HI All--well that has been two hours. Thanks so much for all the questions--I think I got to every one. And apologies for the typos in the responses--I was trying to write as much as possible! We will do this again sometime. CHeers, Phil
Hi Everyone, a number of people started sending in questions right away. If you see a question that you want answered, why don't you like/heart it. What I will do is start with the questions with the most likes/hearts.
If the West (mostly USA and Germany) never give Ukraine the long range weaponry and/or permission to strike into Russia, do you think Ukraine could ever scale up it's long range drone and missile programme to the level required to win this war?
Great question, and Ive been talking this over with some Ukrainians in their own think tanks. The problem the Ukrainians face is that they can manufacture large numbers of their types of UAVs (such as the ones that attacked Toropets--jet powered ones like V-1s from WWII). However what they lack are the very accurate and heavy penetrating weapons like ATACMS, JASSM, Taurus, etc. They need these US-German systems to work hand in hand with their own to be devastating
For instance--if there was a really valuable target with a great deal of Russian air defense--they could use the US systems to take try and neutralize the air defense, which would then allow the Ukrainian systems to swarm the target. Thats why US systems are so important to them
With leaders like Orbán in Hungary, Fico in Slovakia, now Kickl in Austria, and possibly Babiš in the Czech Republic within a year, how should we approach the apparent lack of political will to defend our countries? It seems that retreat is preferred over resistance. How can we counter this trend of leaders prioritizing self-interest and accommodation over a united defense?
Its appalling. If Czech goes populist pro-Russian than will be a disaster in particular. Right now neither Hungary, Slovakia or Austria is really helping Ukraine, so they would not make a difference. If Czech goes, its a blow. Of course the big pro-Putin populist is Trump. If he wins, it changes everything
You have repeatedly stressed that the setbacks in the Donbass should not be considered “strategic” and I understand your argument about the, so far, relatively small loss of land.
My concern is the continued mauling of already tired and battered troops whose moral at least for some, seems to be waning. This is especially concerning because we are not reading much these days about successful recruitment and training of fresh troops.
Much having been written about the demographic advantage of the Russians and their ability to mobilize and deploy seemingly endless amounts of cannon fodder wouldn’t you consider the degrading of Ukrainian quality troops able to oppose these hordes as strategic ?
Ukrainian troops are absolutely tired--I get that. And actually trading territory to inflict greater losses on the RUssians in equipment (while preserving Ukrainian lives) is a deal they must make at present. The issue isnt demographics--its whether we want Ukraine to win or not. If we do, we can arm them to win the war, as the Russian military is still deeply flawed. But we need to arm them in such a way that they have an alternative to a ground-slugfest in the Donbas. Thats why I ve called for the range attacks to try and collapse the Russian army from behind (which is how the Germans and Japanese were beaten in WWII).
Hi Phillips. I’ve seen graphs of the daily Russian casuality figures as reported by the Ukranians showing continuous accelerating attrition on the Russian side. With the time taken for a the next 100k casualties down to < 4 months by Q2 24. We are also seeing improved Ukrainian capabilities on every technological front, add improving ranged capabilities to this and is there a chance we could see a larger collapse on the Russian side sometime soon? I could easily imagine the truth of the situation on the frontlines not being communicated truthfully to Putin and his cabal or Putin refusing to accept the truthful reports - leading to the Russian forces continuing to try to seize territory until they reach a complete breaking point. Or is this just wishful thinking? Or are Ukrainian casualties possibly a mirror of the Russian ones and also increasing exponentially but with a different scale 3:1, 4:1?
Ukrainian casualties are very high--though not comparable to Russian. I also believe that the Russian rate of casualties (and equipment losses) would not be sustainable if Ukraine were armed to fight the war as they would like to fight it. The problems the Ukrainians face is that they are being compelled to fight a war that they know is difficult.
