Thanks again for this article. It's always a pleasure to read. A bit of introspection is very noble and something many Western experts on Ukraine should practice imo. I think you're more spot on in general than not. Indeed as others already stipulated this war is being fought by two more or less Soviet like armies, old habits die hard I guess. Another aspect of this war that I never expected is the way it influences geopolitical conflicts world wide, i.e. the Middle East and the Pacific. These are worrying times for global stability and peace, especially as both the US and Europe are not ready for a full scale war while China is waging an arms race. Also, the war in Ukraine contributes to the ongoing nuclear proliferation. As long as you have nuclear weapons you're allowed to start a war is the message the combined West is conveying. It's a multiplayer prisoner's dilemma, and it will only lead to more geopolitical instability imo.
Arent, I thinks the main point of this review is that we cannot assume decisions makers on the US and EU view game theoretical notions of credible threats in the same way nor how advances in technology have changed the nature of warfare. Finally, The Russian economy is quickly moving toward a collapse of some kind with high inflation and interest rates, supply chain problems and labor market shortages. Ukraine does have the economic support of the EU and UK, and US to a large extent which stands in sharp contrast to Russia. I do I not think US and EU leaders see this or fully understand this pressure point at this moment and they are losing the opportunity to speed up that collapse.
Russian munition manufacture cannot keep up with replacement of equipment loss, but they have found other sources of supply. As for the civilian population, Russians are used to being miserable and regard it as the normal state of life. They can put up with s**t longer than any country north of the 30th parallel.
The last time Russians came to a breaking point was 1917. That does not augur well for a breaking point any time soon. And since 1917, if has been constantly drilled into them that rebellion doesn't pay. It didn't even work out for Yevgeny Prigozhin, a man with a well drilled private army.
But I would argue we are approaching that 1917 breaking point in some ways. The parallels are striking. Human wave attacks under poor leadership, deteriorating economy with logistics in shambles by some accounts with railway problems, and that means bringing crops to market is more difficult and more expensive. All was fine until it was not in 1917.
And since 1917, if has been constantly drilled into the Russians that rebellion doesn't pay. It didn't even work out for Yevgeny Prigozhin, a man with a well drilled private army.
World War II was infinitely more damaging to the Russian population than World War I.
U.S. and (to a lesser extent) E.U. leaders don't accept Putin's (and Russians broadly) commitment to dominating Eastern Europe. They still believe Putin can be appeased by some territory in Ukraine. They may or may not sense a possible RU economic collapse; the bigger problem is they are ambivalent about such a collapse. The Republicans are mostly on Putin & Orban's side.
A lot of ppl in this forum, especially Andrew, have been hammering similar points for a couple years.
Totally agree with you and Andrew on the point that Putin will not stop unless Russia is totally defeated. The biggest pressure point in Russia is tightening economic sanctions if the west has the stomach for it.
Agree Paul, Russia still thinks along the lines of its former spheres of influence. The Soviet Union economically never got over their loss in Afghanistan (although when you visit the Central Armed Forces Museum in Moscow you could be deceived by their representation of the conflict). Perhaps its better if we see a similar collapse in Russia as in 1989-1991, in that case we will witness the birth of several new countries.
The geopolitical aspects of this war will keep historians busy for years. Just look at the number of official visits to different countries Zelenskyy has made. Consider too that 2024 was notable in that almost half of the world's population was involved in elections in 70 countries. Many of these results resulted in losses for incumbents. Looking at the big elections coming up in 2025, especially France and Germany, the trend may continue. In short, there does not seem to be a stable floor to base Ukranian support. Getting that support is another war and continues the "great game" of foreign policy.
Certainly Germany should improve from the German Ukrainian perspective--but no way that compensates for the USA and possibly France going in the other direction.
We are expecting more than what Europe can deliver. Think about Germany, whose defense relied on the US, its energy, until recently, on Russia, and then its markets in China. Trying to untangle all those interdependencies is a massive undertaking. We can't count Europe out but we also cannot be under the tyranny of expectations that may need adjustment.
Many of those elections ended with losses for the Zelensky supporting incumbents didn't they? Might have been a couple more had the Romania one not been nullified because of some guff on tiktok and the Moldovan one been monstrously bent.
You’re right, the elections were totally about Ukraine only! And there was no Russian meddling / hybrid warfare in Moldova, Romania, or Georgia for that matter!
