Weekend Update #136: The War In A Nutshell

The Trump Administration Is More Terrified of Escalation Than Biden Ever Was; This Week In The Sanctions Pantomime

Hello All,

I’m sending out the weekend update on Saturday this weekend, as its an extremely busy few days for me, and frankly so much has already happened that there is more than enough to discuss as is. The week started with the Ukrainian successful strike against Russian strategic air power (and other strategic targets), which set the tone for the week. The Russian response which came the evening of June 5-6 was one of attacking civilian targets (by the way not really an escalation—they have been doing this all along). The comparison between these operations helped show, once again, the difference in the war fighting approaches of the two countries.

A Russian aircraft burning after being hit by a Ukrainian drone as part of Operation Spiderweb

Also, instead of writing another long section this week about how Trump is continuing to string everyone along on sanctions on Russia, I thought it might be interesting to return to the idea of escalation control. The Trump administration seems even more terrified about Russian escalation than the Biden administration—which is worthy of note as many Republicans were telling us Trump would be much tougher on Russia.

And then finally, inevitably, a short update on the sanctions pantomime. Depressing, but it needs a little coverage.

The War In A Nutshell

Over the past seven days the Ukrainians have undertaken a number of well-thought out strategic attacks designed to hit Russian military targets and degrade Russia’s ability to wage war. I’m sure you heard of the most well-covered of these, Operation Spiderweb—the very successful operation which took out a large number of expensive, in some cases irreplaceable, Russian aircraft using drones that together cost a few hundred thousand dollars (see calculation below).

I updated last weekend’s update when reports of the operations started coming in. Its worthy of note that over the last few days what has emerged is pretty strong evidence that the Ukrainians were being as accurate as possible in their original estimates of Russian losses. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, compiled this report on confirmed Russian losses (12 aircraft) and those which can only be confirmed damaged/targeted. Here is the chart in the report.

This one operation took out 15% of Russia’s Tu-95 (Bear) force and destroyed/damaged about the same percentage of TU-22 (Backfire) aircraft. And it matters. The real damage this represents is far higher than 15%, as no power can either deploy all aircraft of a type it possesses, nor were all the 58 estimated Tu-95s, for instance, be available for operations.

As evidence of this, the Russian retaliation strike saw the Russians basically overloading some of their surviving Tu-95s to carry out the attack—and it seems it might be a while until they can do something similar again.

And what did the Ukrainians use for this damage. Well, this excellent CSIS report, states that overall 117 Ukrainian drones took part in the operation. These drones have been estimated at costing around $1200 each, so the total cost of the attack systems employed, even with serious rounding up, would have been less than $200,000.

In cost efficiency terms, that is one of the most successful attacks in modern military history. Btw, I wrote a piece about it in The Atlantic, if you want to see an attempt to put it into context. Here is a gift link. This one operation is a real warning to advanced militaries in the world about the vulnerability of their highly-priced legacy systems to much less expensive defensive firepower.

And it was not all. During the last seven days the Ukrainians have attacked the Kerch Bridge again, a Russia missile launch base in Bryansk (used to launch Iskanders at Ukraine, and a large Russian fuel refinery near the strategic Engels Air Force Base in Saratov. Reports from a few hours ago say the fire at this facility was so intense that it could not be put out.

And at the same time, reports came in over the past week of Ukrainian operations against Russian railway logistics both in occupied Ukraine and in Russia.

When you add it altogether, the breadth of these attacks, their geographical spread and strategic value, they show that the Ukrainians are (with very limited resources compared to the Russians) attempting to wage a strategically sophisticated and effective war (and one which actually fits within the laws of war). Its a tragedy that they have been forced to wait so long, and been forced to develop their own systems, to fight such a war. The USA claimed for decades that it stood for such laws of war as part of the US dominated Rules-Based Order. The Ukrainians are actually fighting within that order—and the US has hindered them to get there.

The opposite to this is what the Russians are and have been doing. This week, while the Ukrainians were attacking strategic, military targets, the Russians threw a huge number of more expensive systems against Ukrainian cities, at least partly out of the desire to kill civilians. Their major attack, on the evening of July 5-6, involved 38 cruise missiles and hundreds of drones. These attacks seem to have included a deliberate attempt to target first-responder emergency workers. In Kyiv, three were killed in a follow up attack that came not long after the original one.

A Ukrainian first-responder in Kyiv, covering the body of a fellow worker.

There was even reportedly a Russian double-tap strike in Zaporizhzhia, which was aimed at killing Ukrainian first responders, and sadly took a significant toll though injured, not killed.

It should also be said that for all the talk of Russia escalating in response to Ukrainian success (see below) these Russian attacks are basically a repeat of what they have been doing for years. Russia already is doing everything it can—it has little or no room to escalate beyond nuclear weapons (which it will never use).

The financial cost overall of the Russian operation would have been exponentially more than the Ukrainian operations—and achieved far less. It is really an example of the war fighting strategies of the two states in a nutshell. Ukraine is having to be resourceful within strict limits, using brainpower to make up for the lack of sophisticated equipment, and is focussing on Russia’s ability to wage war by attacking military targets. The Russians are using billions of dollars of equipment, much of it as part of a terror campaign.

