Weekend Update #123, Part 2: A European Response Primer

Also: The Russians Advance For 4 Miles In Kursk

Hello All,

Here is the rest of the update. I do hope it was ok that I sent out the first part yesterday. When I was writing it, it did seem more and more like a stand-alone piece that needed to be released as soon as was possible. If you missed the email—here it is.

Weekend Update #123: The Week The USA Started Killing Ukrainians

I will talk about the other two main stories of the week here. The first is the ongoing and evolving reaction of European leaders, and the second is the Russian advance in Kursk.

A European Response Primer

Up until the Oval Office meeting Europe’s leaders simply had not grasped what they were up again. They had failed one of the basic tests of leadership, as was outlined in this piece.

We Have Witnessed A Historic Failure of Leadership

That now is spilt milk under the bridge (points if you know the movie), but can we stop with the “shocked” articles. Any leaders “shocked” by what we have seen since Trump’s inaugural are simply revealing their own wilful inability to accept the truth of the matter.

Now, there is no more time for recriminations, and the issue is to what degree are they accepting the new reality and, crucially, acting to adjust to it. Its not possible to survey Europe as a whole, but its worth examining the 5 largest powers (Germany, the UK, France, Poland and Italy) as they give a fascinating cross-section of response and together a better indication of where things are standing. They are also a balance of different political outlooks. Ultimately, if these five can hang together, Europe has a real chance.

Germany

It does seem more and more that Friedrich Merz’s election of chancellor at this time is the most important European election result since 1945. Merz has been indicating verbally that he understands the reality of the situation, speaking about the need for Europe to plan for its own security without the USA—and even wondering whether NATO will be NATO by this summer.

Should this Picture Be Titled: Waiting For Merz?

This week there were two developments of note. The first is that the Merz government is closer and closer to become a reality (and is coming together rather more quickly than German governments sometimes do). It does look now that the grand coalition of the CDU/CSU and the SDP will be agreed shortly, and this coalition should be strong enough to govern Germany during this crazy period. For those of you who are worried that Scholz might be back in the cabinet—the key thing to remember is that what Scholz demonstrated when he was Chancellor, was that the Chancellor really calls the shots on all important questions. Merz will have all the powers.

As for the shots that Merz called, he indicated this week that he will take a concrete step that needs to be taken if Europe is really to look after itself. He will get legal approval to override the German debt brake (which severely constrains German government spending) to allow a massive infusion of funds to pay for German defense and infrastructure. The figure being mentioned is 500 billion euros in the first instance.

If this happens, it will be historic. Germany is not only the largest economy in Europe, it is also the greatest failure in European leadership over the last few years. If Germany can lead, while spending real sums, rebuilding its defense industrial base and fixing its creaking infrastructure—it gives Europe a chance.

Poland

When the history of this period is written by historians, one of the most important developments will be how Europe’s big 3 (Germany, France, the UK) were joined by Poland as one of the continent’s strategic leaders. Poland was the first large state to put its money where its mouth is, in leading the charge to get to 5% of GDP on defense spending. This week it is also the first to start contemplating the full implications for Europe of the possible end of transatlantic alliance.

What I mean is that instead of pledging that it stands with Ukraine (which the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk did very well this week), the Polish government is willing to contemplate and even publicly discuss issues that would terrify many other European states. The first is whether Poland should have nuclear weapons. Just yesterday, Tusk addressed the nuclear deterrent question openly, saying that in the first instance Poland will have to rely on the (very small) French nuclear force. However going forward, it seems clear that Poland will want a deterrent that it can play a role in constructing and commanding.

The other issue the Poles threw on the table this week is compulsory military training for all male citizens. It sounds like the Polish government wants something like this in place very soon.

In bringing up issues that might be horrifying to certain western European sympathies, the Poles are playing a very important role. If they can work together with Merz, that will provide a serious land force at the heart of Europe.

France

The French reaction continues to be, I’m sorry to say, more on the disappointing side. Macron and other French politicians can be brilliant rhetorically. For more than a year now, Macron has been in the lead in calling for some European strategic autonomy. This week he continued doing that. He spoke publicly and passionately about the need for Europe to plan for its own defense without the USA and mentioned expanding the French nuclear deterrent to the rest of Europe (in some ways the least he could do).

Macron has even called for European states to plan on increasing defense spending to 3% of GDP. All that is well and good—but what is accompanying these calls seems to be precious action. While Merz is talking about actual sums, the French seem to still be at the general principle stage.

If this continues, France will have failed the great test that it had always set for itself. Since De Gaulle, the French have said that Europe needed to prepare to defend itself without the USA. Now that this time is here—they need to do more than give fine speeches.