Part of the strategic failure of the West is explained in this thread from a week ago: https://x.com/andrewmichta/status/1873186349840523702 Here's the key point (but every part of the thread is important): "The problem of Russia we confront today-what I called elsewhere the "Russian question"-is both historical and systemic. Until Western leaders understand this, we have no realistic prospect of crafting a workable strategy to deal with Russia, either today or in the future."
A great thread - I follow him but Musk hid it :-(. Lord Salisbury said in 1885 ❝My idea of the manner of dealing with Russia is not to extract from her promises which she will not keep (cheers), but to say to her, "There is a point to which you shall not go (cheers), and if you go we will spare neither men nor money until you go back." (Loud cheers.)❞ So now we are at the point where "money and men" are needed. It is, in the end, so bloody obvious that I am confident that enough will be done.
Phil, I'd like to have your analysis of this substack post. It identifies Ukrainian weaknesses that are quite profound. It is written from a pro Ukrainian perspective.
I went and asked Ukrainians I trust about the information of the Anne of Kyiv brigade--and they admit that its true. The response I get from the same Ukrainians about this kind of reporting is that it basically extrapolates from some bad units and generalizes to the whole Ukrainian army. The Ukrainians have shown that they have some very effective brigades--the issue therefore becomes how to replicate. Also, for an anonymous source to make these criticisms really lessens them. If someone wanted to stand up and say it publicly (as the leader of Azov did before) that could have much greater impact.
It likely comes down to two issues: people and materiel.
The Russian / Soviet depots are near empty which helps explain Russian troops starting to attack Ukrainian positions with electric scooters, golf carts, and like civilian gear. They aren’t doing so hot on the artillery front either.
Russians do not enjoy air supremacy over the front line. Their Black Sea fleet has been largely decimated and only trots out occasionally to fire off a Kalibr or whatever as production allows. Russian bombers keep getting pulled back further and further from the front. Etc.
Meanwhile the Russian economy is still suffering from massive losses of people, a 21% central bank rate (!!!), and high inflation. The value of the ruble has started to drop but has a long way to go. The wheels are coming off the rail system (literally) as the state tries to economize and bodge whatever it can with chewing gum and tape.
Meanwhile, the civilian aviation situation has become so dire that the Russians are asking foreign airlines to do domestic service in Russia. Aka the sanctions can work, if exercised correctly.
Ditto dealing with Russian shadow fleets by simply impounding the vessels whenever they misbehave. A full tanker of oil will likely help pay for economic losses and the cable / comm link repairs. Similarly, the Swedes, Estonians, poles, etc could elect to declare their sea rights fully in the baltics and eliminate the thin sliver of international waters in the middle.
The Russians are grasping at straws via sabotage attempts that increasingly are inching the west towards all out war. But so far the west is unwilling to commit real quantities of troops, whether as mercenaries or as consultants to repair and maintain gear in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, inside Ukraine the lack of shells, materiel, transport, etc is going to severely hamper any hope of taking large swaths of territory any more quickly than the Russians are at present. They need a lot more tanks, APCs, artillery shells, rockets, SAM systems, etc.
Then there is the question of where to source the people necessary to get the job done. Never mind the command and control structure that doesn’t reflexively plug holes by mixing and matching units whenever there is a retreat and destroying any kind of cohesion in the process. They have yet to adopt post Soviet tactics on a wide scale and it shows. At the same time, they are suffering from a severe people shortage.
Anyhow, 2025 could have been the breakout year for Ukraine. But between Trump being elected, EU malaise, and a gradual grinding down of Ukraine (see public surveys re: territorial integrity) I’m a lot more pessimistic. It would likely require a Russian internal event like the oligarchs defenestrating Putin for positive change to come by.
And the only way to achieve that is more effective sanctions. Stopping rich Russians from partying in the west via Turkey, etc. Effective sanctions on more than just airliner parts. Etc. Don’t see that happening under the current leadership in the west.
The Russians do have an air firepower advantage to help their assaults--such as with glidebombs. Ukraine still cant compete with them from what I hear.
Lets hope 2025 goes the way it should for the courageous Ukrainians. Your insights are very much appreciated Phillips, and long may they continue. I have personally learned a great deal, from your articles and also from the many expert comments coming in. It is a fantastic place for learning and sharing thoughtful ideas and opinions. May there be better 2025 all round. Thanks to all.
Thank you for your analysis. Whatever you got wrong in 2024 pales next to what America got wrong in not supporting Ukraine fully and electing Donald Trump.
When Russia invaded, I was pessimistic, although not for the reasons most were. Having watched Syria for a long time, I believed Russia could be beaten militarily. I was worried that a Russian scorched earth strategy, of making Ukraine uninhabitable for civilians would lead to the withdrawal of western support and ultimately a collapse of the Ukrainian state.