Also, I agree with you that Putin is probably not being told the truth--though if he were, I dont think he would change that much (proviso--Im not a Putin expert)
Are the analysts assessing China realistically now? Corruption has historically been even worse in China than in Russia. PLA is, if anything, even more politicized than the Russian armed forces (I've heard somewhere that a quarter of troops training time is devoted to studying The Thought of Xi Jinping). Unlike Russian equipment, Chinese equipment has never been tested in actual combat, and literally nobody in the PLA has any combat experience. In addition to all that, China has been a land power for several millennia but has virtually no naval experience (but then neither did Japan before annihilating the Russian navy in 1904-1905). So is there a risk that the analysts look only at troops and equipment numbers and industrial capacity and may end up influencing the Western policy to be more cautious than warranted?
This is a great question Andrew. I think they are doing better (and actually we look into this question a little as part of the Russia-Ukraine military assessment project. I would say that there were a number of mistakes being made about a war with China before Feb 2022--particularly the short-war idea (it would be decided either way relatively quickly, such as with a CHinese amphibious invasion attempt of Taiwan). There is alot more discussion now of a long-messy war, which poses a huge amount of different challenges. So I think the scenarios are broadening in a more realistic way.
If Trump wins in November or Harris chooses a less active support posture, how far do you think Europe (EU or individual countries) will go in supporting Ukraine? Do you think they will continue or increase their level of weapons deliveries? And money, of course.
This will lead to a crisis that could split Europe in two (or three). There could be one faction--led by Germany--that would want to force a deal on Ukraine almost at any cost. There would be another faction--the Baltics, Finland, Poland, that might believe that if the US is leaving Europe, than they must help Ukraine to win asap. And there will be a number of states in the middle. So the US cutting the cord if Trump wins could lead to massive EUropean splits.
I dont think Harris would downsize aid. At worst, she would do what Biden is doing.
I've been wondering about Poland's military strength but didn't know anything about its true capabilities. Nor did I know about the military strength of the Nordic countries. Thank you for this. It's very interesting, indeed.
Yep, being a Canadian, we are keeping a close eye on things. If project 25 is ever implemented, I think it leads to an eventual civil war or a military coup. And if those happen, things will spill over into Canada.
It isn't. Just have to keep encouraging our cousins south of the border to vote for Harris. I have been saying on here and occassionaly in your articles that I think the polls are off and that Kamala will win in a landslide. Either or, so long as she wins and trumps starts his journey to spend the rest of his life in federal or state prison.
Don't you think this crisis is coming anyway? The US appears to be headed for the "Force a Settlement" option either directly or via default by not allowing Ukraine to fight from a winning position. Keeping Ukraine fighting a slowly losing war is one way to force a capitulation (since the US doesn't view this as a fight to the death for Ukraine).
The question becomes will the Baltics, Finland and Poland find a way to get usable long-range weapons to Ukraine despite US opposition if thing get dire enough?
If the US stays in NATO, then those NATO states who want to aid Ukraine will be restrained from going too far down that road. They wont want to do anything to make the US worry about their loyalty
I guess, FWIW, my thought was that if/as the situation turned critical for Ukraine, then those States might feel increasingly threatened themselves and would, hence, be pushed to more aggressive action. Thoughts?
Except if they felt it would weaken US commitment to NATO. Above all--they want the US in NATO--which is why they are not helping Ukraine as much as they would like now
If the U.S. pulls support I'd expect all European states to follow Germany and head for the exits. The "exits" being a loss of confidence in collective security and a pursuit of narrow self-interest. Even Poland and the Baltics will recalculate. Accommodation of Russia will be back in vogue. Perhaps countries will increase their defense budgets with the hopes that they will outrun the bear and the bear will eye a slower target.
In short, I see complete disaster.
I am angry at France's paltry contribution to defending Ukraine's democratic future.
I rag on Biden. But half of Europe has been worse, and this is their immediate concern.
Have you heard anything about Ukraine's Special Forces that might be of interest? I've wondered, why they haven't attempted to take out russian leadership. I've read that they are in Africa, why aren't they in Moscow?
