Weekend Update #117: OK, the War was not Ended on Tuesday--So what Now?

Also: Ukraine’s Fighting Shape: Two Views; The Battlefield

Hi All,

Apologies if this update is a little shorter than usual. Its been a crazy week with Davos and then a pit-stop in London to record a series of podcasts with Dan Snow based on The Strategists (more on that very soon), It then culminated with a rather hairy flight through Storm Eowyn.

And exhaustion.

In anticipation of this I have produced a little more content, much of it free, over the previous week. There was this free piece from Davos a few days ago.

Experience Davos From Your Own Living Room

As well as this piece yesterday on some impressions of US and European policy makers in Davos (for subscribers).

Davos Impressions and Ukraine: Dealing with a Cult

Because of this, I wont be saying much about Davos in this update. However, I will, of course, be saying something about Donald Trump. During the campaign he claimed he was going to “very easily” settle the Russo-Ukrainian War; in a day no less. For a little trip down memory lane, here is one example of what he was claiming (and notice the woops of joy and adoration from his supporters while he lies his ass off). We don’t live in a post-truth reality, we live in a post-reality reality.

Well, that means the war should have been over Tuesday. But as far as I know that hasn’t happened.

So what now?

What is Trump Saying and What is He not Saying?

I want to start with a mea culpa. Like many people I’ve been looking for signs of what Trump might do about the war, when it was revealed that he was speaking through his—-elbow—-about quickly ending it. Needless to say I’ve been looking for anything hopeful. The greatest concern for me, as I talked about two weeks ago, was that much of his thinking comes straight from the Russian playbook. When he describes why he believes the war started, or outlines his views on ranged fire into Russia—he speaks the Putin-inspired narrative about the role of NATO in causing the former and the risks of escalation if the latter occurs.

I’ve been looking for any signs that he might be breaking free from Russian reflexive control. Twelve days ago I wrote that the most hopeful sign would be if Trump understood that Russia was much weaker than he, and most other had earlier assumed.

Well, this week it seemed that that message had gotten through to him. In a series of statements and tweets, he started pushing the narrative that the war needed to be ended because Russia was not doing well. I think this tweet might have been the most fascinating—and it caused a real stir in Davos when it came out. People even read it out loud at meetings as some delphic proclamation of US policy.

This was only one example of such thinking this week. Trump also claimed in a press conference that the Russian economy was “failing” and as such it was not making Putin “look good”. Here is a whole quote.

"[Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskyy told me he wants to make a deal, I don’t know if Putin does ... He might not. I think he should make a deal. I think he’s destroying Russia by not making a deal," Trump said in the Oval Office on the first day of his second presidency.

"I think, Russia is kinda in big trouble. You take a look at their economy, you take a look at their inflation in Russia. I got along with [Putin] great, I would hope he wants to make a deal,"

Of course in some ways the key thing is that these messages reinforce just how much Trump still exists in the Russian information space. He always stresses the strength of his personal relationship with Putin—and NEVER criticizes Russian behavior in the war. There is not the slightest understanding that Russia is the illegal aggressor and has committed massive war crimes. Also, Russia did not lose 60,000,000 million lives in World War II.

Now, Trump’s claim that the Russian economy was “failing” and that he might sanction Russian economic relations with the USA seemed to electrify supporters of Ukraine who had deep hopes that he would do something for Ukraine. Not only was it read out at Davos, I tweeted it out as an indication that Trump’s thinking might be changing.

I believe now that there is a strong chance that I overreacted.

Yes, Trump does seem to understand that Russia is in worse shape now and is not as powerful as he originally assumed. However, that is not translating into pushing for a better deal for Ukraine, or changing the basic way in which he understands the war.

What he is pressing for is clear—a “deal” that “stops” the war. He is not and has never said he is looking for a deal that gives Ukraine security, restores its borders, or makes Russia give up anything at all that he is seized. In other words, he wants to gain credit for stopping the fighting, declare he is a peace-maker and go home.

However he is in no ways engaged in constructing an actual international arrangement that will bring a longer-lasting peace. His threats to Russia are simply to make the Russians stop fighting (temporarily, which they very well might want to do btw). But beyond this—there is nothing else that has been offered to Ukraine. To whit:

• Trump has at no point said he will support more aid for Ukraine, and has so far not asked Congress to approve any.

• Trump has basically ruled out any hope of NATO membership for Ukraine.