I think I was seduced by the successes of the Ukrainian military - which were much greater than I'd expected, even though I believed Russia militarily beatable. But I think in the long run, my initial pessimism was justified: western leaderships seem incapable of thinking strategically, even if they're not actually corrupted or even co-opted by the pro-Russia oligarch-mafia class.
Assad's fall in Syria was both unexpected by anyone... but also not surprising for those who'd been paying attention. We knew that the Baathist state was completely hollowed out, incompetent and utterly despised, even by people not historically inclined to support the opposition. It had long been propped up by Russian and Iranian / Iraqi power.
When the HTS-led opposition began their offensive, the regime collapsed so quickly that neither Assad's allies, nor his supposed opponents (the US / the west / the Gulf states) were able to act quickly enough to 'stablise' or 'manage escalation' in Syria.
Ukraine can absolutely beat Russia with support... But there is a lot of de-facto political support for a Russian status-quo throughout the west. I really hope those countries who understand the danger are willing to act and can hopefully drag enough other European 'allies' along with them.
Jonathan, I think what this showed was the global nature of the conflict as well as the quiet work of “belligerents” we have not been paying attention to (Turkey in this case). It has also exposed the inherent weakness of Iran politically, militarily, and economically. They cannot even keep the lights on or homes heated complements of the Israeli Air Force taking out two major pipelines that has shut in Iranian gas production that would otherwise be used domestically. But also we are seeing how weak Russia is “depending” on North Korean arms and now men/cannon fodder which have all been built with Russian and Chinese support and will only drain those economies more as North Korea looks to replace weapons stores. Oh, and China’s economy is in slowdown mode with illiquid state run banks and their ability to remain a stroking economic force waning. It says something when investment analysts and economists are threatened by Xi to lose their jobs or worse if they say anything bad about the economy. While the war is not over, Phillips’ lesson in HTWWW comes to the fore yet again with the economic weakness of Russia, China, and their allies such as NK, Iran.
The "Russia status quo" is fundamentally unsustainable and will self-destruct no matter what, and is already self-destructing, and will collapse before the end of the year, *even* in a worst-plausible-case scenario where the West bizarrely removes all sanctions on Russia. *Russia has very little left to export* and has become *entirely* import dependent.
With massive and increasing worker shortages leading to an inability to produce anything new (and in fact reduction of productive capacity), Russia cannot get out of the economic hole even if sanctions are removed. The only way out of the economic collapse is to end the war, stop attacking, which Putin will refuse to do. (Ending the war would restore lots of workers to the domestic industries, convince people who fled to come back to Russia, and stop literally burning up resources. But Putin won't do it.)
Since Ukraine will not roll over and surrender everything, and since Russia cannot advance in any reasonable fashion, Russia has two theoretical options:
(a) run out of men and materiel and face total frontline collapse with domestic hyperinflation -- the Russian government would be overthrown soon after
(b) stop attacking and retrench to an older defensive line. Which might work, but Putin will simply refuse to do it. It might happen if Putin is overthrown earlier.
Neither of these are the status quo. Both involve the removal of Putin.
That's it. The actions of the West affect only the timeline. Putin's out and it's just a matter of time before he's out. Therefore the status quo is non-viable.
There are a lot of options for what happens after Putin is out, but the status quo has zero chance no matter how many idiot governments back it.
Now that he's no longer Lithuania's foreign minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis has his own Substack-like newsletter at landsbergis.ghost.io, which he started on Dec. 12, 2024 ("Despite being warned many times, we weren't ready for Russia's attacks, and we're still not pushing back against nuclear bullying. We are as unprepared now as we were forty years ago when this British sitcom predicted everything. There are two things we can do to defeat Russia's nuclear blackmail without depending on China for help." https://bsky.app/profile/glandsbergis.bsky.social/post/3leyd4st44k2r). In today's post he writes something interesting about China:
"What is even more concerning to me now are the announcements that Chinese involvement has been instrumental in persuading Russia to stop considering the nuclear option. Just imagine what sort of leverage this gives China. Now China and not the US (or EU for that matter) is the security guarantor of the European continent. Let that sink in.
On one hand, it is easy to understand the sentiment which says that China has to be involved in the peace process in Ukraine. Clearly, if we are unable to deter Russian nuclear escalation and only China can do that, people start considering that maybe China should be invited to become the security guarantor for Ukraine.
