Weekend Update #112: Ukraine Strikes a Senior Russian Officer (Again).
Also: Pokrovsk and Kurakhove; Kursk and North Koreans
Hello All,
The big story this week in terms of press coverage was the Ukrainian-claimed strike against a senior Russian officer in Moscow. The strange thing was that this got a huge amount of attention and people seemed to think it marked a major turning point—when actually these kinds of attacks have been absolutely typical throughout the war.
Also, the results on the battlefield are focussing into a smaller and smaller area (primarily near Pokrovsk and Kurakhove)—which is in itself more interesting than they actually small amounts of area being changing hands. Also, there were substantial reports that the North Koreans were committed to the fight around Kursk. All covered below
Ukraine Strikes a Senior Russian Officer (Again)
On Tuesday morning this week, as he was preparing to drive, a senior Russian general. Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, was blown up in/next to his car by a explosive laden moped that was parked right there.
There was some video filmed which was reportedly of the attack. You can see the key moments at the start of this news report if you would like.
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And here is a brief description of Kirillov’s background so you can see how senior he was—in command of Russia’s chemical weapons forces (and chemical weapons are now being used regularly in this war).
Kirillov, 54, was the chief of Russia's Radiation, Biological and Chemical Protection Forces. These special troops are tasked with protecting the military from the enemy’s use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and ensuring operations in a contaminated environment.
He was under sanctions from several countries, including the U.K. and Canada, for his actions in Moscow’s war in Ukraine. On Monday, Ukraine’s Security Service, or SBU, opened a criminal investigation against him, accusing Kirillov of directing the use of banned chemical weapons.
What is remarkable about the attack is not that it was illegal (its not), is not that it was an escalation (its not), its that people decided to go into these issues in the way that they did. Sadly, these kinds of attacks have been commonplace througout this war and many in the 20th and 21st centuries, and the shocking thing is that people are acting like they are somehow surprised.
First off, since the Russian full-scale invasions, both sides have targeted senior military and political figures on the other side. Indeed, the Russian full-scale invasion itself seemed predicated on a “decapitation” mission against Zelensky and the senior leaders in the Ukrainian government. The Russians have regularly tried to kill Zelensky since. There have been descriptions of a number of different efforts in and around Kyiv, for instance, of the Russians trying to kill Zelensky.
However, maybe most openly, the Russians tried to kill Zelensky a few months ago with a missile strike in Odesa, when the Ukrainian president was visiting that city in the company of the Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis.
(btw—this attack saw 5 civilians killed—which seems to get no comment at all these days—a sign of the moral poverty of the world in which we live).
And these Russian attacks have reached down to senior officers. The Russians have clearly been trying to kill Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukrainian Military intelligence, throughout the war. At one point they introduced poison into his food chain, and ended up poisoning Budanov’s wife.
The Ukrainians have also been enthusiastically targeting Russian officers in Russia, and killed a number it seemed. A Russian submarine commander, Stanislav Rzhitsky, was killed out running near Krasnodar in July 2023.
Russian submarines, btw, are being used to fire many of the missiles that are regularly attacking Ukrainian cities. In this case, Rzhitsky might have been the cause of his own demise, as he liked to post his running routes on a sports app, which allowed Ukrainian intelligence to track his movements.
The Ukrainians have also targeted senior military and political figures in occupied Ukraine as well.
So the killing or attempted killing of officers and even senior political leaders has been par for the course in this war. This did not, however, stop people from taking the strangest takes on the Kirillov attack. Most notably, Trump’s Ukrainian envoy, General Kellogg, went on Fox News and criticized the attack, seemingly saying that not only was it not “smart”, but that it might have been illegal and an escalation. You can watch him here.
Its hard to know what to make of this. Targeted killing of senior military officers has been US policy since the US revolution. Arguably its been central to the US way of war.
Two examples.
In April 1943, the US targeted the plane of the legendary Japanese Admiral Yamamoto. Using decryption results, they were able to determine when and where he would be making a flight and, operating at the extreme edge of their range, American P-38s operating from Guadalcanal shot down Yamamoto’s plane over the island of Bouganville.
To give you an idea of US motivation, the actual plan that saw Yamamoto killed was called Operation Vengeance.
However, the US has even targeted and killed senior officers with whom the country is not strictly at war. Maybe the most famous recent one was the 2020 killing of the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani.
Soleimani was arguably the most important officer in the Iranian military—far more important that Kirillov. And the US attacked him (under Trump’s presidency no less) when he was paying a trip to Iraq—outwardly a friendly country with the USA. Indeed, Trump came out and openly claimed responsibility for the Soleimani attack, celebrating it as a great victory. Here is how he described it in a public statement.
Last night, at my direction, the United States military successfully executed a flawless precision strike that killed the number-one terrorist anywhere in the world, Qasem Soleimani.
Soleimani was plotting imminent and sinister attacks on American diplomats and military personnel, but we caught him in the act and terminated him.
Under my leadership, America’s policy is unambiguous: To terrorists who harm or intend to harm any American, we will find you; we will eliminate you. We will always protect our diplomats, service members, all Americans, and our allies.
I could go on and on.
