Weekend Update #3
Where might the war be heading in the next few months.
Weekend Update #3 on Substack. Where might the war be heading in the next few months.
With the Russian withdrawal from the west bank of the Dnipro and the city of Kherson, it might be said that a phase of the war which stretched from July to today is ending. This was the phase of an extremely long-front line, and the Ukrainians adjusting to getting a significant infusion of new weaponry. These two things were interrelated. Its important to go back and see just how long the front-line was between the forces on June 30 when compared to today. Ive taken these maps from the Institute for the Study of War. https://www.understandingwar.org/
November 19 above.
What you will see is the great shrinkage of the area in which both sides can make significant offensive action. Ive put a thick black line over that area today so you can see it. Everything to the west of that line, I would argue, because of the great with of the Dnipro River, and the lack of functioning bridges, would be very difficult for either side to assault. You would not only have to get large forces over the river, you would have to set up a regular supply system—no easy feat.
There will certainly be raids up and down the river, particularly by the Ukrainians. If you remember this story of a few days ago, the Ukrainians are being given some ‘riverine’ armored patrol boats. There was a pretty good story about it from the US Naval Institute
https://news.usni.org/2022/11/07/pentagon-adds-40-armed-patrol-boats-in-latest-ukraine-aid-package
The Ukrainians were also given patrol boats a few months ago and all these boats will come in very handy now. The Russians will have to deploy forces up and down the Dnipro (as will the Ukrainians) to maintain their lines. The Ukrainians will have the ability to launch raids up and down the river, however that’s very different from launching a major offensive over the river with AFV and other heavy equipment.
So while the Russians will have to maintain their lines along their bank of the Dnipro, they will probably not have to maintain anything like the concentrated forces they were maintaining on the west bank of the Dnipro.
So the area for larger army formations to maneuver is now much smaller than before. That means surprise is more difficult than before, and its unlikely that the Ukrainians will be able to find an area that is very thinly held (which is what happened in their offensive Kharkiv). In other words, its very difficult to see them creating a similar battle situation to that in the summer when they pulled off this masterstroke.

So what happens? Well with the shortened lines for operations, its hard to see the Ukrainians doing anything rash. They still have the advantage of better, more accurate ranged fires, and the Russians still have the trouble of getting supplies to their forces—which set the stage for what has happened over the last few months. Now they basically can hit almost everything in occupied Ukraine north of Crimea. Here is a useful map of extreme HIMARS range.



Note—its unlikely the Ukrainians will expose their HIMARS too close to the front—on the other hand there have been reports that they have been firing them at longer than expected ranges. In some ways it doesn’t matter much. It will be difficult for the Russians now to move supplies around Ukraine, as long as the supplies coming through Crimea over the Kerch bridge remain reduced. Basically the Ukrainians have mostly succeeded in dividing Russian forces in Ukraine into two separate supply zones—east and west. The west is dependent on supplies through Crimea and what can be brought in by truck along the roads from east to west. There are some reports of the Russians using trucks along the extreme south around Mariupol, to try and move supplies to the west.

If the Ukrainians continue to fight the methodical, logistically centric war that they have so far, then their next move will probably to try and extend the range of their weapons to fully separate Russian forces into completely unsupported zones. This will require them to push south somewhere in this blue zone I’ve highlighted on the map.
Doing this wont be easy, as the Russians are there in some depth (one imagines). However the Ukrainians can continue what they’ve been doing in Kherson (maybe on an even larger scale). They will have to concentrate their effective ranged systems, and ground down Russian force to the degree that they can push forward. The Russian issue is that they cant really afford to pull back (unlike at Kherson) so their forces will have to stand and fight.
In the short term, the line probably wont move much. The relative stability of the line that we have witnessed for the last week could endure for a while longer. Its likely now that both sides are resting and redeploying forces that have been fighting on the Kherson front. Its worth noting that there are some reports that the Russians are continuing and maybe intensifying offensive operations in the centre of the line (from the ever-attacked Bakhmut to the south and west.


This is probably fine by the Ukrainians. Having the Russians continue such assaults serves their purpose while the Ukrainians prepare another one of their more well-planned operations.
Also, unless the winter is particularly severe, its unlikely that the weather will seriously retard any such Ukrainian operation. They seem to be preparing well for winter (thanks Canada) and its more than likely than the Russians are less well-prepared, considering the chaos that has typified their mobilization so far.
So best guess, a methodical Ukrainians attempt to sever Russian forces into two completely non-supporting areas over the coming weeks and months.
Evening update. There have been some interesting sources today which reflect on what is said here. One of the most interesting is Mikhailo Polodyak (a close adviser to Zelensky and a regular public commentator) saying what Ukraine needs to prepare to ‘end the war’. A relatively small number of more tanks needed compared to the stress on MLRS (HIMARS). 150-200 tanks really is not much. On the other hand asking for 50-70 more MLRS shows how important they are to the Ukrainians (they did all their damage this summer when they had only about 20 HIMARS).


Also, regular reports that the Russians are sending troops withdrawn from Kherson to the east, and starting offensive action.





Will be interesting to see if they can do anything more with them then launch the kinds of almost piecemeal attacks that they have relied on so far, attacks which have not pushed the Ukrainians back in and meaningful way since July. Seeing the way Ukraine has faught earlier campaigns, the Ukrainians will probably be happy to let the Russians attack with these forces for a while, while they attrit them and continue to degrade logistics.
Thank you. Your Sunday updates are very informative. Substack is a far better fit for them than Twitter.
Many thanks .. am sharing these updates on Mastodon now