Hi everyone. I’m really amazed with all the questions. Just a quick note. I see that many of them are about the Ukrainian decision to replace Defense Minister Fedorov. That will be the lead story in the upcoming weekend update, so i will try to answer all of these issues in that.
Hi everyone. I’m really amazed with all the questions. Just a quick note. I see that many of them are about the Ukrainian decision to replace Defense Minister Fedorov. That will be the lead story in the upcoming weekend update, so i will try to answer all of these issues in that.
The decision to appoint Syrskyi in the first place, the pointless reopening of old wounds via the UPA firestorm about a month ago and now this - also in clinging on to Yermak for so long when everyone regarded him as corrupt, toxic and wanted him gone - have soured my view of Zelensky's abilities to a new low. At this point I think he should probably resign as well as reinstating Fedorov and replacing Syrskyi with Drapatyi.
Will you be addressing the sacking of Mykhailo Fedorov? I am trying to come to grips with the internal politics, and what it all means for Ukraine military strategy/success.
The implications for civil-military control would be worth exploring too - how can it be that a civilian Defence Minister who has lost the confidence of the Chief of the Armed Forces is forced to resign, rather than the Chief who is insufficiently subordinate?
I'm also very interested in this, but some reporting suggests that Fedorov went off the ranch with respect to criticism of Commander In Chief, Syrskyi. Without knowing the merits of the positions, that's not something you can openly do and expect to keep your job.
But isn't the military subordinate to the civilian government? The question is how has Ukraine structured this before and how should it relate to EU requirements?
Yes, but it was Zelensky who fired his Defense Minister, so that civilian control was maintained. It could have gone the other way as when Marshall reviewed the MacArthur file at Truman's request and concluded that Truman should have fired him some time ago. But at this level, the President makes the decision. What is difficult about the timing is that Ukraine seems to be making progress in punishing Russia--and maybe both men have had something to do with that.
Is is possible for Fedorov to be reinstated and for both men The Defense Minister and the Commander In Chief, Syrskyi to work together? This idea was posted by Shankar Narayan this morning. I had also wondered if Zelensky had dismissed Fedorov knowing there was friction between the two but hoping to use the huge public support for Fedorov has to show the Government that both men were/are vital and neither should be dismissed. (I had started reading an article which had a paywall so I was only able to read the first paragraph) but thought that might be a move which Zelensky made to try to bring the two men together.
Two related questions about UK / western re-armament:
1) How should we go about rearming when the pace of change is so great that anything we buy, even if it's delivered on time and under budget (hah!), will be obsolete by the time it's received?
2) Should we just spend whatever money is available for rearmament on Ukraine, on the basis that we'll get more bang for our buck, when we need it, even at the risk of delaying the rebuilding of our own armed forces?
Great question--rearmament should be based around building up capacity and ensuring resilience in supplies. I actually went into that question in this piece, when discussing European rearmament.
As for your second question--definitely helping Ukraine win should get more of Europe's defense spending than it is--and that can help Europe by creating a more powerful continental defense industry.
Is this perhaps a "singularity moment" in arms development and that getting ahead of the curve is the best financial decision? Hardware always needs updating before it is completed, but perhaps investing in nextgen weaponry is most cost effective? Investing in already obsolete weaponry will most certainly leave us behind the chinese (and the Ukrainians).
I think my point is that even a decision to get ahead of the curve by investing in the next gen weapons may not work. If we buy the most advanced drone available today... It'll be out of date before we need to use it. (I'm assuming we won't need to use it before the end of the year.) The cycle of development in the Russia-Ukraine war is moving so quickly that new weapons are being _used_ rather than _stored_.
Hopefully we won't need to use it before the end of the year, or next year, or the year after... but if the purpose of rearming is to be ready for (and/or to deter) a future war, then we have a problem in that what we're buying now but not using immediately won't remain 'in date'.
Many of the "oldest" drones, esp. maybe wire guided, will still be useful for generations to come just as tanks were most useful for 100-plus years and still are to a much more limited extent. Infrared-based autonomous weapons will always be useful. You'll still need small drones for urban warfare to fly in and out of buildings. And yes, as "senseisntcommon" noted, we have to keep investing in R&D for advanced systems. But to keep investing in $200 million F-35s with pilots and multi-billion-dollar, 6,000-man aircraft carriers is just plain stupid. Use the F-22 and F-35 stealth technology to silence drones and autonomous ground robotic systems. The Ukrainians box-size, machine gun robots are just the beginning. Finally, as the "kill zones" get wider and wider--what up to 50 Kms now?--you have to do R&D to develop effective, coordinated autonomous systems--ground and air--and sometimes, sea--that will win the battle.