On the other hand, and there is always another hand, just imagine the price tag on such a request. One does not need to look far, just take the latest EU vote on tariffs for Chinese electric vehicles. It wasn't an easy task to get the required majority of countries in the EU to support the Commission's proposal. Afterwards, China threatened to treat the countries that voted in favour differently when it comes to trade deals, so it will be even more difficult to find a majority the next time around. Now you see what will happen to EU sovereignty if we outsource the security of our continent to China."
On the political front I recently read Endgame by J Dimbleby and although the description of the big three leaders discussions on the future of Europe post WW2 are not very detailed I was struck by the similarities with today on Ukraine and Russia of Roosevelts and Churchills positions on Stalin and the USSRs positions on the Baltics and Poland during 1944 as the Red Army advanced towards Germany. R and C simply accepted without even attempting to persuade S that the presence of USSR armies in those areas meant they must be left to the tender mercies of Stalin. Not only that but in relation to Poland both R and C treated the London based Polish in exile abysmally and as their contemporaries later commented shamefully simply because they did not want to confront USSR. These decisions consigned the Baltic States and Poland to nearly half a century of misery under the rule of USSR. For US and European leaders to make this same mistake but with a situation where Russia is nowhere near as well placed militarily on the battlefield would be unforgivable and yet it seems to be a real prospect if not a policy of several so called leaders.
Russia flat out lacks the capacity to subjugate Ukraine. Putin's actually losing the capacity to subjugate the Russian Federation (the signs are visible if you look).
The arms race in drone technology seems critically important to me for offsetting Ukraine’s manpower disadvantage. New fiber-optically controlled and AI guided drones have the potential to make irrelevant the Russian advantage in EW. Am I wrong to think this is more important than ranged warfare going forward?
Hi Jim, Im trying to find out more about the fibre optic UAVs. It would seem to me that they would have serious limitations too (tethered to a cable, unable to operate in groups without the possibility of getting scrambled). Yet you hear stories that they are effective.
Prof, I do not think your political analyses were way off the mark. While perhaps we missed the actual scale and duration of the actions (if one can put inaction on a scale) and Trump's influence, we were entitled to hope it was all better than it seemed. Many of your thoughts you indicated as "hope".
Thank you for great analysis and comments. I agree with your perspective, but it seems to me that you are missing one Russian succes. In the strategic air campaign they are succeeding in degrading Ukrainian infrastructure. This might not win them the war, but is making Ukraine weaker/poorer. So they are managing to degrade future Ukrainian productivity.
Very true. Let's hope that as more of the promised air defence systems arrive in 2025 things look up for Ukraine. It's worth remembering that these complex weapons cannot be bought off the shelf. It's taken a couple of years to manufacture some of them. Meanwhile, Ukraine has just started mass-producing long-range cruise missiles and missiles. Russia may soon pay as heavy a price. Its air defences are already stretched so thin it is reported they're buying missile launchers from Iran.
Ive written about that. Its actually very much in the balance. Ukraine seems to have prepared pretty well for this winter--and the power cuts are much less than feared. Of course one, big successful Russian raid could change that.
Thank you for this, Phillips. Year end summaries are usually a waste of time, but this one is not, because it sets the stage for going forward... except for Washington policy decisions, of course.
Anyone who thinks he knows what Trump will do is guessing, because Trump himself is a completely wild card.
Thanks again for this article. It's always a pleasure to read. A bit of introspection is very noble and something many Western experts on Ukraine should practice imo. I think you're more spot on in general than not. Indeed as others already stipulated this war is being fought by two more or less Soviet like armies, old habits die hard I guess. Another aspect of this war that I never expected is the way it influences geopolitical conflicts world wide, i.e. the Middle East and the Pacific. These are worrying times for global stability and peace, especially as both the US and Europe are not ready for a full scale war while China is waging an arms race. Also, the war in Ukraine contributes to the ongoing nuclear proliferation. As long as you have nuclear weapons you're allowed to start a war is the message the combined West is conveying. It's a multiplayer prisoner's dilemma, and it will only lead to more geopolitical instability imo.
Arent, I thinks the main point of this review is that we cannot assume decisions makers on the US and EU view game theoretical notions of credible threats in the same way nor how advances in technology have changed the nature of warfare. Finally, The Russian economy is quickly moving toward a collapse of some kind with high inflation and interest rates, supply chain problems and labor market shortages. Ukraine does have the economic support of the EU and UK, and US to a large extent which stands in sharp contrast to Russia. I do I not think US and EU leaders see this or fully understand this pressure point at this moment and they are losing the opportunity to speed up that collapse.