I know this is a somewhat barbaric statement, but putting putin down, might create enough chaos to end this war and save more lives, both russian and Ukrainian, in the long run.
The Ukrainians have a number of different special force units--but that would be quite an operation. I dont doubt that they would consider it if they thought it would be realistic, but as of now they probably think Putin is too well protected and difficult to locate
I was thinkimg, if gov and military leaders started belng targetted in moscow it would lead to fear, destabilzation, with everyone busy looking over their shoulders.
Have there been any effects from the dissolution of the Wagner Group on Russia's military strength? It has been puzzling to me how the aftermath to that incident would unfold and how it happened in the first place. Hearing of a march on Moskow was almost too much to fathom.
I think Wagner was one of their best units in 2023. The loss of Wagner has accelerated their transition to this short and brutal way of fighting (high losses for small gains, repeated over and over). Of course, even with Wagner they would probably have had to head down this road.
I am very interested in your assessment that slow escalation encourages a Russian nuclear response rather than a shock and awe attack. Why do you think panic doesn't encourage extreme behavior?
Hi Louis, I think the decision to use nukes is not some end point of a weapons escalation. It will be a decision a leader makes because he/she believes they will gain something from it. So the longer a war goes on, the more opportunities a leader will have to believe that.
The tactical value of a nuc is limited to the number of combatants, so unless a city is destroyed it appears to be an escalation threat. In your gaming, is there a city attack first, or a demonstration battlefield attack? What would China think of this?
I dont know--Ive never thought the Russians could actually target anything to have a significant impact, which is one of the reasons Ive never thought they would use nukes
With the Russian army being exhausted, lacking any great initiative, and only able to make very costly micro-advances, what is Russia's strategy if Harris wins the election?
I think Russia believes that Ukraine will be forced into a cease fire at some point, and Russia will be able to keep all the land its seized--my guess is that they feel the Biden administration would be ok with this, and thinks Harris will be too. I hope they are wrong with Harris.
Despite your focus in prior publications, I do not see you frequently discuss emerging evidence that the Russian economy is in crisis. Prune60 and others are doing great work on Twitter tracking National Welfare Fund, interest rates, bond sales, banking reserves, etc. Increasingly it appears Russia cannot fund this war for another 18 months (and deadline might come sooner). What are you seeing / hearing? How could this situation develop, assuming roughly status quo in front lines (ie no exploited breakthroughs)?
I look for actual data--the problem is that when it comes to military production its very hard to come by. The Russian economy is under strain, but it also can generate capital from selling natural resources. What I would like to see are the actual production figures for military equipment. If we can see that and compare them to Russian losses--we will have a good idea of how long they can fight
The outcome of the Ukraine war will clearly influence whether/how/if China attacks Taiwan. What is the root cause of the insufficient Western response?
I think the Biden administration had a certain mindset which had two main drivers against pushing Russia too much. one was the worry about escalation to nuclear weapons, and the second was a fear of a Russian governmental collapse. Its led them to this policy of providing alot of limited aid to Ukraine--the insufficient response as you call it.
Ukraine is often maligned for having not prepared adequate defensive fortifications. Has this been the greatest failure of Ukraine’s armed forces, or would an extensive defensive system have been impractical and ineffective? Thanks for the updates, they’re brilliantly informed and accurate.
Its been a real shortcoming. They have not build fortifications in the Donbas in the ways that the Russians did in 2023. Im not sure why--it will take an enquiry.
HI All--well that has been two hours. Thanks so much for all the questions--I think I got to every one. And apologies for the typos in the responses--I was trying to write as much as possible! We will do this again sometime. CHeers, Phil
Thanks so much for doing this! Much appreciated.
Hi Everyone, a number of people started sending in questions right away. If you see a question that you want answered, why don't you like/heart it. What I will do is start with the questions with the most likes/hearts.