Would your advice then be to not invest at all? Or to invest in existing, antiquated systems? The investment must be future oriented enough (not "buying the most advanced drone available today" but investing in the technology of drones and developing our own future drone systems) that it includes R&D, not just useable systems. That is the only way to keep abreast of the new waves of development. Will it make you immediately invulnerable? No. But development of new technological approaches seems essential to not falling behind any further than we already are. This includes securing access to materiel needed for production of advanced systems. The US, being as isolated in the world as it is geographically has at least a little breathing room for this.
I'm not offering advice... I don't know what the best thing to do is, hence me asking the question! I could certainly see investing in the capacity to refine and manufacture drones as being as important as in churning them out now though.
The Chinese hold most of the cards: battery material processing & manufacturing, fpv drone & drone motor manufacturing as well as cheap computer chips (not the high end cpus, ram or AI chips).
How should Defence procurement balance the relative need for expensive and long lead time precision munitions against cheap good-enough munitions available in quantity?
We need to be careful here. They are actually achieving some real strategic hits, they just dont get reported. They have done huge damage to Ukrainian power supplies and recently they have hit a number of warehouses with valuable military equipment.
What we will not know, until the war is over, is just how successful (or not) they have been in hitting Ukrainian war industry. I would think they have had a little more success with this than we know.
However they have not been able to stop the rise in drone production--that is clear.
Are there any estimates for how long Crimea can hold out in what has basically become a siege? And assuming Crimea returns to Ukrainian control, do you believe that would cause Putin to fall?
I have not seen one reliable estimate so do not want to guess. Its a question partly of whether Russia still tries to bring in lots of military force.
If the Ukrainians reoccupy Crimea, as opposed to cut it off, I think that would be catastrophic to Putin's rule--though I'm always nervous discussing Russian politics as I am no expert.
I’d like a bit more exploration of what is a best case scenario for Ukraine in Crimea. Are they “merely” hoping to create a PR disaster for Putin (images of civilians fleeing) or would they realistically be hoping to force withdrawal of Russian troops? And what then? How does even that, if attained, bring a more favourable end to the war? Is the real point basically to undermine Purim’s prestige at home and hope to force regime change on Moscow?
...and how will Kyiv re-establishing control of Crimea be welcomed by those who remain there? How will the Ukrainian government administer, supply, and protect the region? Re-taking vs. holding securely
Yes, I would also be interested in this one. Hearing "20 ships are attacked" or "400 trucks destroyed" doesn't tell me much if I don't know how much is needed for effect.
How serious do you think the situation is for the direction of the war with the ousting of the Ukraine defence minister given that it appears to have been a power struggle or deep seated clash between him and the military hierarchy in Ukraine? I ask partly out of curiosity at what insights beyond the news reports you might have and also because, to me, it is a bit unnerving as the tide seemed to have been turning in Ukraine’s favour.
We hear very little about Russian strikes on Ukrainian military infrastructure. Is that due to decentralization, poor Russian intel, or bias in reporting?
Are ongoing advances in drone technology and production increases likely to lead to a frozen conflict, one which persists in a dynamic state of an ongoing technological arms race with regard to drones?
How vulnerable is Ukraine to the same kind of Black Sea drone activity on the part of Russia that it has engaged in recently? What has kept Russia from using drones against maritime commerce vis Ukraine to this point?
I think it is definitely happening and it is occasionally reported. The Russians earlier in the year were having some success attacking Ukrainian logistics near the front line, I will see what is happening with that.
Improvements in drone technology are a double edged sword for freezing the line. Basically they make it much harder for soldiers to advance, but also make it easier to cut off logistics. I suppose its a question of which cracks first.
Russia is waging a campaign against shipping from Ukrainian ports, and having some success, just not the success the Ukrainians have had in the Sea of Azov for example.
I am very curious about the state of the Ukrainian Air Force, the traditional, manned Air Force. This is year 5 of this war. How many Ukrainian trained pilots are there? Another question is why can’t Ukraine launch more glide bombs to the occupied area’s military posts or to military assets in Rostov, Belgorod etc?
