Weekend Update #99, Certain Debates Should be Over

This week proved beyond a doubt the value of ranged attack and the weakness of Russian Red lines. Is the Administration listening?

Hello All,

This was a week which should, I would argue, settle two of the most debated issues of the Russo-Ukraine War. These are the debate over the relative value of ranged attacks (particularly against logistics) and the the legitimacy of Russian red lines and their escalation claims. We can only hope that the administration accepts this and acts accordingly and as such these will be the big subjects of the update.

However, before that, I would like to let you know of two events this week which you can attend online. They are both being sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a group that I am delighted with which to be associated.

The first is on Monday 23 September, and its a book launch discussion about my new book The Strategists. This will involve a discussion between myself, Kori Schake of AEI and Eliot Cohen of CSIS. We will delve into some great questions of grand strategy and personality, with references to Churchill, Roosevelt, Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini. Hopefully you will find it enjoyable. You can sign up through the link above.

The second event is on 24 September (the day after) and will coincide with the launch of a public report about a project that Ive been working on with Professor Cohen almost since Putin started the full-scale invasion. Its a discussion about the report, which delves into the failures of the analytical community to understand what the Russian and Ukrainian militaries were capable of—and indeed how the war between them would develop. Again, you can sign up through the link.

Long-time readers of this substack will probably enjoy finding out more about what I’ve been banging on about over the last few years—so please do come along to both or either.

Certain Debates Should be Over

The last few days have seen attacks of the kind Ukraine has been desperate to do for the last two and a half years, but has not been able to manage in mass. They are important for the fact that they can now be done, what they have accomplished, and what they mean for the war. As such, they will form the basis of this update.

The Attacks

On the evening of 18-19 September, the Ukrainians launched a mass attack against the large Russian armaments depot located at Toropets—a long way from Ukraine, but not far from the Baltic states. Here is a map from the CNN report linked to above.

This facility is one of the largest ammunition storage sites in all of Russia, and was supposedly fully modernized and expanded a few years ago—and obviously would have helped provide ammunition for any Russian attempt against the Baltic states.

The attack on the 18th-19th was devastating. The picture at the top is of one of the early fireballs that erupted when the Ukrainians attacked. It seems to have been a true mass attack by the Ukrainians, with reportedly 100 UAVs, clearly some with jet engines, raining down on the facility. There are some debates I’ve seen with people wondering if Storm Shadows were also used—which certainly cant be ruled out. If so, it would be an important moment—with major NATO weapons being used against a very-high value military target in Russia.

The fact that the Ukrainians could launch such a mass attack against such a high value target deep in Russia is in and of itself a possible turning point. Usually the attacks at far ranges have been with a smaller number of systems, and more spread out. This week we saw a true mass attack against a high value target, and an attack executed with great precision.

What happened next was just as important.

Last night another major Russian depot was attacked, this time near Tihoretsk. Once again pictures have emerged of a large explosion.

Its great to see such systematic targeting—and again, this facility is not close—its about 300 kilometres from the front line and deep in Russia.

And that was not all. Last night there were also credible reports that the Ukrainians were making a follow up attack in the Toropets area.

These additional/follow on attacks are extremely important. It shows that Ukraine is producing enough systems to keep hitting important targets and really damage then. Often one attack is not enough in ranged war. The first pictures might be dramatic, but when the smoke clears the target often can be repaired (this was often the case with bombing in World War II). To really put a target out of action, you want the capacity to return to it a few times if needs be.

So we might be seeing Ukraine now having the mass to methodically target, and re-target, Russian logistics far behind the lines.

What Was Destroyed

Looking at the first of these raids, the destruction looked massive. The fires spread rapidly around the Toropets depot (ammunition depots are not nice places when they burn) and the amount of explosives that went up was dramatic. One early estimate that I saw was that explosions (which were so massive that the smoke could be seen in space) were the equivalent of 200-240 tons of high explosives cooking off. Indeed, the attacks were so destructive, they registered at 2.7 on the Richter scale.

