Weekend Update #135: Scratch That: The Ukrainians Just Pulled Off The Most Successful Operation Of The War

The New York Times Shows How Trump/Putin Control The Narrative; Trump Delays Again

Hi Everyone,

The Ukrainians Just Pulled Off The Most Successful Operation Of The War

Ok—Update time. A few hours after I sent out my update, reports started coming in about the most remarkable and successful operation of the war so far. It seems, entirely credibly, that the Ukrainians in one fell swoop have destroyed or at least heavily damaged 40-plus high value Russian aircraft at four different airbases—at about the same time. This is a big blow to Russian strategic airpower which is hard to underestimate. It also highlights why the narrative that Russia is somehow destined to prevail because of its greater strength is, shall we say, nonsense.

First, what do we know about the attacks.

Well the Ukrainians coordinated attacks on at least four different airfields across Russia, including Belaya Air Base, which is about 6000 kilometres from Ukraine (its a 6105 kilometre drive from Kyiv for instance—here is a map).

Belaya also houses some of the most valuable Russian aircraft, including the long-range TU-95 strategic bombers, which are one of the most effective tools being used by the Russians to attack Ukraine. They can carry up to eight Kh-101 missiles each on external pylons, and these missiles have a range of over 5000 kilometres, advanced radar evading capabilities, integrated decoys, and carry 400 kilogram warheads. Just a few days ago, 10 Russian TU-95s were used to launch a large volley of KH-101s on Ukraine during one of Russia’s massed attacks on Ukrainian cities.

It also must be noted that Russia has no way to build new TU-95s (they were originally built decades ago) and there is no equivalent that they can somehow magically rush into production. These are real capability losses that will be impossible to make up.

Overall, the Ukrainians have claimed to have hit more than 40 Russian aircraft, not only TU-95s, but also Tu-22M3s as well as A-50s. These are all high value targets.

How the attacks were supposedly carried out is also remarkable. It is being claimed that trucks were driven near the bass, trucks which possessed rooftop compartments that were hiding flocks of drones. This is a picture that has been circulating of what they may have looked like.

So, trucks crammed with drones were near enough to the bases that the drones could be have been released and then flown on to attack their targets very quickly. There were a numbers of videos released with pictures of what were claimed to be burning Russian airbases. You can see some here.

Its an amazing operation to have been carried out by Ukrainian intelligence—and reports are circulating that it took one and a half years to organize. That tells you a great deal about how the Ukrainians have gone about planning this war.

What Do We Not Know?

There are a number of intriguing questions to which we will need answers. How many aircraft have been fully destroyed? The original Ukrainian claims are more than 40. However its not clear whether this was aircraft hit or aircraft destroyed. A Ukrainian I trust completely said confirmed Russian bombers destroyed presently sits at 10 (Im assuming that this is TU-95s) and that you can expect this to rise.

Also, we do not know how the UAVs were controlled. There was some talk that this was AI—which seems a reach to me (full AI that is). The drones could have had a basic target recognition software on them, or certain programmed flight patterns. That would be my guess as they would have to be self-guided if they were launched out of those trucks and deep inside Russia. However, we still have lots to learn about this.

If these were really AI-driven UAVS, the world of war just changed today. Im just sceptical for now.

And of course we do not know what the Russian reaction will be—however we can assume it will be violent and destructive. This is the greatest humiliation for Russia in the war. High value targets, deep inside Russia, were destroyed in one-fell swop by Ukrainian intelligence. Something will happen (it just will not be nuclear).

What Does This Mean?

Of course its far too early to say strategically. However it will definitely hurt Russia’s ability to launch the large barrages of missiles on Ukraine, and it will cause pandemonium on Russian bases as they look to their own security.

(Btw, it should also lead to intense security reviews at all NATO bases right now—we have been far too lax in allowing drone overflights of our facilities—and for allowing unfettered traffic alone and foreign nationals to buy land next to the most sensitive military facilities. The Ukrainians have just shown what enormous damage can be done by a (relatively cheap) drone swarm released close to a base. That has to be terribly worrying to every country in Europe and North America.

Most importantly, however, I would argue that this operation shows the value of ranged strike and reinforces the point that Ukraine can win the war is properly supported. The Russian military remains a very beatable, in some ways shoddy instrument. Ukraine has just hammered it using simple weapons, relatively speaking. If we armed Ukraine to take on Russia at range in a real and fulsome way—the Russian military would be in for a very rough time.

Just my first impressions.