With the news of Fedorov, it increasingly seems there is a generation of Ukrainians aged under 40, who never knew the Soviet regime or the corruption of the oligarchs and Poroshenko, Yanukovich and Tymoshenko. Do you think Zelensky will face pressure from more corners of society who are just fed up with corruption and infighting?
Seeing the effect of Ukraine on the Rusian war machine and economy, is Russia/Putin in a position to start another war (thinking invasion of the Baltic states or any NATO country) with or without the tacit support of Trump, and what is the risk of nuclear war seeing the proximity of European possible targets to Russia itself?
This is a highly debated subject. I personally do not see how he could start a full conventional war with another European state now--however he could ramp up subversion, threats, and different things short of full conventional war. I know alot of people disagree with me on this.
What will be the effect of drones on defence against terrorism? Don’t they make every politician / basic infrastructure/ hospital / etc etc hugely vulnerable indeed perhaps indefensible? (Not sure that shouldn’t be undefendable)
Indeed they do. Cheap, fpv drones can be made into attack weapons easily and it will be close to possible to defend against them. I do not see, for instance, how all major hospitals could be defended.
Question: Is Musk still preventing Russia from using Starling but allowing access to Ukraine? If so, how do we explain this? Musk seems like a Putin kinda guy, not a Zelensky kinda guy.
Can you estimate how long can the U.S. carry out attacks against Iran and defend against Iranian attacks against American bases in the Gulf before the U.S. runs out of missiles? In the first 39 days of the war, the U.S. used anywhere from 45% to 61% of its Patriot Missiles (PAC-3) and other missiles including Tomahawk, Precision Strike and Standard Missiles have been significantly depleted. These weapons take 3-5 years to produce so we're looking at years before the stockpile is replenished. This draw down of weapons means no U.S. PAC-3 missiles will be sold for use in Ukraine, European nations will need to donate their PAC-2 or PAC-3 missiles to Ukraine and increased vulnerability to russian ballistic missiles throughout Europe and Ukraine.
And a big thanks for creating this forum to ask questions. I'm looking forward to seeing the questions and answers!
Its impossible to say when exactly the US will run out, as usage rates could vary widely even if the war continues on. All we can say (as you know as you mention the data above) is that the US has already used enough advanced munitions that replacing what has been expended (before this last week) will take many years in terms of Patriots, THAAD, Tomahawks, etc.
Here was a CSIS report from late April. Imagine what the state is now.
Yes to this question although I imagine the answers are pretty closely guarded. Especially interested in the current stock/replenishment capability of Patriots and other interceptors.
And in a larger context, since it’s so much easier/cheaper/faster to build ballistic missiles, is missile defense a losing battle in any protracted conflict. Is the best defense a strong offense (as Ukraine is being forced into)? What is the right ratio for defense production between interceptors and offensive missiles?
Some commentators are describing the effects of climate change as changing not just the character of war, but its nature - big enough to stop competiting wills between organsied groups as humanity struggles against nature for survival.
See, for example, Tehran running out of water, large wildfires in Canada and Australia, heat waves across Europe.
Do you think climate change is changing the nature of war? How about the character of war - is it fair to say militaries will be drawn more and more into humanitarian assistance roles?
Great question--depressingly I think humans have decided to pretend it is not a problem and so far are trying to fight wars as if things are roughly similar to how they were years ago. That will be unsustainable in the future, if sea levels rise and the ice sheets melt, as we will have to fight in places that were never fought over before, and likewise areas that we did plan on defending could end up under water.
I like that line of questioning and have a suggestion for extending it. Assuming climate change is an existential threat that is requires an increasingly urgent response, the response requires significant resources and action. Repurposing military spending to combating climate change and humanitarian assistance would be an investment in humanity that will produce a positive return whereas military spending used for arms and wars only creates financial losses and human suffering. And your phrase 'character of war' (extensive use of drones) suggests both a change in how wars are fought but also that war efforts could shift to humanitarian assistance (war on human suffering). So, to extend your question, whether or not militaries can or will be be repurposed for humanitarian assistance roles, how about spending less on militaries and use the savings to combat climate change?
We are seeing the nature of warfare change in front of our eyes, becoming asymmetric and less predictable, giving extraordinary power to small actors who would in the past have been less significant. This would seem to make the world a less secure place, and the trade routes more open to disruption.... a sort of anarchy, really. How should responsible states deal with this? Is the notion of 'old-fashioned' warfare (and by extension the idea of a 'military super-power') becoming a thing of the past? And if that is the case what would the armed forces of the future look like?
