Thanks both for another insightful and (cautiously) encouraging report from the ground up about what is really going on and what it might signify for the longer term Ukrainian objectives. How unlike the pontificating pundits of most of the MSM. The successful attack on the Russian military radar installation is, I agree, important in its own right as a legitimate target inside Russia and (perhaps more important given Biden's recent reverse ferret on policy) a strong signal to the US that UKR can and will make these attacks and if the US wants to have influence (and it does) then the way to do that is to change its policy about using US weaponry for legitimate attacks into Russia. That makes sense and it seems to have worked. Now the task is to convince the Americans not to be overly restrictive in what type of weaponry UKR can utilise. It has to include long range ATACMS to achieve what is needed. .
I could not understand the West’s over-reaction about Ukraine’s drone attack on Russia’s radar station in Orsk. It is a legitimate military tracking target which detects conventional and nuclear missiles. Why wouldn’t Ukraine want to attack it? Western media went apoplectic, especially Shashank Joshi on X. Another escalation myth destroyed.
I amend my previous comments. On further review, neither the Armavir antennas nor the Orsk antennas were well-positioned to detect a fighter jet over Ukraine, let alone an ATACMS or a drone coming from Ukraine. (Indeed, they cover Central Asia and the Middle East, the least-likely directions from which a strategic nuclear attack might be expected in Russia, somewhat mitigating escalation risk.) I now agree with Mykola that these strikes were primarily about resetting political conditions in Washington, I think with the F-16s foremost in mind.
As a practical matter, to achieve effective SEAD over Ukrainian territorial airspace, occupied or not, requires freedom of action against those SAM sites parked in open fields a few meters on the wrong side of the international boundary. (They actually need freedom to fight many kilometers inside Russia, but baby steps.) Block 1 ATACMS were specifically designed to destroy targets that put NATO air dominance at risk, among other uses. I now assess that Armavir and Orsk were political preparation of the battlefield.
Thanks to both of you for this clear, apparently unvarnished review and preview of the war at this point. I'm wondering if in the next podcast you both could speculate about how the F-16s might affect the war effort, and when. Also, perhaps some speculation as to what it might take for UKR to be able to launch another offensive, and when that might occur at the earliest. It was a bit depressing to hear that this might not ever be possible. Finally, the electronic warfare situation on both sides. What have been the latest developments, with what consequences, and what might we see in the near future?
When we know the F-16s are going into action, we will talk about that. As for a Ukrainian offensive--so much depends on when/whether Ukraine gets the stuff needed to degrade Russian logistics, C2, etc.
Could you please make it easier to find how to support the "Come Back Alive" or similar initiatives? In a not too complicated way? I've been looking around for quite a while, and maybe I'm just talentless, but I haven't found any. Just a couple of links. Thank you!
Do I understand it correctly that the comments about securing a 5-7 year period of stability, securing Ukrainian statehood, and the dominance of defensive technology, refer to a (reluctant) acceptance that currently occupied territories are beyond recovery ?
Dont think so--we both believe that those lands can be reconquered, if Ukraine is helped in the righ way. Its a question now, though, of wasting Russian fighting power to get there.
Wasting (lots?) more of Russia's (greater) fighting power than is consumed of Ukraine's in the process, that must be.
How might that work? Presumably not attacks by ground forces - both sides having attempted that and been burnt so far. So what then - in addition to missile attacks on military targets and DIB inside Russia (once duly approved), strategic attacks on Russia's energy and other infrastructure, along the lines of what Russia has tried on Ukraine?
On a related note, we hear of high estimates of Russia's casualties, but not much of Ukraine's. Russia of course having triple the population, and seemingly caring little about its own casualties. What are we to make off this?
Yes, it is a mystery - it seems Russia has 100k+ dead in 2 years, compared to 15k across 9 years when it had to pull out of Afghanistan, compared to 58k for the US in 8+ years when it had to pull out of Vietnam.
—> undercount which excludes DNR/LPR, for foreign mercenaries, I believe anybody above 50, and based on methodology, I think also undercounts the poor and prisoners.