The Original Update

I am not going to do it. The big story this week (as it has been for the last few months) is that once again Donald Trump is protecting Vladimir Putin. Trump does this by threatening to be all mean and tough with Russia—but never actually doing anything. This week began with arguably the finest example of Trump helping Putin in this way—the famous Putin is “crazy” tweet before Trump spent days doing what he ALWAYS does, back down and ignore the threats he just made. I will talk about this at the end of the update, but really I cannot lead off with it as its become so repetitive and depressing that I am running out of ways to describe the same process over and over. If you really want to get into it right away, I wrote this piece on Monday which pretty much told you exactly how the rest of the week was destined to play out.

The Gaslighter In Chief

Instead, I will start with a discussion of the state of the land war, with reports that the Russians are beginning their “Summer Offensive”—which actually has been going on in some form for months. Also. I discuss how the vision of what a “peace” deal with Ukraine might look like has been perverted in the last few months. The New York Times wrote a leading editorial in which it described what seemed to be a “clear” and straightforward peace deal—but was really anything but. It reveals how the Russians and Trump have basically reconfigured everything about a possible ceasefire arrangement in such a way that it serves Russian interests.

A Ukrainian Rescue Worker After Another Russian Missile Attack in Sumy Oblast.

One final note, Minna was a little under the weather this week and so her column has not yet appeared. Hopefully it will be out tomorrow (Monday). So you will need to wait a little longer, but at least you can look forward to a little more Minna optimism. She is writing about the recent steps taken by the new German government to aid Ukraine (which even make me more a little more hopeful).

Has The Russian Summer Offensive Started?

One of the weird differences in how the war has been reported over the last years is that when the Russians disperse their forces and launch offensive operations which are not self supporting because they are so spread apart, they are usually praised for their military efforts and doom is widely forecast. Think about the Kharkiv Offensive which started just over a year ago, which the press described at first as an operation that could lead to Ukrainian collapse (when actually it was a Russian strategic failure).

On the other hand, when the Ukrainians, on internal lines, launch their offensive on Kursk, that was quickly described as a dangerous risk that was bound to go wrong.

I bring this up because the Russians seem once again to be launching some kind of wide-spread unconcentrated offensive operations (hold your horses before you panic). In the last two weeks one element of this operation has started up in the Sumy Oblast—thousands of kilometres of front from the main fighting in the Donbas. Over the last few days there were lots of reports that the Russians have concentrated about 50,000 troops on the border with Sumy and have started advancing into Ukraine. Zelensky himself used this number in one of his addresses and stated that the Ukrainians were expecting Russian attacks there. Here is the Deep State map of the area as of this morning (with scale in the bottom right).

The Russians have advanced about five miles into Ukraine over the border in the last two weeks. In the last few days the Russian attacks in the Sumy area have picked up and that, as long as the even bigger attacks in the Donbas, have led to some judgements that the Russians have started their major Summer Offensive.

Of course, in today’s war fighting environment, 50,000 troops against defensive positions is enough for a small offensive, but not for a full scale invasion. With defensive firepower and UAVs in large numbers, the Russians can make some problems for the Ukrainians with their high-casualty, small chunks of land attacking techniques, but it will not be sustainable after a few weeks without significantly more forces. Maybe the best way to describe what they were doing was given by Mykola Bielieskov in his Atlantic Council report of what the coming summer offensive by the Russians might entail.

Russia’s strategy continues to rely on costly frontal assaults, but the nature of these attacks is steadily evolving. Russian troops now increasingly employ motorbikes and other improvised vehicles to advance in small groups and infiltrate Ukraine’s defensive lines. These assaults are backed by strike drones, glide bombs, and artillery, making it difficult for Ukraine to direct reinforcements to hot spots or provide medical and engineering support. The end goal is to force Ukrainian tactical withdrawals and inch further forward.

Certainly this kind of tactic is what we have seem from the Russians in the Donbas over the last month, as they have made a few small gains. In the Donbas, the Russians have been maintaining a relatively high tempo of offensive operations for the last month—though interestingly in a relatively small area. The are operating, in the area between Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar (which is an area that they have been fighting in for well over a year).

Here is a map of the area, to give you an idea of the relatively small size involved (includes a distance marker in the bottom left). The distance (by road) from Chasiv Yar to Pokrovsk is just over 50 miles (89 kilometers).

Here is this area within the context of the front line—its pretty small.

Now during the month of May, the Russians made some very small advances in this area. Here is the map on 30 April, so you can see. The Russians have expanded the central bulge by somewhere between 5-10 miles.

So we see a definite uptick in Russian offensive operations, in very disparate theaters. There are even reports that the Russians are about to start offensive operations in another area, Zaporizhzhia oblast. General Syrskyi mentioned that in a statement yesterday where he also implied that a more general Russian offensive is now underway.