Are you asking if small nations having a defence against "superpowers" is a bad thing "make the world less secure", or if it reduces US hegemony, thereby increasing the self-determination of those countries that currently must bow down to the US ?
Given that russia is unlikely to win its war against ukraine, do you believe there is a probability Russia will withdraw from Ukraine as the Soviets did in Afghanistan?
Re Afghanistan. Many have said that the casualties in Afghanistan contributed to the fall of the USSR. Given that the casualties in Ukraine are like 50 times that, can we now say that the role of Soviet casualties in Afghanistan did not play much role in the fall of the USSR?
I hate speculating on Russian decision making as I am no expert. If Putin gets overthrown--maybe there will be a decision to withdraw. He will have to be pushed out, imho
Hi everyone. I’m really amazed with all the questions. Just a quick note. I see that many of them are about the Ukrainian decision to replace Defense Minister Fedorov. That will be the lead story in the upcoming weekend update, so i will try to answer all of these issues in that.
Hi everyone. I’m really amazed with all the questions. Just a quick note. I see that many of them are about the Ukrainian decision to replace Defense Minister Fedorov. That will be the lead story in the upcoming weekend update, so i will try to answer all of these issues in that.
The decision to appoint Syrskyi in the first place, the pointless reopening of old wounds via the UPA firestorm about a month ago and now this - also in clinging on to Yermak for so long when everyone regarded him as corrupt, toxic and wanted him gone - have soured my view of Zelensky's abilities to a new low. At this point I think he should probably resign as well as reinstating Fedorov and replacing Syrskyi with Drapatyi.
Will you be addressing the sacking of Mykhailo Fedorov? I am trying to come to grips with the internal politics, and what it all means for Ukraine military strategy/success.
The implications for civil-military control would be worth exploring too - how can it be that a civilian Defence Minister who has lost the confidence of the Chief of the Armed Forces is forced to resign, rather than the Chief who is insufficiently subordinate?
In particular, how does this impact a condition of EU membership that Secretary of Defence is a civilian.
Please address this matter as much as you can with the likely limited information available.
The Kyiv Independent reports today July 17 that the Deputy Commander in Defense has resigned because he objects to the dismissal of Fedorov.
Indeed. This seems rather like the bricklayer sacking the architect because he didn't want to work with modern materials.
Yes, I would also like to hear about that. It has me deeply worried.
I'm also very interested in this, but some reporting suggests that Fedorov went off the ranch with respect to criticism of Commander In Chief, Syrskyi. Without knowing the merits of the positions, that's not something you can openly do and expect to keep your job.
But isn't the military subordinate to the civilian government? The question is how has Ukraine structured this before and how should it relate to EU requirements?
Yes, but it was Zelensky who fired his Defense Minister, so that civilian control was maintained. It could have gone the other way as when Marshall reviewed the MacArthur file at Truman's request and concluded that Truman should have fired him some time ago. But at this level, the President makes the decision. What is difficult about the timing is that Ukraine seems to be making progress in punishing Russia--and maybe both men have had something to do with that.
I second this. Is Zelenskyy making an error choosing Syrskyi over Fedorov?
There is no question about it. It was a mistake to choose Syrskyi in the first place and everyone was shouting it at the time.
Is is possible for Fedorov to be reinstated and for both men The Defense Minister and the Commander In Chief, Syrskyi to work together? This idea was posted by Shankar Narayan this morning. I had also wondered if Zelensky had dismissed Fedorov knowing there was friction between the two but hoping to use the huge public support for Fedorov has to show the Government that both men were/are vital and neither should be dismissed. (I had started reading an article which had a paywall so I was only able to read the first paragraph) but thought that might be a move which Zelensky made to try to bring the two men together.
this is Shankar's article: https://shankarnarayan.substack.com/p/why-ukraine-cannot-let-go-of-its?r=fa5ey&utm_campaign=post-expanded-share&utm_medium=post%20viewer
Two related questions about UK / western re-armament:
1) How should we go about rearming when the pace of change is so great that anything we buy, even if it's delivered on time and under budget (hah!), will be obsolete by the time it's received?
2) Should we just spend whatever money is available for rearmament on Ukraine, on the basis that we'll get more bang for our buck, when we need it, even at the risk of delaying the rebuilding of our own armed forces?