Russian munition manufacture cannot keep up with replacement of equipment loss, but they have found other sources of supply. As for the civilian population, Russians are used to being miserable and regard it as the normal state of life. They can put up with s**t longer than any country north of the 30th parallel.
Agree--not sure ammunition will be there problem as much as military grade vehucles and artillery barrels.
I was taking munitions in the broadest possible sense—didn't know it meant only ammunition.
True, enough. But even Russians have a breaking point. Question is how close are we to that point.
The last time Russians came to a breaking point was 1917. That does not augur well for a breaking point any time soon. And since 1917, if has been constantly drilled into them that rebellion doesn't pay. It didn't even work out for Yevgeny Prigozhin, a man with a well drilled private army.
But I would argue we are approaching that 1917 breaking point in some ways. The parallels are striking. Human wave attacks under poor leadership, deteriorating economy with logistics in shambles by some accounts with railway problems, and that means bringing crops to market is more difficult and more expensive. All was fine until it was not in 1917.
And since 1917, if has been constantly drilled into the Russians that rebellion doesn't pay. It didn't even work out for Yevgeny Prigozhin, a man with a well drilled private army.
World War II was infinitely more damaging to the Russian population than World War I.
U.S. and (to a lesser extent) E.U. leaders don't accept Putin's (and Russians broadly) commitment to dominating Eastern Europe. They still believe Putin can be appeased by some territory in Ukraine. They may or may not sense a possible RU economic collapse; the bigger problem is they are ambivalent about such a collapse. The Republicans are mostly on Putin & Orban's side.
A lot of ppl in this forum, especially Andrew, have been hammering similar points for a couple years.
Totally agree with you and Andrew on the point that Putin will not stop unless Russia is totally defeated. The biggest pressure point in Russia is tightening economic sanctions if the west has the stomach for it.
Agree Paul, Russia still thinks along the lines of its former spheres of influence. The Soviet Union economically never got over their loss in Afghanistan (although when you visit the Central Armed Forces Museum in Moscow you could be deceived by their representation of the conflict). Perhaps its better if we see a similar collapse in Russia as in 1989-1991, in that case we will witness the birth of several new countries.
Interesting point on decision makers--one thing that is clear, is that there is no accepted idea of national interest. Its a made up idea.
The geopolitical aspects of this war will keep historians busy for years. Just look at the number of official visits to different countries Zelenskyy has made. Consider too that 2024 was notable in that almost half of the world's population was involved in elections in 70 countries. Many of these results resulted in losses for incumbents. Looking at the big elections coming up in 2025, especially France and Germany, the trend may continue. In short, there does not seem to be a stable floor to base Ukranian support. Getting that support is another war and continues the "great game" of foreign policy.
Certainly Germany should improve from the German Ukrainian perspective--but no way that compensates for the USA and possibly France going in the other direction.
We are expecting more than what Europe can deliver. Think about Germany, whose defense relied on the US, its energy, until recently, on Russia, and then its markets in China. Trying to untangle all those interdependencies is a massive undertaking. We can't count Europe out but we also cannot be under the tyranny of expectations that may need adjustment.
My takeaway from 2024 is that democracy's downfall is people's tendency to elect dictators who then dismantle democractic mechanisms.
Yep. This has been a steady trend for at least the last decade.
Many of those elections ended with losses for the Zelensky supporting incumbents didn't they? Might have been a couple more had the Romania one not been nullified because of some guff on tiktok and the Moldovan one been monstrously bent.
You’re right, the elections were totally about Ukraine only! And there was no Russian meddling / hybrid warfare in Moldova, Romania, or Georgia for that matter!
The point about nuclear weapons is really important--its hard to imagine that genie going back into the bottle.
Part of the strategic failure of the West is explained in this thread from a week ago: https://x.com/andrewmichta/status/1873186349840523702 Here's the key point (but every part of the thread is important): "The problem of Russia we confront today-what I called elsewhere the "Russian question"-is both historical and systemic. Until Western leaders understand this, we have no realistic prospect of crafting a workable strategy to deal with Russia, either today or in the future."
I like Andrew and find he speaks a great deal of sense on the Russian threat.
A lot of people don't, especially "realists" who completely ignore the nature of Russian state.
A great thread - I follow him but Musk hid it :-(. Lord Salisbury said in 1885 ❝My idea of the manner of dealing with Russia is not to extract from her promises which she will not keep (cheers), but to say to her, "There is a point to which you shall not go (cheers), and if you go we will spare neither men nor money until you go back." (Loud cheers.)❞ So now we are at the point where "money and men" are needed. It is, in the end, so bloody obvious that I am confident that enough will be done.
