Whats happening in Ukraine now is part of the inevitable process of war. After having finished the campaign in Kherson, the Ukrainians are having to rest, refit, repair and decide where to operate next—all while learning the lessons of this war so far. War as a process basically involves the same three steps throughout, though the way the tools available during each war interact makes the interaction of the three steps very differentindeed.
The basic process of war I would argue, involves a cyclical three steps. There is (1) the creation of force or military power, (2) the deployment of that force, (3) the interaction of that force in destroying that of the other side. If the steps are pretty much the same throughout most wars, the tools available to affect them can be very different. Just one example, the creation of long range bombers in World War II, allowed the extension of war fighting options for the British and US to interfere with Germany’s and Japan’s abilities to undertake steps 1 and 2 in new, very destructive ways. They could attack transportation lines, factories, and deployment airfields in such a way that they seriously reduced the amount of weaponry the Axis could build and then deploy effectively.
What Ukraine is doing now is trying to assess the best way to destroy Russian military power through the steps. Now they cant really attack Russian production directly (though the political campaign calling for sanctions against Russia should have serious ability to limit Russia’s first step). Militarily Ukraine itself can more easily attack the Russians in the second and third step. And, as the Ukrainians have discovered, attacking during the second step (deployment) is always preferable because it means you can destroy enemy force before it can actually be used against you.
So the Ukrainians are looking at the Russians trying to figure out where they can damage them the most (while at the same time keeping Ukrainian losses as small as possible). What is clear is that before they can do that on a large scale, the Ukrainian army needs to recover from its exertions of the previous months. You might want to take a look at this important thread by Mykola Bielieskov (a Ukrainian strategic studies expert) about needing to put what Ukraine can do next into context.
Its important, because it reinforces the difficulty of waging war. If there was one thing before the war that was so maddening about the analysts of the Russian military who were talking about Russia’s supposed strength—it was that they made war seem so easy. Russia was supposedly so strong and well prepared that they would steamroller poor Ukraine. Supposedly the Ukrainians would not be able to fight the Russians in the open, and would have to retreat into the cities to engage in a form of guerilla/city warfare. In many cases it was argued for years that Russia was so strong that arming Ukraine would be counterproductive (Im not naming names on this now, but you can easily find such arguments if you want).
It was a bonkers version of how easy war would be for Russia, based on no real evidence, and has shown itself to be ridiculous from the very beginning. Now, one of the reasons war is difficult is that its not easy to constanly supply, repair and refit equipment that is being operated under massive strain. What we are seeing now in Ukraine is equipment on both sides is being worn out, needing to be repaired and that supplies of things such as ammo are being used at rates that were not considered possible before Feb 24.
There have been a few stories on this if you want to read them. By one estimate one-third of the NATO howitzers sent to Ukraine are out of action at any one time because of wear and tear.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/25/us/ukraine-artillery-breakdown.html
To keep the Ukrainians supported, repair facilities have had to be set up in Poland.
Moreover there needs to be a continual supply of ammunition to Ukraine to keep up with the demands of the battle.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/26/world/europe/nato-weapons-shortage-ukraine.html
These types of continual pauses after campaigns is a constant in war, and Ukraine will need one now until they can prepare the force needed to try and liberate more territory—and they undoubtedly will try. The winter should actually provide an aid to Ukrainian forces, who are better equipped, better motivated and better prepared than the Russians who oppose them.
And they will need these advantages. As I tried to say last week, wherever the Ukrainians press next, there will be Russian defensive forces. We wont see anything like the Kharkiv breakthrough and exploitation again. That was made possible because they helped draw Russian forces into Kherson.
Now, that is not going to happen again. Which means what the Ukrainians do next will far more resemble what we have just seen at Kherson. At Kherson there was no great Ukrainian breakthrough and drive into Russian positions, there was a slower, methodical campaign against Russian logistics and Russian forces, which became so exhausting for the Russians that they eventually pulled out. It really was a form of logistics/attrition warfare writ large, and not the kind of fast moving, armored warfare the analytical community was boasting that the Russians could do before the war.
What we dont know is exactly where the Ukrainians will try that next. As I said last week in the update, ceteris paribus it makes sense to drive the two Russian fronts further apart by degrading Russian forces in the center.
Of course, the Ukrainians have shown an ability to adjust and adapt in this war, and if they feel there is another area that they can really push, they will opt for that. What they wont do, is repetitively bang their head against the wall, focussing on one objective—see the Russian attempt to seize Bakhmut.
Furthermore, once the Ukrainians start pushing again, it will take time. Because they will be attacking Russian forces/logistics in an area that will have some real defenses, they will have to degrade those forces significantly. Now, if they can repair and resupply the equipment they have (thus the first part of this update) they can do that as they have the range, accuracy and intelligence advantage. They will just do it in their own time.
e during each war interact makes the interaction of the three steps very differentindeed.