Of course all of this happens after the Russians have already been attacking for at least the month of May as well. So what is occurring? Well it would be most accurate to say that with the better Spring/Summer weather the Russians are increasing the tempo of what they have been doing. They are pressing to take “inches” wherever they can. Its a strategy based on the Russian assumption that they are ultimately in control of when the fighting stops; that with Trump in the White House that any Ukrainian territory they seize now is one they can hold onto when a “ceasefire” is eventually reached. It allows them to spread out their forces in these unsupported attacks and launch these series of attacks.

Would they be doing this if the US were still strongly backing Ukraine? That is questionable. Its a very high casualty/high loss form of fighting and it is not sustainable. However they could keep it this summer if they do not have any fear that Ukraine will be supported to try and take back its territory.

So do not expect dramatic change in the front line, and be cautious about those who get all panicky—there remains an analytical community functioning which is keen to spread the narrative of an excellent Russian military to justify past failures. However, do expect lost of small attacks, some small advances, and lots of destruction. If the Russians do the attacking and the Ukrainians take advantage of that—so much the better.

The New York Times Shows How Trump/Putin Control The Narrative

Maybe the most surprising element of the last 4-6 months has been the supine nature of many leading American institutions. From universities, to leading law firms and corporations, to networks and the media there has been a noticeable growth in self-censorship or outright appeasement of the Trump administration. In this way US institutions have aided in the destruction of their own credibility—credibility that will be very difficult to repair.

One of the ways this has happened is the adoption of Trump administration talking points as somehow fact—letting the administration set the terms of debate without questioning the underlying rationale of what is clearly weak arguments or outright nonsense. This kind of uncritical adoption has been particularly notable in the discussion of the Russo-Ukraine War, where the idea that the war is hopelessly stalemated, that Ukraine must cede the land Russia has conquered, and that it would be better to get back to business with Russia is increasingly widespread.

As example A in this process I give you this New York Times editorial which was published on May 29. It called on Trump not to walk away from the war, claiming that this would lead to the continuation of a basically lost war. It assumed, very problematically, that Trump is somehow out to negotiate a fair ceasefire for Ukraine (which is decidedly not the case) but more depressingly, the Times editorial team laid out what it thought was the obvious terms for any cease-fire deal.

First The Times made an argument about the importance of Trump staying engaged, which was based on the already disproven idea that he is some honest broker between Ukraine and Russia. Here is the text on that.

An American withdrawal would only encourage a new military push by Mr. Putin, who has staked his authoritarian rule on bringing Ukraine to heel and seizing its territory. Nor would Ukraine surrender. It has developed ways to hold back Russian forces, including through a domestic defense industry that may produce a few million drones this year. Other European powers, including Britain, Germany and France, will also continue to support Ukraine.

Rather than walk away, Mr. Trump has an opportunity to increase the pressure on Russia and Ukraine to agree to a deal. In the past few days, he has even shown signs of doing so (hard as it is to know when his words reflect his intentions). He said on Wednesday that he was “not happy” with Mr. Putin’s recent attacks on Ukraine and said on Monday that he was “absolutely” considering new economic sanctions on Russia.

What, pray tell, is the “pressure” that the US should place on Ukraine? That would be fascinating to hear. The “pressure” that the US is placing on Russia is at least acknowledged, and it is the heretofore non-existent extra sanctions that Trump has threatened numerous time.

That the Times would be so intellectually uninquisitive is depressing—but even more so is how the Times editorial team has now adopted entirely what can only be called a Trump/Putin vision of a peace deal. They even called the outlines “clear”—when it is anything but.

This plan is as clear as mud. What does the Times mean by the word “keep” in terms of Russian conquests. Does that mean Russia gets legal claim to that territory—which was certainly part of the Trump plan (as regards Crimea) that was leaked to the press. If so, this will lead to a massive row with European states who have already said that no legal transfer should occur, an to Ukraine which has a constitutional statement to that effect.

Also, Russia gets a pledge that sanctions will be lifted after making no concessions, while Ukraine is told by “the west” that it will be not admitted into NATO. These two are major concessions to Ukraine—I suppose they are clear, but they are one sided.

And under the Times what does Ukraine get—well nothing clear. You will notice the dodge about the European Union (which Russia does not want Ukraine to join). Can Ukraine still join under this “clear” deal. Ukraine gets to “integrate” more into the European “economy”—whatever that means. The EU is far more than the economy. And Ukraine gets no specific security guarantees at all (unlike Russia getting a guarantee that Ukraine cannot join NATO). Can you tell me what this sentence entails?