If the West (mostly USA and Germany) never give Ukraine the long range weaponry and/or permission to strike into Russia, do you think Ukraine could ever scale up it's long range drone and missile programme to the level required to win this war?
Great question, and Ive been talking this over with some Ukrainians in their own think tanks. The problem the Ukrainians face is that they can manufacture large numbers of their types of UAVs (such as the ones that attacked Toropets--jet powered ones like V-1s from WWII). However what they lack are the very accurate and heavy penetrating weapons like ATACMS, JASSM, Taurus, etc. They need these US-German systems to work hand in hand with their own to be devastating
For instance--if there was a really valuable target with a great deal of Russian air defense--they could use the US systems to take try and neutralize the air defense, which would then allow the Ukrainian systems to swarm the target. Thats why US systems are so important to them
With leaders like Orbán in Hungary, Fico in Slovakia, now Kickl in Austria, and possibly Babiš in the Czech Republic within a year, how should we approach the apparent lack of political will to defend our countries? It seems that retreat is preferred over resistance. How can we counter this trend of leaders prioritizing self-interest and accommodation over a united defense?
Its appalling. If Czech goes populist pro-Russian than will be a disaster in particular. Right now neither Hungary, Slovakia or Austria is really helping Ukraine, so they would not make a difference. If Czech goes, its a blow. Of course the big pro-Putin populist is Trump. If he wins, it changes everything
The Austro-Hungarian empire is reconstituting.
Not a comforting thought
You have repeatedly stressed that the setbacks in the Donbass should not be considered “strategic” and I understand your argument about the, so far, relatively small loss of land.
My concern is the continued mauling of already tired and battered troops whose moral at least for some, seems to be waning. This is especially concerning because we are not reading much these days about successful recruitment and training of fresh troops.
Much having been written about the demographic advantage of the Russians and their ability to mobilize and deploy seemingly endless amounts of cannon fodder wouldn’t you consider the degrading of Ukrainian quality troops able to oppose these hordes as strategic ?
Ukrainian troops are absolutely tired--I get that. And actually trading territory to inflict greater losses on the RUssians in equipment (while preserving Ukrainian lives) is a deal they must make at present. The issue isnt demographics--its whether we want Ukraine to win or not. If we do, we can arm them to win the war, as the Russian military is still deeply flawed. But we need to arm them in such a way that they have an alternative to a ground-slugfest in the Donbas. Thats why I ve called for the range attacks to try and collapse the Russian army from behind (which is how the Germans and Japanese were beaten in WWII).
and do you think s.o. will listen to you.
They havent yet
Hi All--Just logged in, thanks for all the questions--will start with tne most liked and work down!
Hi Phillips. I’ve seen graphs of the daily Russian casuality figures as reported by the Ukranians showing continuous accelerating attrition on the Russian side. With the time taken for a the next 100k casualties down to < 4 months by Q2 24. We are also seeing improved Ukrainian capabilities on every technological front, add improving ranged capabilities to this and is there a chance we could see a larger collapse on the Russian side sometime soon? I could easily imagine the truth of the situation on the frontlines not being communicated truthfully to Putin and his cabal or Putin refusing to accept the truthful reports - leading to the Russian forces continuing to try to seize territory until they reach a complete breaking point. Or is this just wishful thinking? Or are Ukrainian casualties possibly a mirror of the Russian ones and also increasing exponentially but with a different scale 3:1, 4:1?
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GTB3PskWkAANK4w.png
Ukrainian casualties are very high--though not comparable to Russian. I also believe that the Russian rate of casualties (and equipment losses) would not be sustainable if Ukraine were armed to fight the war as they would like to fight it. The problems the Ukrainians face is that they are being compelled to fight a war that they know is difficult.