Great question--rearmament should be based around building up capacity and ensuring resilience in supplies. I actually went into that question in this piece, when discussing European rearmament.
https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/do-not-buy-weapons-build-capacity?r=1tgexa&utm_campaign=post-expanded-share&utm_medium=web
As for your second question--definitely helping Ukraine win should get more of Europe's defense spending than it is--and that can help Europe by creating a more powerful continental defense industry.
Is this perhaps a "singularity moment" in arms development and that getting ahead of the curve is the best financial decision? Hardware always needs updating before it is completed, but perhaps investing in nextgen weaponry is most cost effective? Investing in already obsolete weaponry will most certainly leave us behind the chinese (and the Ukrainians).
I think my point is that even a decision to get ahead of the curve by investing in the next gen weapons may not work. If we buy the most advanced drone available today... It'll be out of date before we need to use it. (I'm assuming we won't need to use it before the end of the year.) The cycle of development in the Russia-Ukraine war is moving so quickly that new weapons are being _used_ rather than _stored_.
Hopefully we won't need to use it before the end of the year, or next year, or the year after... but if the purpose of rearming is to be ready for (and/or to deter) a future war, then we have a problem in that what we're buying now but not using immediately won't remain 'in date'.
Many of the "oldest" drones, esp. maybe wire guided, will still be useful for generations to come just as tanks were most useful for 100-plus years and still are to a much more limited extent. Infrared-based autonomous weapons will always be useful. You'll still need small drones for urban warfare to fly in and out of buildings. And yes, as "senseisntcommon" noted, we have to keep investing in R&D for advanced systems. But to keep investing in $200 million F-35s with pilots and multi-billion-dollar, 6,000-man aircraft carriers is just plain stupid. Use the F-22 and F-35 stealth technology to silence drones and autonomous ground robotic systems. The Ukrainians box-size, machine gun robots are just the beginning. Finally, as the "kill zones" get wider and wider--what up to 50 Kms now?--you have to do R&D to develop effective, coordinated autonomous systems--ground and air--and sometimes, sea--that will win the battle.
Would your advice then be to not invest at all? Or to invest in existing, antiquated systems? The investment must be future oriented enough (not "buying the most advanced drone available today" but investing in the technology of drones and developing our own future drone systems) that it includes R&D, not just useable systems. That is the only way to keep abreast of the new waves of development. Will it make you immediately invulnerable? No. But development of new technological approaches seems essential to not falling behind any further than we already are. This includes securing access to materiel needed for production of advanced systems. The US, being as isolated in the world as it is geographically has at least a little breathing room for this.
I'm not offering advice... I don't know what the best thing to do is, hence me asking the question! I could certainly see investing in the capacity to refine and manufacture drones as being as important as in churning them out now though.
That is still better than continuing to invest in WWII winning military technology and weapons.
And investing in production capacity.
This!!
The Chinese hold most of the cards: battery material processing & manufacturing, fpv drone & drone motor manufacturing as well as cheap computer chips (not the high end cpus, ram or AI chips).
How should Defence procurement balance the relative need for expensive and long lead time precision munitions against cheap good-enough munitions available in quantity?
Perhaps cheap precision munitions? High tech no longer means expensive.
How come the Russian missile attacks are not achieving strategic goals such as drone manufacture or oil supply lines
Is it accuracy inability, mismanagement, ukraine defence/dispersement
We need to be careful here. They are actually achieving some real strategic hits, they just dont get reported. They have done huge damage to Ukrainian power supplies and recently they have hit a number of warehouses with valuable military equipment.
What we will not know, until the war is over, is just how successful (or not) they have been in hitting Ukrainian war industry. I would think they have had a little more success with this than we know.
However they have not been able to stop the rise in drone production--that is clear.
While i understand that Ukraine will not report on these, why do the Russians not highlight this effectiveness internally?
Or is it that the russian approach is that of a terrorist regime?
Are we sure they aren't also hitting strategic military targets?
Are there any estimates for how long Crimea can hold out in what has basically become a siege? And assuming Crimea returns to Ukrainian control, do you believe that would cause Putin to fall?
I have not seen one reliable estimate so do not want to guess. Its a question partly of whether Russia still tries to bring in lots of military force.
If the Ukrainians reoccupy Crimea, as opposed to cut it off, I think that would be catastrophic to Putin's rule--though I'm always nervous discussing Russian politics as I am no expert.