Italy

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni could have been a huge problem for European defense, yet so far she is proving not to be. Seemingly the only western European leader Trump actually likes, Meloni hails from a right-wing populist party which is closer to that of Trump and even Viktor Orban than the parties of Macron or British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. Had Meloni thrown in with Trump and Orban, it would have been a huge strategic problem.

However, since coming to power been far more pro-Ukraine than most of her party and indeed most of the Italian far right. When faced with siding between European unity on one hand, and Trumpist ideology on the other, she has come down regularly for the former.

Now, we need to be careful not to overplay her position. Like Macron, she has been better rhetorically than in reality—and there are no calls for a major spending to boost European security. Indeed, before all this happened, Italian defense spending was slated to come in far below the old 2% of GDP target, which itself is now irrelevant.

So Meloni has hardly been an enthusiastic actor. However, she is also willing to throw out ideas that show that she intends to keep Italy in line with Europe as a whole. This week, for instance, she staked out a position far more pro-Ukraine than most of the rest when she floated the idea that NATO should extend article 5 to Ukraine far sooner than others were thinking. In some ways it would make Ukraine a NATO protectorate (presumably without the USA) without having to wait for Ukraine to join the alliance. It was certainly a novel proposal.

So Italy which could be a major problem, is not. Do not underrate the importance of this.

United Kingdom

The UK seems to be having the hardest time coming to terms with the new world. So much of the UK’s self image (much of which was strategic fantasy) was constructed about the idea that the UK was a bridge between the USA and Europe, that accepting that there is nothing left to bridge seems beyond some British policy makers. Indeed, the idea that the UK can be a “bridge” still cropped up regularly this week.

The only way this can be not a delusion is if the UK government is using that position to try and play for time—to not have a full rupture with the US until Europe can do more. I have certainly been told that this is a possibility.

However, if the UK is not playing for time—than the country really is living in the past (and arguably a past that has not existed since 1945). Partly this is understandable, as the UK has so damaged itself through Brexit, and its political system seems unable to cope with that. Its still living in fantasies that the UK can be half-in and half-out as a European force.

It cannot. The UK needs to accept that its future will be determined not by the Anglo-American special relationship (which has arguably never existed in the way people think) and stop trying to be a bridge to a force (Trump) whose sole purpose is to weaken and divide Europe in the face of Russia. The UK must commit fully to Europe, where it has the ability to be a huge leader—particularly in air-sea power and in leading the JEF. It has an opportunity to be a real leader—so far its not doing that.

Conclusion

Change is coming to Europe’s leading states, but still at a very uneven pace. At least none have broken unity, but it would be better if the British, French and Italians added actions to their words. It might be that we will need Merz to actually become chancellor and start tapping Germany’s productive capacity (about which I think people might have forgotten). So, things are still balanced between understanding and foolishness.

Russians Advance 4 Miles in Kursk.

Because the Russians have made so few advances for the last two months, people were obviously growing restless trying to find some sign of Ukrainian collapse. This might explain the overreaction (as always) to a small Russian advance. Here was the map of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk 5 days ago.

And here is the exact same map now—with a ruler to show the Russian (actually could be said to be North Korean advance as well as Russian). It was 6.42 kilometres—which translates as 3.98 miles.

Almost all of that advance actually happened almost four days ago—then it has stopped. This is actually the story of the war this last 14 months. The Russians make a small advance, people seem to lose their heads talking about the Ukrainians about to be surrounded and collapse, and then the advance peters out.

What seems to be happening is that in preparation for Trump and Putin trying to force a bad cease-fire deal on Ukraine, Russia is throwing everything it can to try and retake as much of the Kursk salient as possible. The more the Ukrainians hold of Russia, the worse it is for Putin. He also now understands that Trump has his back—so he can basically throw the kitchen sink at Kursk to try and take what he can.

One will imagine such attacks continuing.

The flip side of this is that Russian attacks in the Donbas seem to be in their least successful phase for more than a year. Here is large segment of that front running from Pokrovsk to Chasiv Yar, as it stands today.

And here is that exact same front on January 1, 2025 (68 days ago).

For massive cost in this area, the Russians have barely moved the line. This decreasing advance is the military story that is more important.

Its also the great tragedy of the USA switching sides and becoming an ally of Putin. Ukraine was actually inflicting unsustainably high casualties on the Russians. If Europe had stepped up and US aid simply continued as under Biden (particularly with intelligence), the Russians would have had a hard time sustaining the fight by the end of 2025.

Now Putin can wage war knowing he has the USA on his side. Europe must respond or it will fail.

Have a good rest of the weekend.