So the Kirillov attack was typical of this war, typical of many wars, and was absolutely consistent with the policies of the USA. To say otherwise is frankly bizarre. Moreover, the reaction to it has followed the normal hysterical pattern we have seen so far.
First—all the hand-wringing, such as from Kellogg. Many people wondered if Russia might now “escalate” in response. One paper even wondered if, shock, horror, Russia might now attack Zelensky. Its almost like people have no idea what they have been seeing the last 3 years.
And actually—so far there has been no escalation, because Russian escalation has reached the point where there is little more than Putin can do.
As for the impact of the operation—its hard to say. It certainly cant be reassuring to senior Russian officers to see one of their own killed (in many ways quite easily) on the streets of Moscow. It doesn’t say much about the true competence of the Putin regime that such an officer was so lightly protected (one security guard). Indeed, the real impact of this might be to lead to some doubts about the Putin regime.
One thing it is not, however, is exceptional. War is pretty horrible, if you haven’t realized that by now.
Pokrovsk and Kurakhove
Last weekend in the update I made a point of looking at some of the reporting of the fighting around Pokrovsk, which has been amazingly consistent for five months now. Pokrovsk has always been about to fall because of a combination of Ukrainian incompetence and Russian successful adaptation—and the report just over a week ago could have been written in August or September (and in many ways was). You can find it in this link.
Well, this week the Russian advance on Pokrovsk slowed from even the glacial pace of a week ago, so the stories of a week before were quietly shelved. Here is the most recent Deep State map of the area of greatest fighting—with a scale so you can see the very small distances involved (about 3 miles to the inch).
And here was the same exact map last Sunday.
Indeed, the areas of greatest Russian advances have been near Kurakhove—which is a strong indication that the next round or reporting will be around the disastrous implications of the loss of this supposedly strategic city or Ukraine.
Russian attacks, if anything, have been less successful over the last week—certainly towards Pokrovsk. Deep State hasn’t even felt the need to update its map in a few days. Whats worth noting is how limited the areas of Russian operations are. They are getting condensed into a smaller area (Pokrovsk to Kurakhove) with the other area of greatest Russian attacks being in Kursk—more on that next.
Its pretty clear what we are seeing (and have been seeing for months). Putin is trying to take whatever he can of the Donbas before Trump takes office—and after a major push in November is actually seeing less success. He is also trying to take back all of Kursk, as this will complicate any Trump attempt to freeze the war along the present lines.
As such, Putin is basically expending men and equipment at unsustainable rates for these small advances. On December 20, for instance, the Ukrainians reported the highest daily Russian losses of soldiers for the entire war—2200.
Russia cannot generate soldiers to cover such losses for that much longer. It will have to either lower the loss rate or its army will shrink. The same goes for much of their equipment. The Russian war economy actually has some major problems, and is struggling keeping up. For vehicles, for instance, the greatest reinforcement has come from old stocks that are refurbished. Signs are that these are beginning to thin. If the stories about the relentless and inevitable Russian military were wrong in 2024, stories of the powerful Russian war economy were likewise overstated. Its good to see some balance in the coverage, as this Economist story attempted to do this week.
The story is as it was. Russia is not that strong and can be beaten. However, Ukraine can’t do that on its own—it can only do it if we help it to. Sadly, that help is not being provided.
Kursk and North Koreans
One of the reason that Putin has desperately been using North Korean forces in Kursk is that he dealing with losses that he cant sustain relying only on Russian forces. He wouldn’t do this if he did not have to. He is also desperate to take back Kursk before Trump’s inauguration, as its looking more and more like Trump will try to freeze the battlefield in present lines and let Putin keep everything he has conquered.
This week reports came in that the North Koreans were definitely in action and suffering massive losses. There is no way that they could have been prepared, for instance, for the UAV dominated war that they would have encountered. They would simply have been out of their depth, and the reports are that they have been mowed down making straightforward attempts to advance. Here is a picture that Ukrainian intelligence released of North Korean dead.
It is worth noting that the Kursk front line is even more solid than that around Pokrovsk. Deep State has made only very small changes in the last 3 weeks. All we can say is that the North Korean troops better prepare themselves for Russian levels of losses—as Putin will do anything to try and retake Kursk before Trump takes office.
Have a good rest of the weekend everyone.
I think there's a small glimmer of hope in the near shutdown of the US government yesterday. Musk got Trump into serious trouble and made him look bad with no upside whatsoever (unless you count cutting funding for pediatric cancer research as huge political victory). It was obvious even to Trump that Musk's demand for the Congress not to pass anything before January 20 was asinine. And now the talk has turned from Trump winning a "mandate" and being in full control of the GOP to large numbers of Republicans in Congress defying Trump twice. Trump can't be happy. He has thought that Musk is very smart because he's very rich. But now he may become more cautious about doing what Musk wants. And it will be a good thing if perhaps the strongest anti-Ukrainian voice around Trump will become less influential.
Phillips, thanks for sharing your observations and thoughts regularly. It does seem that Russia is fighting an unsustainable war, from the standpoint of both manpower and material. The most directly threatened European countries may well keep up support even if others dither. Your thoughts on how much they can accomplish would be worth hearing. Perhaps that would be an article not a comment reply.