Looking Back in 2023 and Forward to 2024

What I got wrong and right, and what might happen in the coming year.

Hi All,

I’ve noticed that lots of people do a year end wrap up and write some ideas about how the coming year might develop, so I thought I would do the same for 2023 and 2024. Its always interesting to “mark your own work” as the phrase goes and making any kinds of predictions is normally fraught with peril. That being said Looking back on what I wrote over the course of the year, certain things become clear—and looking forward its worth making a few predictions (though so much hinges on what the US does in the coming weeks that they could quickly become out of date).

1. I was right on the importance of range, but wrong that Ukraine would be supplied accordingly.

Almost exactly a year ago, I published my first Atlantic piece of 2023, looking forward to the war this past year. I was strongly of the belief that Ukraine was in the better position for some success—if it were then properly armed with range and more modern systems. The article was entitled:

Time Is on Ukraine’s Side, Not Russia’: The Ukrainians will win if they keep getting better weapons.¹

Note—I dont write the headlines!

This one piece summarized both the strengths and failures. I was convinced in it that Ukraine could drive Russian forces out of occupied Ukraine if it received ranged weapons in large number (such as ATACMS) but I was wrong in thinking that the Biden Administration would make what seemed to be the smart choice to do so, Maybe the key part of the article was this paragraph:

This kind of pressure should hopefully persuade the Biden administration to let Ukraine have the final pieces of military technology that it needs to force the Russians out. These include advanced vehicles to provide increased mobility as well as the kinds of long-range artillery systems that will allow it to hit Russian forces anywhere in occupied Ukraine. This might eventually include ATACMS guided missiles, which extend the effective range of HIMARS equipment and would allow Ukraine to sever supply chains through large parts of Russian-occupied territory.

I was obviously being too hopeful in thinking that the Biden Administration would do the right thing to help Ukraine—but I was clear that Ukraine would need the ranged weapons to hit “anywhere in occupied Ukraine” if they were going to have the best chance to win in 2023.

By the end of March 2023, my optimism was seriously waning. I had thought by that point the US and others would start delivering or at least promising the ranged capabilities Ukraine needed. Unfortunately there was no sign of this—instead the aid that was being given to prepare Ukraine for the counteroffensive was all for direct assaults on Russian prepared defensive lines—the single most difficult task Ukraine could be asked to do. I was so frustrated that I published another Atlantic piece to plead publicly for Ukraine to be given the ranged systems it would need. This one was entitled:

The West Must Give Ukraine the Weapons It Needs to Win: Wars are won or lost well behind the front lines. Allies should arm Ukrainians accordingly.²

It started by pointing out that Ukraine was being prepared in the wrong manner entirely, for direct frontal assaults without the ability to attack behind the lines.

In light of such dynamics, the manner in which the West is supporting Ukraine’s war effort is deeply frustrating. Though NATO countries have a variety of systems that can target Russian forces deep behind their lines, recent aid has been overwhelmingly geared toward preparing Ukraine to make direct assaults against the Russian army. The most widely discussed forms of equipment—such as Leopard 2 tanks, Bradley armored personnel carriers, and even Archer long-range artillery—are not the kinds of systems that can disrupt or degrade Russian forces far behind the front lines.

In short, Ukraine is being made to fight the war the hard way, not the smart way.

What seemed to me wrong was that the fears of escalation were driving Ukraine’s supporters to make a very stupid choice. As the article concluded:

Unfortunately, NATO states, including the U.S., have been reluctant to provide the Ukrainians with missile systems with too long of a range, seemingly for fear of escalating tensions with Russia. Instead of allowing the Ukrainians to degrade Russian forces far from the front line, Ukraine is being prepared to attack that line.

By the end of May 2023, this worry had blown up into complete exasperation and borderline derision (and borderline might be too kind). Hearing the endless and frankly duplicitous arguments being put forward by the administration justifying its continuing refusal to supply F-16s to Ukraine, which could have also helped increase Ukrainian ranged power, I wrote an Atlantic piece (co-authored with Edward Stringer) that was particularly bitter. This was entitled:

America’s Unconvincing Reasons for Denying F-16s to Ukraine: Before giving Kyiv the weapons that it needs, the U.S. always works through a list of excuses

It attacked the whole escalation fear that was controlling what Ukraine was given. The start of the article was particularly bitter.

Before each decision to arm Ukraine with a new category of powerful arms, NATO partners progress through three stages of denial. First comes an outright dismissal of the country’s ability to effectively deploy the weapons in question against Russian invaders. Ukraine could never use these—the argument has been applied to multiple rocket-launch systems, anti-aircraft systems, and sophisticated tanks—because they are just too complex. Next comes a qualified dismissal. Ukrainian forces might be able to use these systems, but equipping and training them would take far too long. Then comes a desperate third stage. Yes, Ukraine can use these weapons, which could make a big difference in the war, but we worry about how Russia or China might respond. This view, though not always publicly voiced, almost certainly is the real reason the United States and other Western powers are holding back some arms.

It just seemed so self-destructive that Washington would allow fears of escalation to deprive Ukraine of the weapons it needed to win the war. The time wasted was all so pointless. As the article concluded:

In the end, providing Ukraine with F-16s as soon as possible would make a major difference in Ukraine’s ability to both wage defensive war and go on the offensive to reclaim its territory. It would allow Ukrainians, finally, to conduct ground operations in a comprehensive manner and to defend their cities and power-generation systems. It would help them win this war as quickly as possible with the fewest losses.