I’d like a bit more exploration of what is a best case scenario for Ukraine in Crimea. Are they “merely” hoping to create a PR disaster for Putin (images of civilians fleeing) or would they realistically be hoping to force withdrawal of Russian troops? And what then? How does even that, if attained, bring a more favourable end to the war? Is the real point basically to undermine Purim’s prestige at home and hope to force regime change on Moscow?
This is really an excellent question. The start is understandable. Maybe it's been more successful than expected? But how do they proceed?
...and how will Kyiv re-establishing control of Crimea be welcomed by those who remain there? How will the Ukrainian government administer, supply, and protect the region? Re-taking vs. holding securely
Yes, I would also be interested in this one. Hearing "20 ships are attacked" or "400 trucks destroyed" doesn't tell me much if I don't know how much is needed for effect.
Vicksburg
Hi Phillips,
How serious do you think the situation is for the direction of the war with the ousting of the Ukraine defence minister given that it appears to have been a power struggle or deep seated clash between him and the military hierarchy in Ukraine? I ask partly out of curiosity at what insights beyond the news reports you might have and also because, to me, it is a bit unnerving as the tide seemed to have been turning in Ukraine’s favour.
Will talk about about this in the weekend update--promise.
We hear very little about Russian strikes on Ukrainian military infrastructure. Is that due to decentralization, poor Russian intel, or bias in reporting?
Are ongoing advances in drone technology and production increases likely to lead to a frozen conflict, one which persists in a dynamic state of an ongoing technological arms race with regard to drones?
How vulnerable is Ukraine to the same kind of Black Sea drone activity on the part of Russia that it has engaged in recently? What has kept Russia from using drones against maritime commerce vis Ukraine to this point?
I think it is definitely happening and it is occasionally reported. The Russians earlier in the year were having some success attacking Ukrainian logistics near the front line, I will see what is happening with that.
Improvements in drone technology are a double edged sword for freezing the line. Basically they make it much harder for soldiers to advance, but also make it easier to cut off logistics. I suppose its a question of which cracks first.
Russia is waging a campaign against shipping from Ukrainian ports, and having some success, just not the success the Ukrainians have had in the Sea of Azov for example.
I am very curious about the state of the Ukrainian Air Force, the traditional, manned Air Force. This is year 5 of this war. How many Ukrainian trained pilots are there? Another question is why can’t Ukraine launch more glide bombs to the occupied area’s military posts or to military assets in Rostov, Belgorod etc?
With the news of Fedorov, it increasingly seems there is a generation of Ukrainians aged under 40, who never knew the Soviet regime or the corruption of the oligarchs and Poroshenko, Yanukovich and Tymoshenko. Do you think Zelensky will face pressure from more corners of society who are just fed up with corruption and infighting?
Will talk more about this in the weekend update--he is already feeling more pressure than he expected.
Seeing the effect of Ukraine on the Rusian war machine and economy, is Russia/Putin in a position to start another war (thinking invasion of the Baltic states or any NATO country) with or without the tacit support of Trump, and what is the risk of nuclear war seeing the proximity of European possible targets to Russia itself?
This is a highly debated subject. I personally do not see how he could start a full conventional war with another European state now--however he could ramp up subversion, threats, and different things short of full conventional war. I know alot of people disagree with me on this.
What will be the effect of drones on defence against terrorism? Don’t they make every politician / basic infrastructure/ hospital / etc etc hugely vulnerable indeed perhaps indefensible? (Not sure that shouldn’t be undefendable)
Indeed they do. Cheap, fpv drones can be made into attack weapons easily and it will be close to possible to defend against them. I do not see, for instance, how all major hospitals could be defended.
Question: Is Musk still preventing Russia from using Starling but allowing access to Ukraine? If so, how do we explain this? Musk seems like a Putin kinda guy, not a Zelensky kinda guy.
My understanding is that Stalink is difficult for Russians to access in occupied Ukraine, but also Ukrainians cannot use it in Russia.
I have the same question
Same here.
Can you estimate how long can the U.S. carry out attacks against Iran and defend against Iranian attacks against American bases in the Gulf before the U.S. runs out of missiles? In the first 39 days of the war, the U.S. used anywhere from 45% to 61% of its Patriot Missiles (PAC-3) and other missiles including Tomahawk, Precision Strike and Standard Missiles have been significantly depleted. These weapons take 3-5 years to produce so we're looking at years before the stockpile is replenished. This draw down of weapons means no U.S. PAC-3 missiles will be sold for use in Ukraine, European nations will need to donate their PAC-2 or PAC-3 missiles to Ukraine and increased vulnerability to russian ballistic missiles throughout Europe and Ukraine.
