Weekend Update #111--Trump And "Abandoning" Ukraine—Be Careful What You Say

Plus a special announcement

Hello Everyone,

This was a week when the reality of the Russo-Ukraine War was (finally) publicly admitted by Donald Trump. The war is not his to control—and other actors (primarily Ukraine and Russia) can determine its ultimate outcome more than the USA. So there will be reflections on this and some other stories, in particular the front line and the collapse narrative (which has moved back to Pokrovsk, where it was this summer).

However, before that, I have a very special announcement to make. One of the reasons this update is a little later than usual, and might be a little shorter, is that tomorrow I hand in the manuscript for my next book. Its entitled: War and Power (snappy, huh) and its an analytical romp over the last century and a half from the origins of World War I to the prospect of a war in the Indo-Pacific today (and in the near future). Its a shorter, punchier book than I have written recently, about 80,000 words, and designed to take on big ideas on both concepts. Its been partly motivated by what were the terribly analytical failures in understanding both of these concepts before the Russian-full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 (which should lead to a wholesale re-examination how both power and war are understood and analyzed).

I will have much more to say about this book in the coming months, including the release of at least one lengthy chapter excerpt for subscribers. I can also happily report that the basic website information (and boy do I mean basic) is now available from Penguin/Random House in the UK and on Amazon. It will be released by Basic Books in the USA, and Im hoping those sites will be live in the not too distant future. No fancy graphics yet, but we have a release date for this coming August!

Btw—there has been some discussion about the title. Do you like the simple; War and Power? Other thoughts have been to make it slightly more discursive and include the idea of “Full-Spectrum Powers” that I discussed in Foreign Affairs (when I first started working on this book), in 2023. Actually, might throw in a poll about the title to see what you all think.

Anyway, I just thought I should let you know. Im really excited about this book, and it was in many ways the most fun Ive had writing—in that I could play around with big ideas and concepts. Its been a mad process, in particular in the last few months—but I think you will find that it was worth it.

And now, without further adieu, the weekend update.

Trump And “Abandoning” Ukraine—Be Careful What You Say

Donald Trump gave an interview for Time this week, that is worth reading in full. Here is a link to the whole transcript if you’re interested. Trump is actually quite candid in it, and seems revealing. It may be that it being done as part of him being named Man of the Year by time caused him to be a little more revealing. Just one example—he seems clear in his own mind that his victory in the election was to a large degree determined by the immigration question. While many people laughed or were horrified by the Haitians eating pets false accusation—Trump seemed to view the whole issue as a winner for him.

Now, what is also interesting is that Trump spoke a good deal about Ukraine, Russia and the war. I hope you don’t mind, but you need to read the whole exchange, and not just the one line on not abandoning (which people are not understanding I would argue). Anyway here is the whole exchange on the war at present—as well as its historical roots on which Trump is clear.

I’m going to shift to foreign policy. Have you spoken to Vladimir Putin since your election?

I can’t tell you. I can’t tell you. It’s just inappropriate.

If Ukraine doesn’t agree to a peace deal that you have said you will broker, will you cut military, humanitarian, and intelligence assistance to them?

The reason that I don’t like to tell you this is that, as a negotiator, when I sit down and talk to some very brilliant young people: young, young, young, young. Compared to me, you’re very young. But when I talk to people—when I start I think I have a very good plan to help, but when I start exposing that plan, it becomes almost a worthless plan.

Will you commit to protecting Ukrainian sovereignty, though, from Russia?

I would like to see Ukraine—okay, ready? You have to go back a little bit further. It would have never happened if I were president. Would have never happened—

But it has happened. So the question people want to know is, Would you abandon Ukraine?

It makes it so bad. And I had a meeting recently with a group of people from the government, where they come in and brief me, and I'm not speaking out of turn, the numbers of dead soldiers that have been killed in the last month are numbers that are staggering, both Russians and Ukrainians, and the amounts are fairly equal. You know, I know they like to say they weren't, but they're fairly equal, but the numbers of dead young soldiers lying on fields all over the place are staggering. It's crazy what's taking place. It's crazy. I disagree very vehemently with sending missiles hundreds of miles into Russia. Why are we doing that? We're just escalating this war and making it worse. That should not have been allowed to be done. Now they're doing not only missiles, but they're doing other types of weapons. And I think that's a very big mistake, very big mistake. But the level, the number of people dying is number one, not sustainable, and I'm talking on both sides. It’s really an advantage to both sides to get this thing done.

