndrome. Please do join us if you are interested.
And now to the update.
Is Ukraine Causing More Russian Losses Than Putin Can Replace?
One of the reasons that in my research I try to steer people away from seeing individual battles as decisive (or in many cases even that important) is that history tends to greatly distort their impact.1 Writers, readers, film-makers, etc, like to make battles dramatic as events, not surprisingly, as it makes what happens during them seems that history is in the balance. In reality, individual battles decide very little. They usually cause far fewer losses than one thinks and effect the trajectories of a war only in small ways.
far more important in understanding the course of a war is to follow longer term trends of losses caused, losses experienced, and new forces/equipment generated. As a war progresses, if one side starts experiencing losses at a higher rate than they can replace, that is not a good sign for them. This kind of thinking has influenced the Ukrainian strategy for 2026 as I have mentioned a few times most recently is last week’s Ukrainian victory strategy piece. The Ukrainians have a goal of inflicting 50,000 casualties a month on the Russians, on the assumption that the Russians can replace approximately 30,000 of these. This latter figure was the Russian replacement rate in 2025.
Note: The third part of the Ukrainian strategy is to reduce their casualties even further at the same time.
Now the Ukrainians are not yet getting close to the 50,000 a month target for Russian losses, but in their claims for December 2025 and January 2026, claims that are being supported by different western intelligence agencies, they are finally causing losses for the Russians that are significantly above the Russian loss rates.
The specific claims are:
December 2025: Russian losses 33,200—Russian new recruits 27,400
January 2026: Russian losses 30,618—Russian new recruits 22,000
Note: With the weather being so cold and difficult in January, attacks could have been down and Ukrainian drone usage was probably made more complex.
So overall for two months the Ukrainians claim to have caused 63,818 losses which the Russians have only been able to replace with 47,400 forces. This is actually statistically a very large gap, with new troops only making up for about 75% of the losses suffered.
This is also a marked change from 2025 overall, when the Ukrainians said that they were able to inflict approximately as many losses on the Russian (410,000) as the Russians were able to recruit during the same period (406,000).
To go from approximately equal loss/replacement levels to a 25% gap in a short period is striking. It is also worth noting that it happened because the Russians seem to be struggling to attract new recruits. This is not a surprise, as the Russian casualty-heavy way of fighting is not one that is likely to win them many eager new sacrificial lambs the longer the war goes on. In the past they have tried to get around this problem with massive financial incentives, however there are signs now that this enticement is losing its appeal. The Russians are also trying to lure/trick young men from other parts of the world to join their military, but that is probably not a war-winning tactic.
The Russian way of war, which too many brain-dead propagandists like to present as some inexorable steam-roller of suffering that cannot be beaten, is actually not effective as a long-term strategy. It is one of the reasons that the Russian inevitable victory argument, so beloved of Donald Trump and some others, is so wrong-headed. The Russian way of fighting actually contains the seeds of Russian defeat—if Ukraine’s friends want to support Ukraine to take advantage of that fact.
Now this is only two months so we need to be careful. Perhaps recruiting in a terribly cold winter was down for other reasons and will snap back. However if it continues and the Ukrainians are able to raise their monthly total of inflicted losses to 40,000 (I think 50,000 is ambitious so will go for the lower target for now), that will mean that even the small Russian advances should ground to a halt.
Armies tend to get either relatively stronger or relatively weaker. They rarely tread water for long periods. The trajectory over the last two months is that the Russian army could be getting weaker. That is a story of note.
Rubio, Russia, Ukraine And The European Reaction
An update on the piece yesterday about Marco Rubio’s speech at Munich. There is still a great deal here to uncover about what the speech was aiming to do and the reaction to it.
First is what was said, or more accurately not said, about Russia and Ukraine. Stepping back from yesterday’s speech (and it was given about 24 hours ago from this very moment) what was striking was how little was said about Russia and Ukraine. The US State Department has now released an official transcript of the remarks, a transcript that was not available when I first sent out the piece.
What is extraordinary is that in the entire text of the address, neither Russia nor Ukraine are mentioned once. Russia was not portrayed as an enemy nor Ukraine as a friend. At no point was the greatest war in Europe since 1945, which was being waged only a few hundred miles away from where Rubio was speaking, even mentioned. Yet, this was supposed to be a speech about the importance of Europe to the USA and to assure Europeans that the US really does care about them.
The simple fact is that Rubio was admitting in the text that the outcome of the war is entirely secondary to the USA at present, certainly not important enough that it needs to be mentioned in a speech about the transatlantic relationship. In fact, it took the question and answer period afterwards for Rubio to be gently forced to provide a response on the question of the war. Once prodded, he took a decidedly neutral stance. The US wants a deal with which Russia can be happy or can “accept”. The key thing was clearly to bring the war “to an end” not to defend European democracy. Here is a quote from the transcript.
What we can’t answer – but we’re going to continue to test – is whether there is an outcome that Ukraine can live with and that Russia will accept. And I would say it’s been elusive up to this point. We’ve made progress in the sense that for the first time, I think in years, at least at the technical level, there were military officials from both sides that met together last week, and there’ll be – and there’ll be meetings again on Tuesday, although it may not be the same group of people.