• Trump has ruled out all US peacekeeping forces in Ukraine to patrol a ceasefire line.

• Trump has put no pressure on Putin to return any of the land he has seized—all he wants is Putin to stop fighting.

In other words, if you add it all together, the peace that Trump is talking about is basically a ceasefire along the present line of contact—exactly what he and those around him were talking about during the campaign. The specifics of any Trump deal are no better for Ukraine than they were before—he just seems willing to try and publicly pressure Putin to accept them (which might be posturing anyway).

The worrying thing is that Trump has now formally repositioned the USA not as a supporter of Ukraine, but as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine. He has no commitment to Ukraine in any way—beyond trying to get credit for securing some kind of cease fire. He no longer talks about standing by Ukraine “for as long as it takes”, for example.

All of this is a way of saying that if you think Trump has been much better for Ukraine since becoming president than he was before—you are probably over-reacting too. He has made a few public statements to try and seem tough on Putin—but all of his substantial changes have been worse for Ukraine.

He is also putting Ukraine in a dangerous box. If Putin turns around and says, OK—I agree to a cease fire along the present line of contact, I get to keep what I’ve seized but wont attack any more, and in exchange I get a relaxation of sanctions and we get back to business with Trump’s America—there is every indication that Trump would accept that.

That would also not be peace. It would be a ceasefire on advantageous terms for Russia—which would allow the Russians to rebuild their military forces while providing no credible security guarantees for Ukraine. It is basically Sam Charap’s peace plan.

A lesson that must always be learned—don’t overreact to Trump tweets!

Ukraine’s Fighting Shape: Two Views

Davos is not a good place for hard information. It is basically populated by people who think they are important, gossiping based on second, third, fourth hand information which has come into their possession. However what was fascinating is how little was actually known there—which left people obsessing about Trump tweets (which they could have done in their living rooms).

Thus it was a really bad place to get any real information about the state of the Ukrainian military. However there was one piece of information that was stated by a very credible source—Polish Foreign Secretary Radosław Sikorski. A strong backer of Ukraine, Sikorski stated in a publicly streamed breakfast (he starts speaking one hour and 2/5 minutes after the video starts) that he believes Ukraine has already received and stockpiled the resources its needs to fight through 2025. This btw was also stated in another private meeting that I heard from a credible source—that is is believed Ukraine received a flood of new supplies in the last two months (both from the outgoing Biden Administration and from European sources), so in supply terms is doing better than people realize. In other words, Trump stopping aid wont lead to an immediate crisis as happened when the Republicans in Congress stopped aid for the first few months of 2024.

This optimistic view is not universally shared. For instance, an adviser to the outgoing Biden Administration, speaking in a populist capital in Europe this week, was far more downbeat. They prophesied a Ukrainian collapse in 2025—because the Ukrainians have not listened to the Biden Administration no less. Moreover this adviser waxed rhapsodical about Russian military adaptation. Sadly, I cant pass on any more details (but I have them).

So there are some very different views of Ukraine’s fighting shape that are being passed around. I won’t judge between them. However we might see Ukraine’s reactions to Trump’s pressure as a sign. If Trump starts pushing a cease-fire with Putin keeping what he has, and no credible security guarantees—Ukraine is under no obligation to accept his terms. If the Ukrainians believe that they can keep fighting and Russia is not in great shape, they might delay and keep going. If they, otoh, instantly jump of a Trump cease-fire plan, that reveals something else.

This also shows why Europe is so important and why the failure of Europe to coordinate and be forceful enough in its backing for Ukraine has been so deleterious. If Ukraine does have a decent supply of military equipment, and Europe was willing to step up, it would strengthen Ukraine’s position immensely.

The Battlefield.

Not much to add. We are nearing the end of the first month of January, and Russian micro advances are getting more micro. The Russian plan to try and cut the roads into Pokrovsk (which was supposed to fall in August 2024 if you remember) crept forward a few kilometres—but that’s about it. Here is the map today showing the furthest Russian extent (centre on Avdiivka, which the Ukrainians withdrew from almost a year ago). The Russian advance in that time has been just under 40 miles.

Here is the same map a week ago—so Russian advances in the last week have been about one mile (from 57.89 kilometres from Avdiivka a week ago to today being 59.27 kilometres).

Its about time that we have another round of stories about the brilliance of Russian military adaptation and the impending collapse of Ukrainian morale. There is much evidence for it now as there has always been.

Have a good rest of the weekend everyone!