I am not that confident. Russia is very good at information war.
Phil, there's a fog of war and there's a fog of politics. If Shakespeare is to be trusted, Henry V didn't know that he had won at Agincourt.
https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/command-and-consequences-ukraines
Phil, I'd like to have your analysis of this substack post. It identifies Ukrainian weaknesses that are quite profound. It is written from a pro Ukrainian perspective.
I went and asked Ukrainians I trust about the information of the Anne of Kyiv brigade--and they admit that its true. The response I get from the same Ukrainians about this kind of reporting is that it basically extrapolates from some bad units and generalizes to the whole Ukrainian army. The Ukrainians have shown that they have some very effective brigades--the issue therefore becomes how to replicate. Also, for an anonymous source to make these criticisms really lessens them. If someone wanted to stand up and say it publicly (as the leader of Azov did before) that could have much greater impact.
Me too. That post seems thoughtful, informed, and realistic.
It likely comes down to two issues: people and materiel.
The Russian / Soviet depots are near empty which helps explain Russian troops starting to attack Ukrainian positions with electric scooters, golf carts, and like civilian gear. They aren’t doing so hot on the artillery front either.
Russians do not enjoy air supremacy over the front line. Their Black Sea fleet has been largely decimated and only trots out occasionally to fire off a Kalibr or whatever as production allows. Russian bombers keep getting pulled back further and further from the front. Etc.
Meanwhile the Russian economy is still suffering from massive losses of people, a 21% central bank rate (!!!), and high inflation. The value of the ruble has started to drop but has a long way to go. The wheels are coming off the rail system (literally) as the state tries to economize and bodge whatever it can with chewing gum and tape.
Meanwhile, the civilian aviation situation has become so dire that the Russians are asking foreign airlines to do domestic service in Russia. Aka the sanctions can work, if exercised correctly.
Ditto dealing with Russian shadow fleets by simply impounding the vessels whenever they misbehave. A full tanker of oil will likely help pay for economic losses and the cable / comm link repairs. Similarly, the Swedes, Estonians, poles, etc could elect to declare their sea rights fully in the baltics and eliminate the thin sliver of international waters in the middle.
The Russians are grasping at straws via sabotage attempts that increasingly are inching the west towards all out war. But so far the west is unwilling to commit real quantities of troops, whether as mercenaries or as consultants to repair and maintain gear in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, inside Ukraine the lack of shells, materiel, transport, etc is going to severely hamper any hope of taking large swaths of territory any more quickly than the Russians are at present. They need a lot more tanks, APCs, artillery shells, rockets, SAM systems, etc.
Then there is the question of where to source the people necessary to get the job done. Never mind the command and control structure that doesn’t reflexively plug holes by mixing and matching units whenever there is a retreat and destroying any kind of cohesion in the process. They have yet to adopt post Soviet tactics on a wide scale and it shows. At the same time, they are suffering from a severe people shortage.
Anyhow, 2025 could have been the breakout year for Ukraine. But between Trump being elected, EU malaise, and a gradual grinding down of Ukraine (see public surveys re: territorial integrity) I’m a lot more pessimistic. It would likely require a Russian internal event like the oligarchs defenestrating Putin for positive change to come by.
And the only way to achieve that is more effective sanctions. Stopping rich Russians from partying in the west via Turkey, etc. Effective sanctions on more than just airliner parts. Etc. Don’t see that happening under the current leadership in the west.
The Russians do have an air firepower advantage to help their assaults--such as with glidebombs. Ukraine still cant compete with them from what I hear.
Lets hope 2025 goes the way it should for the courageous Ukrainians. Your insights are very much appreciated Phillips, and long may they continue. I have personally learned a great deal, from your articles and also from the many expert comments coming in. It is a fantastic place for learning and sharing thoughtful ideas and opinions. May there be better 2025 all round. Thanks to all.
It is a great community that has come together
Yes, please keep up your writing Phillips. I’m learning with you, and your well-informed followers as well.
Thank you for your analysis. Whatever you got wrong in 2024 pales next to what America got wrong in not supporting Ukraine fully and electing Donald Trump.
Im not sure that makes me feel much better Carol! ;)
"I would argue that you would have learned far more from my weekend updates on these issues that the mainstream media."
I fully agree
Agreed!
Thanks Troels
Good summary.