The exact amount of destruction is almost impossible to estimate, as we cant be sure what was in all the depots. However it does seem safe to say that at least 50% of the Toropets depot, and its contents, was functionally destroyed in the first raid (and this is being cautious)

The Ukrainians claimed initially that there was alot of long-range ordnance there, including Iskander missiles, and there were reports of large amounts of smaller ordnances reaching down to as small as mortar ammunition.

Maybe the most interesting analysis came out of Estonian intelligence, who tried to quantify the losses. The Estonians said the destruction was the equivalent of 750,000 shells! In other words, this one attack could have destroyed the equivalent of 3 months of Russian shell usage.

This would make the Toropets attack alone the single most impactful military operation of the war. At the cost of 100 UAVs (and it must be said—not one Ukrainian casualty) the Ukrainians have destroyed the equivalent of 3 months of Russian shell usage. Not only have the ukrainians not wasted any of their own lives in the attack, they have saved thousands of their own soldiers—and mass amounts of equipment

It is what I call in my earlier research pre-battlefield destruction—of the highest order.

As I write about extensively in How the War was Won, to understand how modern wars are won and lost, people need to look at the destruction of equipment before it reaches the battlefield—because such destruction is doubly valuable. Not only does is deny the enemy the use of the equipment/ammunition, it destroys it before it can ever be used. Destroying equipment on the battlefield means it could have been used before. Destroying it in the depots means it never had any effect.

So Ukraine has destroyed a massive amount of equipment with small cost and no losses in humans. Sit back and think about that.

The Vindication of the Ukrainian Claim of Ranged War

For those of use who have been screaming for the last few years that Ukraine needed greater ranged weaponry and the ability to hit militarily useful targets far behind the lines—this is a moment that has come far too late. There have been two rather ludicrous arguments given against this call.

The first was that ranged attacks would not make that much difference, as Ukraine needed to win the war on the battlefield. The second was that such attacks would result in Russian dramatic escalation, even nuclear weapons use.

Both arguments were weak. The first was, to put it bluntly, nonsensical. Ranged fire has been one of the most important abilities of successful militaries in war at all times—particularly modern war. If you can hit your enemy deep in the rear, it has a corrosive impact on the front lines. War requires masses of material to be fought—and the troops in the front lines of this war are running through equipment at frightening clips. If you can destroy that equipment or keep it from being moved to the front line—it will have a cascading impact.

Its why the US military has decided that ranged fires are the King of Battle.

The truth was that they almost certainly new how effective Ukraine would be with ranged capacity—but they didn’t want Ukraine to have the ability for the second reason. They were overly afraid of the Russian reaction because they had bought into a flawed escalation model.

Russia cant afford to escalate to nuclear weapons usage for a number of reasons. The fact that Ukraine can now attack vital military facilities deep inside Russia, and devastate them, should help end the escalation debate for now (though sadly it wont). Ukraine needs to be able to fight a normal war—to attack the military facilities of the country attacking it, whether on the front line or in the rear.

Its why ranged war capabilities have become more and more part of Ukraine’s asks from the USA. The Ukrainians understand that if they are going to win, and not just survive, they need the ability to hit Russia at range. Zelensky is going to speak about this alot in the next few days, I wager.

So these attacks by the Ukrainians destroyed not just Russian depots and ammunition, they have destroyed most of the intellectual arguments used against giving them more ranged capability.

Overall, these attacks are some of the most important of the war.

Whither Pokrovsk?

Over the last few weeks the discussion of the “strategic” city of Pokrovsk has quieted. Its because the Russians have advanced incredibly slowly towards what we were being told was their great strategic objective.

Here is the most recent Deep State Map.

And here is the map last weekend.

The Russians are a few hundred yards closer to Pokrovsk. Yet, you wont hear the press saying that they went overboard a month ago. The truth is, the Russians don’t seem to have the troops to launch a major assault on the town. They have had to send forces to Kursk (which we were told they would not do) and they are trying to press other parts of the lines which are easier for them to attack. It does highlight one of the weirdnesses of the reporting. Marginal Russian gains are highlighted as great successes, but when things don’t go so well, the press is quiet.

I will write about this in my midweek update.

Have a good rest of the weekend everyone.