And yet it is the Ukrainians who are accused of escalation. What a strange world we live in.

The Trump Administration Is More Terrified of Escalation Than Biden Ever Was

From February 2022 until January 2025 I was as critical about the Biden Administration’s fears of escalation as practically anyone. They were far too deferential to Putin, forced Ukraine to fight the war in a wrong-headed and at times even self-defeating way, and ultimately lengthened a war that could have been ended more sooner with less blood. What happened was that fears of what Russia would do (particularly use nuclear weapons) severely restricted the type of capability the Biden Administration was willing to provide the Ukrainians—giving Russia a massive strategic advantage that the Ukrainians are only now contesting with some home-grown systems and ingenuity.

And some people were arguing that Trump would never be so timid—that he would stand up to the Russians and force them to back down.

It was all a fantasy—and the reality was re-emphasized loudly this week. Trump is far more timid than Biden ever was, is terrified of doing anything to provoke Putin, and is willing to consider punishing Ukraine because of what Russia might do to escalate.

And those around him echo this. General Kellogg, widely seen as one of the more pro-Ukraine (I use this phrase relatively) figures around Trump, hit the escalation worry button hard after Operation Spiderweb’s great success. Kellogg went on Fox News to criticize the Ukrainians for having the courage to fight back, on the grounds that it could provoke the Russians to escalate. Here is the key quote.

"I'm telling you, the risk levels are going way up - I mean, what happened this weekend…People have to understand in the national security space: when you attack an opponent's part of their national survival system, which is their triad, the nuclear triad, that means your risk level goes up because you don't know what the other side is going to do. You're not sure.”

The Biden Administration was actually never so craven publicly.

Of course what Kellogg is saying is exactly what Trump believes. Trump has always wanted to pressure the Ukrainians to make concessions to Putin out of fears of Russian escalation. Where the idea that Trump might be tougher on Putin ever emerged from is beyond me.

And Trump’s reaction to the Ukrainian operation this week is more to look for ways to punish or sanction Ukraine than it is to crack down on Russia. There were two instances of his mindset this week.

In the Atlantic, Jonathan Lemire, relying on three different White House sources, said the Ukrainian attacks had stoked Trump’s fear of a Russian escalation and the president was considering punishing Ukraine. Btw, here is a gift link to that piece.

Here is the key section of the article that discusses Trump and escalation.

“…since Sunday’s attack, which hit a series of Russian military airfields, the president has privately expressed frustration that the strike could escalate the conflict, according to three administration officials and an outside adviser to the White House. (They spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.)

These sources told me that the drone strike has reignited the president’s long-held displeasure with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and prompted a new debate in the White House about whether the United States should abandon Ukraine. Throughout the war, Trump has deemed Zelensky a “bad guy” and a “hothead,” the outside adviser said—someone who could be pushing the globe toward World War III.”

And Trump publicly provided some evidence that this is his thinking. In his public press conference with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz (who was pushing Trump to be harsher on Russia) Trump responded that he might sanction both sides because of how they were fighting. His exact threat was against “both countries”.

“It could be on both countries to be honest. You know, it takes two to tango, but we’re going to be very tough, whether it’s Russia or anybody else.”

So, the next time a Trumpite backer starts criticizing the Biden administration for its escalation fears, you can point out that Trump is, and always has been, worse.

He is absolutely terrified of doing anything to anger Putin.

In decades to come, the study of how the US, because of a deep-seated timidity, lost the greatest chance it has received in many decades to improve its strategic position, will be the focus of some of the most depressing studies of US foreign policy ever written.

This Week In The Sanctions Pantomime

Of course Trump’s threat of sanctions against Ukraine was not just a sign of escalation fears—probably more important it was part of the ongoing pantomime of Trump wanting to seem tough on Russia but always, always, finding ways not to do anything against Putin when the time comes. Remember it was two weeks ago Sunday (tomorrow) that Trump called Putin “absolutely CRAZY” and threatened to get tough on the Russian leader if Putin did not show commitment to the peace process.

Btw, the two-week deadline that Trump then issued a few days later, is looming—are you excited?

This week the pantomime involved Trump trying to neuter the Senate bill threatening Russia with sanctions, the one sponsored by Senators Blumenthal and Graham.

Trump really hates this bill, but cannot admit to that publicly. The bill actually would give him everything he would need to try and get Putin in line—were he so inclined. It empowers the President to put crippling economic sanctions on states/countries that do energy business with Russia. It would thus allow the US to economic neuter anyone doing business with Putin’s war machine.

So what did we see this week? Well behind the scenes Trump is trying to make sure the bill either does not get a vote or, if it does, that is it crystal clear that he and only he can decide whether to impose such sanctions. His threat to have sanctions on Ukraine and Russia is another way that he can maneuver around the bill if he wanted.

I am detecting, finally, that people seem to understand this. Trump will never put harsh sanctions on Putin unless the Republican Party stages an outright rebellion against his pro-Russian positions (and even then he might resist). So far, the party is nowhere near that.

Cant wait to see what happens this week in the pantomime.

Have a good rest of the weekend everyone.