Weekend Update 79: The Lines are Stabilizing
What the big story (stories) of the last 4 months might actually be.
Hi All,
Well, last week I tried to add a dose of common sense to restrain much of the doom and gloom that has infected the reporting of the war in Ukraine. We had been hearing quite dramatic stories of Russian breakthroughs and Ukrainian forces seemingly on the brink of collapse. Alot of this seems to come from those who want the Russian army to perform well, either to reinforce early analysis or because they would like to see a deal forced on Ukraine to allow Putin to declare a victory.
The reality is far less dramatic. As Mykola Bielieskov and I tried to describe in our latest Ukraine-Russia War Talk podcast (released yesterday), the Russian advances have been limited, there has been no sign of an ability to exploit, and assuming ammunition gets to Ukraine in the numbers promised, the Russians should have more difficulty advancing in the future, not less.
So, instead of repeating what we say in the podcast, I thought I would try and show what has changed (or really not changed) in the battle line over the last week and then talk about what might actually be the most important strategic story of the last 4 months (which is not what you think).
The Lines Stabilize
Last weekend in the update, I described how Russia and Ukraine were engaging in a race against each other. Russia was trying to take territory before US started flowing into Ukraine (while the Ukrainians were having to fight with a major shortage of supplies). Ukraine, otoh, was racing to try and get access to those supplies and get them to the front.
Now, how much aid has actually reached the front is not easy to know—it might not be much as of yet. However, whether US aid has reached the front in bulk or not, the Russian advances have slowed and for the last few days hardly progressed at all. Take a look at the most talked about parts of the line (Ocheretyne and Chasiv Yar). Here are maps comparing them last Sunday and today.
Sunday April 28
By Thursday 2 May, the Russian forces had made very small advances—and crucially of the easiest kind. They made no attempt to exploit their supposed breakthrough into Ocheretyne, but actually just tried to consolidate the tiny advance. They certainly either lacked the ability to will to try an exploitation type of advance.
Since Thursday there has been no advance of any note.
The situation at Chasiv Yar has witnessed even less change. Here was the front line there on 28 April.
And here is the line today. Do you see any difference? I dont.
So what we have seen in the last week is no successful attempt by the assumed to be powerful and improving Russian army to make a successful advance against a Ukrainian army which was supposedly in dire straits.
Why is this?
Well its probably not because the Ukrainian Army is in great shape. The Ukrainian army is presently under-armed and almost certainly undermanned and exhausted. It will probably have to make some further retreats in the future and the Russians might even take some more towns. What its down to is a combination of 3 factors. The continuing advantage of defensive firepower, the continual over-rating of Russian offensive capacity, and a temporary panic about the Ukrainian army which had some evidence—but was significantly overblown.
For instance, all the stories about the Russians supposedly being on the brink of great success leave out a hard-headed reckoning of the state of the Russian Army. This latter force has now been built up and wiped out twice since February 24, 2022. It is generating lots of soldiers, but obviously not training them to a high standard, and losing these new soldiers at a horrific clip. Its also suffered enormous equipment losses.
The most up to date UK intelligence estimates, for instance, have the Russians losing (assumed Killed, missing, seriously wounded) over 465,000 soldiers since the full-scale invasion. These are staggering losses, which will have a serious effect on the new troops being generated.
Even in the best of times such a force would struggle with basic combined arms warfare of the type that the Russians would need to be able to execute to advance. At this time my strong guess is that these skills are almost nonexistent in all but a handful of the best units.
Once again, because reporters have a huge amount of access to Ukrainian forces, they can see, hear, smell the problems that the Ukrainians face—and they go ahead and report that. Because they dont get any real access to the Russian forces, they rely on bad historical generalizations (Russian steamroller, Russians win in the end, etc etc—none of which are true) to contextualize the state of the Russian army.
Add that to the probably growing advantages of defensive firepower, and the real story of the last few months becomes clear.
What the big story (stories) of the last 4 months might actually be
You would hardly be forgiven for believing that the big story of the last few months is that the Russians are rejuvenated, growing in strength, successfully attacking and that the Ukrainians are worn out and on the verge of collapse.
The New York Times started its pivot in early January.
There is also a growing chorus in the analytical community, as always led by those who believed the Russians would decimate Ukraine in a few days or weeks at the start of the full-scale invasion, that Ukraine must start negotiating and prepare to give up its territory.
In this way, the narrative since January 1 has been pretty well set—and widely accepted. Russia is strong, getting stronger, Ukraine is in real trouble, and Ukrainian victory is all but impossible while a Ukrainian collapse is definitely a possibility.
It certainly sounds dramatic and would get clicks—from those with a macabre sense at least. However—what have we seen on the ground.