The question that many Americans and many people around the world have is, Will you abandon Ukraine?

I want to reach an agreement, and the only way you're going to reach an agreement is not to abandon. You understand what that means, right?

Right. Well, no, tell me.

Well, I just said it. You can't reach an agreement if you abandon, in my opinion. And I disagree with the whole thing, because it should have never happened. Putin would have never invaded Ukraine if I were president for numerous reasons. Number one, they drove up the oil price. When they drove up the oil price, they made it a profit-making situation for him, the oil price should have been driven down. If it was driven down, you wouldn't have had it wouldn't have started just for pure economic reasons. But when it hits $80, $85, and $90 a barrel. I mean, he made, he made a lot of money. I'm not saying it's a good thing, because he's also suffered, but they are moving forward. You know, this is a war that's been—this is a tragedy. This is death that's far greater than anyone knows. When the real numbers come out, you're going to see numbers that you're not going to believe.

The one thing Trump refuses to answer is whether he has spoken to Putin—which is not at all inappropriate (he has spoken to Zelensky) but its interesting that he wont divulge this.

Anyway, much of the public discussion was about Trump stating categorically that he would not abandon Ukraine (which btw, is not exactly true). This has been widely reported and made headlines around the world, including in Ukraine.

Actually Trump never says he can only stop the war by not abandoning Ukraine. He first avoids the question, then says you cant have a US-deal by abandoning (though never says Ukraine!)—which leaves open the possibility that there is no deal and he walks away.

This is how the whole exchange goes. The first time Trump is asked the question about whether he will abandon Ukraine (the question above)—he refuses to answer! He does what he always does when he doesn’t want to answer or dislikes a question—he swerves and talks about other things. Indeed, his first response is not only to avoid saying he will not abandon Ukraine, but to turn the question on its head and say that he is against attacks into Russia. In other words, Trump is a greater believer in the escalation paradigm that has so handicapped the US under Biden, than Biden himself. In other words, Trump is showing himself to be operating under greater reflexive control than Biden (which really should not be a surprise to anyone, but will be as there has been a whole chorus of pro-Trump voices who have been lying about the fact that he would be tougher than Biden on Russia.

However, the questioners keep at him and ask again—resulting in the exchange which got everyone excited. What is interesting is that even here, Trump refuses to directly say he wont abandon Ukraine. He says he wants a deal, and that would not happen if he abandons Ukraine. However, Trump might also walk away from the whole thing and not get a deal—in which case the abandonment is still very much on the cards. Also—worth noting that he never says in one sentence—I will not abandon Ukraine.

Now having made his non-denial, denial about abandonment, Trump gets asked a third time by the interviewer (nice job by her by the Time team btw) about whether he would abandon Ukraine. Here he throws shade rather effectively. He answers once again about getting a deal and abandoning (without saying he would definitely get a deal and not abandoning) and then turns to discuss the war as a whole. The line people think attaches itself to the abandonment discussion “And I disagree with the whole thing” is not about whether he would abandon Ukraine at all—its that he doesn’t like the war as a whole. And then he goes on to basically talk nonsense about oil prices.

So Trump is forced to even answer the question on abandonment and when he does, he mostly prevaricates. Certainly I hope that he wont abandon Ukraine, and there are some people around him who dont want him to (but there are many people around him who do). The one thing I would say is that if you read that interview as a commitment by Trump to stand by Ukraine, you are certainly more creative than am I.

The Understanding that Russia is Weaker than Understood is Gaining some Traction

For much of 2024 the focus in the reporting and analysis has been squarely on Russian strength and Ukrainian weakness. We’ve been hearing regularly that a Ukrainian collapse was right around the corner and that the Russian steamroller was relentlessly squashing the life out of Ukraine. Such stories are still occurring—thats for sure (see last story).