“For Ukraine, the West could commit to military and economic support of Russia attacks again….”

Does that mean no support for Ukraine until Russia attacks again? If not, what kind of “support” (worth noting that the Times will not even use the word “guarantee”) does it even cover? Certainly Ukraine cannot count on any real security out of this. Note—that the Times will not even touch the question of whether the US would provide any security—Trump has killed that off and they meekly bow their heads and accept.

This recitation of the Trump/Putin peace plan actually makes the last sentence a lie. How is Ukraine’s population supposed to “thrive” if the country has no clear security guarantees, cannot get into NATO, has been forced to give up its land to Russia and cannot even be assured of EU membership? The opposite would be the case—no one would invest in a Ukraine that could slip back into war at any time if Russia felt like it.

Basically what the Times has done is taken the Trump/Putin plan, adopted it as now the base case scenario and in many ways made it worse. The damage done in these four months to freedom and critical thinking is immense.

Trump Delays Again

It took all of two days this time for Trump to admit that he is full of BS. When, on Monday May 26, Trump released his public, performative tweet expressing irritation with Putin for bombarding Ukrainian cities on Monday and threatening harsh sanctions against Russia, some people once again took Trump seriously.

As I mentioned in the piece above, please do not do that. Trump is using these tweets to protect Putin, not threaten the Russian dictator. As long as Trump looks irritated with Russia and threatens sanctions, he can hold US-backers of Ukraine at bay and keep some Europeans hopeful that he might stand with them. However, all that really matters now is actions—and Trump did what he always does and come up with reasons not to do anything to hurt Russia. Two days after that tweet, on May 28, Trump announced that he was so irritated with Putin that he would need “about two weeks” to think things through.

For those who don’t know—the two week claim is Trump’s standard delaying claim. In Trump’s first term he regularly claimed, for instance, that he was going to produce a replacement for Obamacare in two or a few weeks time. None ever appeared. In this term he has regularly said that a deal with Russia is only a few or two weeks away—or that he needs two weeks more to decide whether to sanction Russia.

And it never happens.

This week to make it clear that it will not happen, by Friday Trump was back making excuses for Putin, In arguably the second most unnerving press conference of the last 4 months (the first was the press conference during with Vance and Trump ambushed Zelensky), Trump trotted out his regular defense of the Russian dictator.

This was the “farewell” press conference for Elon Musk, who is reportedly stepping back from his very influential position in the Trump administration. The Press conference was unnerving because of Musk’s behavior, which seemed spacey (following hard on the heels of the news reports of his very heavy drug use during the presidential campaign—drug use the supposedly involved so much ketamine that at times he could not control his bladder at times). If you want to watch Musk and the whole press conference—here is a link. From the very beginning its profoundly weird.

Anyway, as part of the performance, Trump was asked about Putin—and his response was illuminating to say the least. Here is a transcript.

Media question:

And you guys, you and your team deal with a very stubborn Vladimir Putin, do you…

President Donald Trump:

And Zelensky.

Media question:

But do you look at this conflict…

President Donald Trump:

Zelensky too…

Media question:

Any differently Now, do you look at this and see Putin as the good guy or the bad guy?

President Donald Trump:

So I've known him very well, and I went through a lot of things with him because Russia was the Russia, Russia, Russia hoax turned out to be a total hoax. New York Times, they got a Pulitzer surprise. They have to give back the Pulitzer Prize. That's my lawsuit. And they're doing very poorly in that lawsuit. But they wrote stories about how it was true and it was false. And a lot of Washington Post also, I have gotten to see things that I was very surprised at rockets being shot into cities like Kyiv during a negotiation that I felt was maybe very close to ending. We were going to solve a problem and then all of a sudden rockets got shot into a couple of cities and people died. I saw things that I was surprised at and I don't like being surprised. So I'm very disappointed in that way. With that being said, I'd like to see it end 5,000 people. I think the numbers even more than that, but 5,000 people a week are being killed. Mostly soldiers, but also people that live in little cities and towns throughout Ukraine. And I'd like to see that stop.

Where is crazy Putin here?

So, Trump is back defending Putin after his brief pivot. Now Zelensky is as big a problem as Putin (pesky Zelensky who does not want his country to be destroyed), and really the big issue is the Russia “hoax” (that was not a hoax).

What is not there—no sanctions threats, no offers of weapons for Ukraine, nada. It was the moment that confirmed (once again) that Trump is, through his delaying tactic, protecting Putin.

I would really prefer never having to write about this process again.

Have a good rest of the weekend everyone.