Well around Avidiivka—the area of Russia’s greatest advance, here was the situation on January 1, 2024. (note—the Russians were only 5 kilometres from Ocheretyne at that time.
Basically in the last 4 months, Russia blasted Ukrainian forces (who were short of ammunition) out of Avdiivka, and made very small advances to the north west. Here is the same map today.
So on this very small scale map (an inch being about three miles) Russian advances over 4 months against an enemy running out of ammunition have been by historical standards tiny—certainly what would be considered failing by World War I standards, let alone World War II.
The situation around Chasiv Yar has even less change.
Here is the map on January 1
And here it is today
So in 4 months, in their attempts to take what people are referring to as the strategically important city of Chasiv Yar, the Russians have advanced at the pace of a mile a month.
Russian advances towards Chasiv Yar actually compare rather poorly to what the Ukrainians did this summer in their supposedly disastrous counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia. Here, for instance, was the start of the line in the centre of Zaporizhzhia on June 1
And here is the exact same exactly 3 months later on 1 September.
The Ukrainians made small, incremental advances, moving forward at most 10 miles in depth, relying on infantry led attacks. However this was portrayed as a failure while the Russian similar advances of the last few months were a harbinger of Russian success.
Actually, in many ways the Ukrainian advance was far more impressive, as they were attacking Russian forces who had access to large stores of ammunition and who could answer Ukrainian fires with fire. In the last few months, the Russians have been attacking Ukrainian forces who were operating at a major fire disadvantage because of ammunition shortage. At the same time, the Russians had some growing advantages in areas such as glide bombs, and the Ukrainians were running very short of anti-air ammunition, which allowed some Russian aircraft to operate closer to the front line than before.
In other words, over the last few months the Russians were fighting with major advantages that the Ukrainians have never possessed.
You might see what I am getting at. You could easily say one of the most important stories of the last few months is that the Russians, attacking a force with very little ammunition, who had not prepared fortifications in the way that they should, and who were struggling to generate new forces (Ukraine has really been indecisive in this area) only made very small advances for large losses.
And Russian losses really have been large. We have the UK intelligence figure above, which covers the whole war, but it does seem that Russian losses are trending upwards. In taking Avdiivka alone, Russian casualties were estimated at 17000 after a few months of fighting. Certainly, Ukrainian figures for months now have had the Russians losing 1000 a day on average—sometimes more for weeks at a time.
If headlines of the last few months were regularly: Russians Advance one kilometer for Heavy Losses in Soldiers and Vehicles, the war would seem very different.
And this brings out the other real story. Even a weakened Ukraine without ammunition can take a terrible toll on the attacker. Maybe, just maybe, people will realize the true story of the last few months is that attacking, even with major advantages, is a mugs game. It will be extremely expensive and destructive for the attacking force, and it will show little strategic benefit. This has now been seen for well over a year (since Bakhmut) and it should be the real story of the war to now.
Indeed the side that learns it, and does its best to establish ranged dominance, will be the side that comes out on top in the end. Ukraine, were it smart, (and I very much hope/think that it is) will double down on defensive strategy in 2024. Let the Russians attack, attack, attack. Greet them with now better supplied forces, hopefully in better entrenchments, and take a terrible toll.
At the same time, work on winning the ranged war to roll up the Russian Armed forces from the rear.
Its actually been the story of much of modern war—but its one people need to hear again and again.
Ukraine has much to do. It needs to conscript wisely, it needs to fortify lines, it needs to only attack selectively when it can, and it needs to develop and be given as much ranged capacity as possible. But the story of the last few months confirms that this is the way to win the war.
Have a good rest of the weekend everyone.
Thank you for an informative post. I've long been perplexed by maps which show small advances toward villages vs news stories which make it sound as if the Russians were Patton rolling toward Prague. What sort of casualties do you think the Russians can endure before they break down completely?
Can I get an amen!!!! As I just noted in Mick Ryan’s Substack, echoing what you have written here, the Russians are hemorrhaging men and materiel at an alarming rate through “meat attacks” and having their armor decimated via drones where arty is scarce. The fact AFU can do this undermanned and outgunned is a testament to their strategy and tactics as well as a lack of imagination on the part of the Russians. When we start seeing T-62s on a regular basis it is not a good sign for Russia.
If anything I would argue, assuming UK intel estimates are correct, that Russia is setting itself up to get over extended, and with increasing AFU ranged fires attacking rear logistics and storage areas, Russia will find itself dangerously exposed at the front and ripe for a major counterattack come 2025.
So when will US media learn the lessons and stop the doom and gloom? As I I said previously in your last essay, imagine the reaction today to Kasserine Pass in 1942? The world would be coming your way and end. Losing the Philippines and Bataan? Yet, those were just blips on the way to winning. Media need to read HTWWW and reset their ideas!