When Russia invaded, I was pessimistic, although not for the reasons most were. Having watched Syria for a long time, I believed Russia could be beaten militarily. I was worried that a Russian scorched earth strategy, of making Ukraine uninhabitable for civilians would lead to the withdrawal of western support and ultimately a collapse of the Ukrainian state.
I think I was seduced by the successes of the Ukrainian military - which were much greater than I'd expected, even though I believed Russia militarily beatable. But I think in the long run, my initial pessimism was justified: western leaderships seem incapable of thinking strategically, even if they're not actually corrupted or even co-opted by the pro-Russia oligarch-mafia class.
Assad's fall in Syria was both unexpected by anyone... but also not surprising for those who'd been paying attention. We knew that the Baathist state was completely hollowed out, incompetent and utterly despised, even by people not historically inclined to support the opposition. It had long been propped up by Russian and Iranian / Iraqi power.
When the HTS-led opposition began their offensive, the regime collapsed so quickly that neither Assad's allies, nor his supposed opponents (the US / the west / the Gulf states) were able to act quickly enough to 'stablise' or 'manage escalation' in Syria.
Ukraine can absolutely beat Russia with support... But there is a lot of de-facto political support for a Russian status-quo throughout the west. I really hope those countries who understand the danger are willing to act and can hopefully drag enough other European 'allies' along with them.
Jonathan, I think what this showed was the global nature of the conflict as well as the quiet work of “belligerents” we have not been paying attention to (Turkey in this case). It has also exposed the inherent weakness of Iran politically, militarily, and economically. They cannot even keep the lights on or homes heated complements of the Israeli Air Force taking out two major pipelines that has shut in Iranian gas production that would otherwise be used domestically. But also we are seeing how weak Russia is “depending” on North Korean arms and now men/cannon fodder which have all been built with Russian and Chinese support and will only drain those economies more as North Korea looks to replace weapons stores. Oh, and China’s economy is in slowdown mode with illiquid state run banks and their ability to remain a stroking economic force waning. It says something when investment analysts and economists are threatened by Xi to lose their jobs or worse if they say anything bad about the economy. While the war is not over, Phillips’ lesson in HTWWW comes to the fore yet again with the economic weakness of Russia, China, and their allies such as NK, Iran.
Sadly you are right about the support for the Russia status quo. Its there and strong and very well might win out in the end.
No chance. None whatsoever.
The "Russia status quo" is fundamentally unsustainable and will self-destruct no matter what, and is already self-destructing, and will collapse before the end of the year, *even* in a worst-plausible-case scenario where the West bizarrely removes all sanctions on Russia. *Russia has very little left to export* and has become *entirely* import dependent.
With massive and increasing worker shortages leading to an inability to produce anything new (and in fact reduction of productive capacity), Russia cannot get out of the economic hole even if sanctions are removed. The only way out of the economic collapse is to end the war, stop attacking, which Putin will refuse to do. (Ending the war would restore lots of workers to the domestic industries, convince people who fled to come back to Russia, and stop literally burning up resources. But Putin won't do it.)
Since Ukraine will not roll over and surrender everything, and since Russia cannot advance in any reasonable fashion, Russia has two theoretical options:
(a) run out of men and materiel and face total frontline collapse with domestic hyperinflation -- the Russian government would be overthrown soon after
(b) stop attacking and retrench to an older defensive line. Which might work, but Putin will simply refuse to do it. It might happen if Putin is overthrown earlier.
Neither of these are the status quo. Both involve the removal of Putin.
That's it. The actions of the West affect only the timeline. Putin's out and it's just a matter of time before he's out. Therefore the status quo is non-viable.
There are a lot of options for what happens after Putin is out, but the status quo has zero chance no matter how many idiot governments back it.
Now that he's no longer Lithuania's foreign minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis has his own Substack-like newsletter at landsbergis.ghost.io, which he started on Dec. 12, 2024 ("Despite being warned many times, we weren't ready for Russia's attacks, and we're still not pushing back against nuclear bullying. We are as unprepared now as we were forty years ago when this British sitcom predicted everything. There are two things we can do to defeat Russia's nuclear blackmail without depending on China for help." https://bsky.app/profile/glandsbergis.bsky.social/post/3leyd4st44k2r). In today's post he writes something interesting about China:
"What is even more concerning to me now are the announcements that Chinese involvement has been instrumental in persuading Russia to stop considering the nuclear option. Just imagine what sort of leverage this gives China. Now China and not the US (or EU for that matter) is the security guarantor of the European continent. Let that sink in.