Thanks both for another insightful and (cautiously) encouraging report from the ground up about what is really going on and what it might signify for the longer term Ukrainian objectives. How unlike the pontificating pundits of most of the MSM. The successful attack on the Russian military radar installation is, I agree, important in its own right as a legitimate target inside Russia and (perhaps more important given Biden's recent reverse ferret on policy) a strong signal to the US that UKR can and will make these attacks and if the US wants to have influence (and it does) then the way to do that is to change its policy about using US weaponry for legitimate attacks into Russia. That makes sense and it seems to have worked. Now the task is to convince the Americans not to be overly restrictive in what type of weaponry UKR can utilise. It has to include long range ATACMS to achieve what is needed. .
Agree--cant make up my mind about how long it might take to get the Biden admin to loosen the reins a little more. Wish I felt more confident.
I could not understand the West’s over-reaction about Ukraine’s drone attack on Russia’s radar station in Orsk. It is a legitimate military tracking target which detects conventional and nuclear missiles. Why wouldn’t Ukraine want to attack it? Western media went apoplectic, especially Shashank Joshi on X. Another escalation myth destroyed.
I missed him going nuts--really? It was just so silly, the way that people let Russia rule their thoughts.
Yes. He really went nuts. He went on challenging people for quite awhile on X. (which is not a good idea). Very puzzling reaction from him.
I amend my previous comments. On further review, neither the Armavir antennas nor the Orsk antennas were well-positioned to detect a fighter jet over Ukraine, let alone an ATACMS or a drone coming from Ukraine. (Indeed, they cover Central Asia and the Middle East, the least-likely directions from which a strategic nuclear attack might be expected in Russia, somewhat mitigating escalation risk.) I now agree with Mykola that these strikes were primarily about resetting political conditions in Washington, I think with the F-16s foremost in mind.
As a practical matter, to achieve effective SEAD over Ukrainian territorial airspace, occupied or not, requires freedom of action against those SAM sites parked in open fields a few meters on the wrong side of the international boundary. (They actually need freedom to fight many kilometers inside Russia, but baby steps.) Block 1 ATACMS were specifically designed to destroy targets that put NATO air dominance at risk, among other uses. I now assess that Armavir and Orsk were political preparation of the battlefield.
Interesting analysis
Thanks to both of you for this clear, apparently unvarnished review and preview of the war at this point. I'm wondering if in the next podcast you both could speculate about how the F-16s might affect the war effort, and when. Also, perhaps some speculation as to what it might take for UKR to be able to launch another offensive, and when that might occur at the earliest. It was a bit depressing to hear that this might not ever be possible. Finally, the electronic warfare situation on both sides. What have been the latest developments, with what consequences, and what might we see in the near future?
When we know the F-16s are going into action, we will talk about that. As for a Ukrainian offensive--so much depends on when/whether Ukraine gets the stuff needed to degrade Russian logistics, C2, etc.
Could you please make it easier to find how to support the "Come Back Alive" or similar initiatives? In a not too complicated way? I've been looking around for quite a while, and maybe I'm just talentless, but I haven't found any. Just a couple of links. Thank you!
Maybe this will work:
https://savelife.in.ua/en/donate-en/#donate-army-card-monthly
Ivar, I think it’s:
https://savelife.in.ua/en/
Do I understand it correctly that the comments about securing a 5-7 year period of stability, securing Ukrainian statehood, and the dominance of defensive technology, refer to a (reluctant) acceptance that currently occupied territories are beyond recovery ?
Dont think so--we both believe that those lands can be reconquered, if Ukraine is helped in the righ way. Its a question now, though, of wasting Russian fighting power to get there.
Wasting (lots?) more of Russia's (greater) fighting power than is consumed of Ukraine's in the process, that must be.
How might that work? Presumably not attacks by ground forces - both sides having attempted that and been burnt so far. So what then - in addition to missile attacks on military targets and DIB inside Russia (once duly approved), strategic attacks on Russia's energy and other infrastructure, along the lines of what Russia has tried on Ukraine?
On a related note, we hear of high estimates of Russia's casualties, but not much of Ukraine's. Russia of course having triple the population, and seemingly caring little about its own casualties. What are we to make off this?
Yes, it is a mystery - it seems Russia has 100k+ dead in 2 years, compared to 15k across 9 years when it had to pull out of Afghanistan, compared to 58k for the US in 8+ years when it had to pull out of Vietnam.
https://en.zona.media/article/2022/05/20/casualties_eng
—> undercount which excludes DNR/LPR, for foreign mercenaries, I believe anybody above 50, and based on methodology, I think also undercounts the poor and prisoners.