And a big thanks for creating this forum to ask questions. I'm looking forward to seeing the questions and answers!
https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/04/22/us-spent-up-to-61-of-its-patriot-arsenal-in-39-days-ukraine-looks-at-building-its-own-ballistic-defense/
Slava Ukraini!
Its impossible to say when exactly the US will run out, as usage rates could vary widely even if the war continues on. All we can say (as you know as you mention the data above) is that the US has already used enough advanced munitions that replacing what has been expended (before this last week) will take many years in terms of Patriots, THAAD, Tomahawks, etc.
Here was a CSIS report from late April. Imagine what the state is now.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/last-rounds-status-key-munitions-iran-war-ceasefire
With almost 300 questions posed, you exceeded my expectations for a response!
Thank you for taking the time to consider the question and inform us.
Slava Ukraini!
Yes to this question although I imagine the answers are pretty closely guarded. Especially interested in the current stock/replenishment capability of Patriots and other interceptors.
And in a larger context, since it’s so much easier/cheaper/faster to build ballistic missiles, is missile defense a losing battle in any protracted conflict. Is the best defense a strong offense (as Ukraine is being forced into)? What is the right ratio for defense production between interceptors and offensive missiles?
Any idea of the testosterone level in the Ukraine military? Asking for a friend
Shakes head in despair....
ha ha ha
And what is the testosterone level of the US Commander-in-Chief? George Conway once posted that Trump is a most effeminate man!
😁
Well there is his mushroom penis! 🤔
Some commentators are describing the effects of climate change as changing not just the character of war, but its nature - big enough to stop competiting wills between organsied groups as humanity struggles against nature for survival.
See, for example, Tehran running out of water, large wildfires in Canada and Australia, heat waves across Europe.
Do you think climate change is changing the nature of war? How about the character of war - is it fair to say militaries will be drawn more and more into humanitarian assistance roles?
Great question--depressingly I think humans have decided to pretend it is not a problem and so far are trying to fight wars as if things are roughly similar to how they were years ago. That will be unsustainable in the future, if sea levels rise and the ice sheets melt, as we will have to fight in places that were never fought over before, and likewise areas that we did plan on defending could end up under water.
I like that line of questioning and have a suggestion for extending it. Assuming climate change is an existential threat that is requires an increasingly urgent response, the response requires significant resources and action. Repurposing military spending to combating climate change and humanitarian assistance would be an investment in humanity that will produce a positive return whereas military spending used for arms and wars only creates financial losses and human suffering. And your phrase 'character of war' (extensive use of drones) suggests both a change in how wars are fought but also that war efforts could shift to humanitarian assistance (war on human suffering). So, to extend your question, whether or not militaries can or will be be repurposed for humanitarian assistance roles, how about spending less on militaries and use the savings to combat climate change?
We are seeing the nature of warfare change in front of our eyes, becoming asymmetric and less predictable, giving extraordinary power to small actors who would in the past have been less significant. This would seem to make the world a less secure place, and the trade routes more open to disruption.... a sort of anarchy, really. How should responsible states deal with this? Is the notion of 'old-fashioned' warfare (and by extension the idea of a 'military super-power') becoming a thing of the past? And if that is the case what would the armed forces of the future look like?
We have had periods of chaotic warfare in the past, lots of piracy, lack of control by a powerful state over large areas---we could see that.
Are you asking if small nations having a defence against "superpowers" is a bad thing "make the world less secure", or if it reduces US hegemony, thereby increasing the self-determination of those countries that currently must bow down to the US ?
Given that russia is unlikely to win its war against ukraine, do you believe there is a probability Russia will withdraw from Ukraine as the Soviets did in Afghanistan?
Re Afghanistan. Many have said that the casualties in Afghanistan contributed to the fall of the USSR. Given that the casualties in Ukraine are like 50 times that, can we now say that the role of Soviet casualties in Afghanistan did not play much role in the fall of the USSR?
I hate speculating on Russian decision making as I am no expert. If Putin gets overthrown--maybe there will be a decision to withdraw. He will have to be pushed out, imho