On one hand, it is easy to understand the sentiment which says that China has to be involved in the peace process in Ukraine. Clearly, if we are unable to deter Russian nuclear escalation and only China can do that, people start considering that maybe China should be invited to become the security guarantor for Ukraine.
On the other hand, and there is always another hand, just imagine the price tag on such a request. One does not need to look far, just take the latest EU vote on tariffs for Chinese electric vehicles. It wasn't an easy task to get the required majority of countries in the EU to support the Commission's proposal. Afterwards, China threatened to treat the countries that voted in favour differently when it comes to trade deals, so it will be even more difficult to find a majority the next time around. Now you see what will happen to EU sovereignty if we outsource the security of our continent to China."
https://landsbergis.ghost.io/what-can-you-do-with-a-nuclear-bully/
Thanks for that--he was a very effective FS.
That’s the most depressing thing I’ve read this week. But I thank you for bringing this to my attention.
On the political front I recently read Endgame by J Dimbleby and although the description of the big three leaders discussions on the future of Europe post WW2 are not very detailed I was struck by the similarities with today on Ukraine and Russia of Roosevelts and Churchills positions on Stalin and the USSRs positions on the Baltics and Poland during 1944 as the Red Army advanced towards Germany. R and C simply accepted without even attempting to persuade S that the presence of USSR armies in those areas meant they must be left to the tender mercies of Stalin. Not only that but in relation to Poland both R and C treated the London based Polish in exile abysmally and as their contemporaries later commented shamefully simply because they did not want to confront USSR. These decisions consigned the Baltic States and Poland to nearly half a century of misery under the rule of USSR. For US and European leaders to make this same mistake but with a situation where Russia is nowhere near as well placed militarily on the battlefield would be unforgivable and yet it seems to be a real prospect if not a policy of several so called leaders.
Dimbleby's analysis of victory and defeat in WWII is childish.
I'd say the difference this time is that Ukraine would be a complete nightmare for Russia to subjugate.
Putin has made a horrible mistake. Maybe he can make this "work" for the duration of his rule. maybe not.
Russia flat out lacks the capacity to subjugate Ukraine. Putin's actually losing the capacity to subjugate the Russian Federation (the signs are visible if you look).
The arms race in drone technology seems critically important to me for offsetting Ukraine’s manpower disadvantage. New fiber-optically controlled and AI guided drones have the potential to make irrelevant the Russian advantage in EW. Am I wrong to think this is more important than ranged warfare going forward?
Hi Jim, Im trying to find out more about the fibre optic UAVs. It would seem to me that they would have serious limitations too (tethered to a cable, unable to operate in groups without the possibility of getting scrambled). Yet you hear stories that they are effective.
Ukraine's consistently been ahead on the OODA loop, which I do believe is the critical factor.
I can already see the NYTs headline: 'Phillips OBrien Admits He was Wrong on Ukraine'...
I laughed at that one!
Prof, I do not think your political analyses were way off the mark. While perhaps we missed the actual scale and duration of the actions (if one can put inaction on a scale) and Trump's influence, we were entitled to hope it was all better than it seemed. Many of your thoughts you indicated as "hope".
Thanks G--but if Im letting hope cloud my judgement, thats not good either!
Thank you for great analysis and comments. I agree with your perspective, but it seems to me that you are missing one Russian succes. In the strategic air campaign they are succeeding in degrading Ukrainian infrastructure. This might not win them the war, but is making Ukraine weaker/poorer. So they are managing to degrade future Ukrainian productivity.
Very true. Let's hope that as more of the promised air defence systems arrive in 2025 things look up for Ukraine. It's worth remembering that these complex weapons cannot be bought off the shelf. It's taken a couple of years to manufacture some of them. Meanwhile, Ukraine has just started mass-producing long-range cruise missiles and missiles. Russia may soon pay as heavy a price. Its air defences are already stretched so thin it is reported they're buying missile launchers from Iran.
Ive written about that. Its actually very much in the balance. Ukraine seems to have prepared pretty well for this winter--and the power cuts are much less than feared. Of course one, big successful Russian raid could change that.
Thank you for this, Phillips. Year end summaries are usually a waste of time, but this one is not, because it sets the stage for going forward... except for Washington policy decisions, of course.
Anyone who thinks he knows what Trump will do is guessing, because Trump himself is a completely wild card.
Would like to believe that--however when it comes to Putin, Trump has not been a wildcard. Sadly, hes been regularly positive and supportive.
‘So overall, I think I had a far better idea than most about how the war was developing…definitely, however even without your review we got it
Assolutamente! Avanti, Phillips! 🌈🇺🇦
Thanks Paolo!