The basic process of war I would argue, involves a cyclical three steps. There is (1) the creation of force or military power, (2) the deployment of that force, (3) the interaction of that force in destroying that of the other side. If the steps are pretty much the same throughout most wars, the tools available to affect them can be very different. Just one example, the creation of long range bombers in World War II, allowed the extension of war fighting options for the British and US to interfere with Germany’s and Japan’s abilities to undertake steps 1 and 2 in new, very destructive ways. They could attack transportation lines, factories, and deployment airfields in such a way that they seriously reduced the amount of weaponry the Axis could build and then deploy effectively.
What Ukraine is doing now is trying to assess the best way to destroy Russian military power through the steps. Now they cant really attack Russian production directly (though the political campaign calling for sanctions against Russia should have serious ability to limit Russia’s first step). Militarily Ukraine itself can more easily attack the Russians in the second and third step. And, as the Ukrainians have discovered, attacking during the second step (deployment) is always preferable because it means you can destroy enemy force before it can actually be used against you.
So the Ukrainians are looking at the Russians trying to figure out where they can damage them the most (while at the same time keeping Ukrainian losses as small as possible). What is clear is that before they can do that on a large scale, the Ukrainian army needs to recover from its exertions of the previous months. You might want to take a look at this important thread by Mykola Bielieskov (a Ukrainian strategic studies expert) about needing to put what Ukraine can do next into context.
Its important, because it reinforces the difficulty of waging war. If there was one thing before the war that was so maddening about the analysts of the Russian military who were talking about Russia’s supposed strength—it was that they made war seem so easy. Russia was supposedly so strong and well prepared that they would steamroller poor Ukraine. Supposedly the Ukrainians would not be able to fight the Russians in the open, and would have to retreat into the cities to engage in a form of guerilla/city warfare. In many cases it was argued for years that Russia was so strong that arming Ukraine would be counterproductive (Im not naming names on this now, but you can easily find such arguments if you want).
It was a bonkers version of how easy war would be for Russia, based on no real evidence, and has shown itself to be ridiculous from the very beginning. Now, one of the reasons war is difficult is that its not easy to constanly supply, repair and refit equipment that is being operated under massive strain. What we are seeing now in Ukraine is equipment on both sides is being worn out, needing to be repaired and that supplies of things such as ammo are being used at rates that were not considered possible before Feb 24.
There have been a few stories on this if you want to read them. By one estimate one-third of the NATO howitzers sent to Ukraine are out of action at any one time because of wear and tear.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/25/us/ukraine-artillery-breakdown.html
To keep the Ukrainians supported, repair facilities have had to be set up in Poland.
Moreover there needs to be a continual supply of ammunition to Ukraine to keep up with the demands of the battle.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/26/world/europe/nato-weapons-shortage-ukraine.html
These types of continual pauses after campaigns is a constant in war, and Ukraine will need one now until they can prepare the force needed to try and liberate more territory—and they undoubtedly will try. The winter should actually provide an aid to Ukrainian forces, who are better equipped, better motivated and better prepared than the Russians who oppose them.
And they will need these advantages. As I tried to say last week, wherever the Ukrainians press next, there will be Russian defensive forces. We wont see anything like the Kharkiv breakthrough and exploitation again. That was made possible because they helped draw Russian forces into Kherson.
Now, that is not going to happen again. Which means what the Ukrainians do next will far more resemble what we have just seen at Kherson. At Kherson there was no great Ukrainian breakthrough and drive into Russian positions, there was a slower, methodical campaign against Russian logistics and Russian forces, which became so exhausting for the Russians that they eventually pulled out. It really was a form of logistics/attrition warfare writ large, and not the kind of fast moving, armored warfare the analytical community was boasting that the Russians could do before the war.
What we dont know is exactly where the Ukrainians will try that next. As I said last week in the update, ceteris paribus it makes sense to drive the two Russian fronts further apart by degrading Russian forces in the center.
Of course, the Ukrainians have shown an ability to adjust and adapt in this war, and if they feel there is another area that they can really push, they will opt for that. What they wont do, is repetitively bang their head against the wall, focussing on one objective—see the Russian attempt to seize Bakhmut.
Furthermore, once the Ukrainians start pushing again, it will take time. Because they will be attacking Russian forces/logistics in an area that will have some real defenses, they will have to degrade those forces significantly. Now, if they can repair and resupply the equipment they have (thus the first part of this update) they can do that as they have the range, accuracy and intelligence advantage. They will just do it in their own time.
Philips, do you think Western governments will start supplying Ukraine with the heavier weapons and aircraft they need to end this war? If yes, what sort of timeframe do you think it might happen in?
Many thanks. I wonder if the reported sickness in Russian troops will play a part as well. Sounds like an internal war of attrition with lack of equipment, motivation etc. During cold winter months that has to play in. Perhaps the big breakthroughs may also be in the increasingly fed up Russian population - but that is so hard to predict.