Also, I agree with you that Putin is probably not being told the truth--though if he were, I dont think he would change that much (proviso--Im not a Putin expert)
Are the analysts assessing China realistically now? Corruption has historically been even worse in China than in Russia. PLA is, if anything, even more politicized than the Russian armed forces (I've heard somewhere that a quarter of troops training time is devoted to studying The Thought of Xi Jinping). Unlike Russian equipment, Chinese equipment has never been tested in actual combat, and literally nobody in the PLA has any combat experience. In addition to all that, China has been a land power for several millennia but has virtually no naval experience (but then neither did Japan before annihilating the Russian navy in 1904-1905). So is there a risk that the analysts look only at troops and equipment numbers and industrial capacity and may end up influencing the Western policy to be more cautious than warranted?
This is a great question Andrew. I think they are doing better (and actually we look into this question a little as part of the Russia-Ukraine military assessment project. I would say that there were a number of mistakes being made about a war with China before Feb 2022--particularly the short-war idea (it would be decided either way relatively quickly, such as with a CHinese amphibious invasion attempt of Taiwan). There is alot more discussion now of a long-messy war, which poses a huge amount of different challenges. So I think the scenarios are broadening in a more realistic way.
If Trump wins in November or Harris chooses a less active support posture, how far do you think Europe (EU or individual countries) will go in supporting Ukraine? Do you think they will continue or increase their level of weapons deliveries? And money, of course.
This will lead to a crisis that could split Europe in two (or three). There could be one faction--led by Germany--that would want to force a deal on Ukraine almost at any cost. There would be another faction--the Baltics, Finland, Poland, that might believe that if the US is leaving Europe, than they must help Ukraine to win asap. And there will be a number of states in the middle. So the US cutting the cord if Trump wins could lead to massive EUropean splits.
I dont think Harris would downsize aid. At worst, she would do what Biden is doing.
Poland could defeat Russia quite easily now. But, would it. The Nordic armies as well. But would they.
that is indeed the question. They wont do anything while the US is leading NATO--but if the US pulls out, who knows
I've been wondering about Poland's military strength but didn't know anything about its true capabilities. Nor did I know about the military strength of the Nordic countries. Thank you for this. It's very interesting, indeed.
There is no corner of the world that will not suffer if Trump is elected....
and America would suffer as well
Yep, being a Canadian, we are keeping a close eye on things. If project 25 is ever implemented, I think it leads to an eventual civil war or a military coup. And if those happen, things will spill over into Canada.
Not a pleasant thought
It isn't. Just have to keep encouraging our cousins south of the border to vote for Harris. I have been saying on here and occassionaly in your articles that I think the polls are off and that Kamala will win in a landslide. Either or, so long as she wins and trumps starts his journey to spend the rest of his life in federal or state prison.
Don't you think this crisis is coming anyway? The US appears to be headed for the "Force a Settlement" option either directly or via default by not allowing Ukraine to fight from a winning position. Keeping Ukraine fighting a slowly losing war is one way to force a capitulation (since the US doesn't view this as a fight to the death for Ukraine).
The question becomes will the Baltics, Finland and Poland find a way to get usable long-range weapons to Ukraine despite US opposition if thing get dire enough?
If the US stays in NATO, then those NATO states who want to aid Ukraine will be restrained from going too far down that road. They wont want to do anything to make the US worry about their loyalty
I guess, FWIW, my thought was that if/as the situation turned critical for Ukraine, then those States might feel increasingly threatened themselves and would, hence, be pushed to more aggressive action. Thoughts?
Except if they felt it would weaken US commitment to NATO. Above all--they want the US in NATO--which is why they are not helping Ukraine as much as they would like now
If the U.S. pulls support I'd expect all European states to follow Germany and head for the exits. The "exits" being a loss of confidence in collective security and a pursuit of narrow self-interest. Even Poland and the Baltics will recalculate. Accommodation of Russia will be back in vogue. Perhaps countries will increase their defense budgets with the hopes that they will outrun the bear and the bear will eye a slower target.
In short, I see complete disaster.
I am angry at France's paltry contribution to defending Ukraine's democratic future.
I rag on Biden. But half of Europe has been worse, and this is their immediate concern.