Look, we’re going to continue to do everything we can to play this role of bringing this war to an end. I don’t think anybody in this room would be against a negotiated settlement to this war so long as the conditions are just and sustainable. And that’s what we aim to achieve, and we’re going to continue to try to achieve it, even as all these other things continue to happen on the sanctions front and so forth.
This lack of commitment to a European democracy should have set off alarm bells, but does not seem to be getting reaction that it should. The US is screaming at Europe that they would be happy to see dictatorship expand on the European continent, but too much of the reporting seemed to be about how the speech reassured people.
And this brings up the general question of the reaction to the speech. A significant number of people reached out or said that they believe that the reaction to the speech was more polite than laudatory and that it did not change anything materially. In other words, that European leaders would not be fooled by the gelatinous ooze of friendship with which Rubio smeared them.
A few people even got upset at a tweet that I sent out at the time, which was, I admit, rather vivid.
The different reactions I believe come from whether you believe the glass is half-empty or half-full on whether Europe understands what the Trump administration is and what it is trying to do to Europe.
I remain more of a half-empty kind of guy. European leaders have given some excellent speeches about how the world has changed and how US leadership needs to be questioned. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz did this kind of this particularly well at Munich the day before Rubio spoke. You can watch Merz’s entire speech here. The German chancellor both attacked MAGA politics and made it clear, verbally at least, that the US is losing trust in Europe. To deal with a rogue USA, Merz even called for a European-dominated pillar in NATO to look after European interests.
Merz is right btw, and that is why I remain a pessimist. I am done with excellent speeches. Its now 13 months since Trump became president, almost 16 months since he was elected, and two years since it was at least a 50-50 possibility that he would return to the White House. We should have processed down the road of creating this European pillar but we are nowhere near seeing it emerge.
In other words, it has taken two years of Europe getting hit over the head by reality, and we are still at the speech giving stage. This is what I mean about European leaders being addicted to the USA. They do not want to take the concrete steps to admit that the alliance is being deconstructed before their eyes. And too many of them are still making the argument that Europe cannot defend itself without the USA anyway—so why bother?
So, in the midst of this self-destructive discussion, Rubio gives a speech that is clearly designed to prevent Europeans from taking such steps and it is greeted with a standing ovation.
Whether the reaction it was polite or not, I do not really care. Europe has not taken enough action to look after itself, at least partly because it does not want to. If Rubio’s speech reinforces that reality, it is just another fentanyl dose to an addict.
A Notable Ukrainian Reaction To Developments In The War
Sometimes you need to be flexible. I was going to write a brief summary of the strategic airpower war, but then a Ukrainian friend just send me this very recent article. It was written by Dr. Andrii Demartino. While you might not have heard of Dr Demartino, since 2019 he has been Head of Strategic Planning and Analysis in the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine. He knows his stuff from a Ukrainian perspective.
Anyway, he just published this piece in Ukrainska Pravda, which touches on the state of the war and peace negotiations. The English translation of the Ukrainian version I have been told is pretty solid but it is a translation so can be rough in places. Moreover, this piece was clearly written for Ukrainians and that is worthy of note.
Demartino makes one very clear point. There can be no “peace” as long as Putin is in control of what is happening and the negotiations are designed to create a deal to please him. Though he does not say it, he is rejecting the entire premise of the Rubio analysis of the negotiations, that there needs to be a way to make Putin “happy”. As such it is a perfect contrast to what the US Secretary of State just said. Here are two key excerpts.
First:
As of today, even the most pro-Kremlin options are essentially capitulations for Russia. Everything the West can offer and Ukraine can agree to is a pittance and a mockery.
Even if America recognizes Crimea as Russian, will this decision last until the next elections or presidential impeachment in the US?
Should Ukraine’s non-admission to NATO be enshrined in its Constitution? After one, maximum two election cycles, the next single majority will unanimously repeal this norm.
Requirements regarding the Russian language, restrictions on the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and official relinquishment of territories are possible only in the case of the Russian flag over the Maidan, concentration camps, and full occupation.
Second:
But there is another reality - “on the ground”, where in Russia:
– minimal tactical achievements;
– colossal human losses;
– lack of prospects for victory…
What could change the situation and make the Kremlin demand the reality of the results and an end to the war? This is the same set of circumstances that Moscow is counting on regarding Ukraine: a crisis on the front, internal Russian tension, and external pressure.
Ukraine’s homework is to create a situation of long-term and stable positional stalemate. Blocking the possibilities of further Russian advancement. Minimizing terror in the Ukrainian rear. Demonstrating internal resilience and stability.
In other words, Ukraine must turn the tables on Russia and put the Russian regime under the kind of pressure that Putin is trying to put the Ukrainians. It is clear and I believe a correct diagnoses. Hopefully Ukraine’s friends will pay attention.
Have a good rest of the weekend everyone.
If you want to read more on this—see chapter 6 in my recent book: War and Power: Who Wins Wars and Why.
Russia is also losing troops through desertion, which isn't captured by casualty figures. Less clearly, it seems as if some contract soldiers manage to get out at the end of their term, or else that the extension of their contracts is counted as a new enlistment.
So, they may already be falling short
As a European, I so wish that your analyses and (de facto) warnings to European leaders would lead to action.
The cow towing to Trump’sUS and pussyfooting around Putin’s Russia just needs to end.
What conversations do we need to have on this continent to finally be counted?