I know Ukrainians will never give up.
Harris has to change the trajectory.
Have you heard anything about Ukraine's Special Forces that might be of interest? I've wondered, why they haven't attempted to take out russian leadership. I've read that they are in Africa, why aren't they in Moscow?
I know this is a somewhat barbaric statement, but putting putin down, might create enough chaos to end this war and save more lives, both russian and Ukrainian, in the long run.
The Ukrainians have a number of different special force units--but that would be quite an operation. I dont doubt that they would consider it if they thought it would be realistic, but as of now they probably think Putin is too well protected and difficult to locate
Would you say this also applies to the rest of the government and military leadership?
Not sure that they would care about anyone other than Putin enough. Alot of these people are not very competent.
I was thinkimg, if gov and military leaders started belng targetted in moscow it would lead to fear, destabilzation, with everyone busy looking over their shoulders.
Have there been any effects from the dissolution of the Wagner Group on Russia's military strength? It has been puzzling to me how the aftermath to that incident would unfold and how it happened in the first place. Hearing of a march on Moskow was almost too much to fathom.
I think Wagner was one of their best units in 2023. The loss of Wagner has accelerated their transition to this short and brutal way of fighting (high losses for small gains, repeated over and over). Of course, even with Wagner they would probably have had to head down this road.
I am very interested in your assessment that slow escalation encourages a Russian nuclear response rather than a shock and awe attack. Why do you think panic doesn't encourage extreme behavior?
Hi Louis, I think the decision to use nukes is not some end point of a weapons escalation. It will be a decision a leader makes because he/she believes they will gain something from it. So the longer a war goes on, the more opportunities a leader will have to believe that.
The tactical value of a nuc is limited to the number of combatants, so unless a city is destroyed it appears to be an escalation threat. In your gaming, is there a city attack first, or a demonstration battlefield attack? What would China think of this?
I dont know--Ive never thought the Russians could actually target anything to have a significant impact, which is one of the reasons Ive never thought they would use nukes
With the Russian army being exhausted, lacking any great initiative, and only able to make very costly micro-advances, what is Russia's strategy if Harris wins the election?
I think Russia believes that Ukraine will be forced into a cease fire at some point, and Russia will be able to keep all the land its seized--my guess is that they feel the Biden administration would be ok with this, and thinks Harris will be too. I hope they are wrong with Harris.
Despite your focus in prior publications, I do not see you frequently discuss emerging evidence that the Russian economy is in crisis. Prune60 and others are doing great work on Twitter tracking National Welfare Fund, interest rates, bond sales, banking reserves, etc. Increasingly it appears Russia cannot fund this war for another 18 months (and deadline might come sooner). What are you seeing / hearing? How could this situation develop, assuming roughly status quo in front lines (ie no exploited breakthroughs)?
I look for actual data--the problem is that when it comes to military production its very hard to come by. The Russian economy is under strain, but it also can generate capital from selling natural resources. What I would like to see are the actual production figures for military equipment. If we can see that and compare them to Russian losses--we will have a good idea of how long they can fight
The outcome of the Ukraine war will clearly influence whether/how/if China attacks Taiwan. What is the root cause of the insufficient Western response?
I think the Biden administration had a certain mindset which had two main drivers against pushing Russia too much. one was the worry about escalation to nuclear weapons, and the second was a fear of a Russian governmental collapse. Its led them to this policy of providing alot of limited aid to Ukraine--the insufficient response as you call it.
and your reply to those 2 positions by Biden?
He's wrong. RUssia wont use nukes because of China and Putin's government falling is not a bad thing
Ukraine is often maligned for having not prepared adequate defensive fortifications. Has this been the greatest failure of Ukraine’s armed forces, or would an extensive defensive system have been impractical and ineffective? Thanks for the updates, they’re brilliantly informed and accurate.
Its been a real shortcoming. They have not build fortifications in the Donbas in the ways that the Russians did in 2023. Im not sure why--it will take an enquiry.