Of course readers of this substack have been hearing for years that Russian strength is being greatly over-estimated. Thankfully, events internationally (particularly with Syria) and the fact that Russia is suffering huge losses for small gains in Ukraine is also leading to some people understanding Russia’s true vulnerability. There was a really interesting piece to that effect by Fareed Zakaria in the Washington Post.

I can safely report that Russia is probably not weaker than many readers of this substack realize—but certainly Russia is much weaker than people who rely on mainstream reporting would have been led to think. The whole article is worth a read, if you can access it—and Zakaria goes a great deal into the production problems that Russia is facing, particularly in the face of such high losses. Here are three key paragraphs.

Vladimir Putin’s Russia now resembles the Soviet Union in the 1970s. While it is still assertive and interventionist abroad, its economy at home is increasingly weak and distorted by its conversion into a wartime operation. But just as the external expansionism and internal mobilization could not mask Soviet decay forever, so today Putin’s bravado should not scare us. Think about it: If Russia were winning in Ukraine, would Putin threaten to use nuclear weapons?

Two scholars, Marc DeVore and Alexander Mertens, note in Foreign Policy that “Russia is losing around 320 tank and artillery cannon barrels a month and producing only 20.” Citing open sources, they note that Russia has lost almost 5,000 infantry fighting vehicles since its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian defense contractors can make only around 200 a year. Its labor shortages are acute in virtually every sector, something even Putin has acknowledged.

In the military, the starkest sign is that the Russian army has had to invite North Korea to send in troops to help it out. Noel Foster of the Naval War College wrote that Moscow’s desperation can be seen in the rising salaries and bonuses it has to offer to recruits: “As of July 2024, recruits from Moscow received a $21,000 enlistment bonus and wages amounting in total to just under $60,000 in their first year of service, effectively earning more per month than privates enlisting in the US Army at the same time.” (Keep in mind that average Russian income is less than one-fifth that of America’s.)

What Zakaria is arguing is not new—but it is so important that it be understood publicly. Russia is now losing men and equipment at rates that it cannot replace with new production or soldiers (without wrecking its economy). It literally has almost all of its military fighting Ukraine—and has nothing to spare; not for Syria (which was strategically important) not even to defend its own borders. Fighting Ukraine is all it can do.

And still, even with massive Iranian and North Korean aid (and some significant Chinese), they are struggling. Im going to go into this in more detail in an end of the year analysis—but instead of showing that Russia cant be beaten, 2024 shows it very much can. However that needs to be both understood and acted upon. Its good, therefore, to see such arguments being made.

Also, its nice to see a plug for the article by Mark Devore and Alexander Mertens (which was aided by Oleksiy Zagorodnyuk) in Foreign Policy. It really deserves a read if you have time. It provides evidence showing how Russia should have major equipment shortages by the end of 2025. Definitely worth a read if you can.

The Financial Times and Pokrovsk—the same article every month.

Just ending on an example of how not everyone is stressing Russian weakness. The Financial Times yesterday published a piece saying Ukraine was in terrible shape around Pokrovsk, had made fundamental mistakes, and the city could very well fall. All very depressing.

If you had a sense of deja vu in reading this piece—you should not be surprised. The Financial Times has basically written the same article for almost half a year now. I will give a few examples.

In early August, Ukraine’s defenses around Pokrovsk were cracking, according to the FT, as Russia was very close to seizing the supposedly vital logistics hub.

Over the past week, the Russian army advanced within 15km of the garrison city of Pokrovsk and the outskirts of nearby Toretsk, according to military analysts, reviews of combat footage and interviews with Ukrainian soldiers and senior officials. It also captured part of the neighbouring town of Niu-York and is still pressing ahead.

Pokrovsk is a major logistical hub for Ukraine’s military that has become a linchpin for its defence of the rest of Donetsk region, while Toretsk and Niu-York have been bulwarks against Russian forces since 2014.

The Russians are just 5km from the main T0504 highway, bombarding it with artillery and drones, and threatening to cut it off.

The culprit, as always, was Ukrainian inefficiency and failure. In late August, the FT wrote a piece saying the impending fall of Pokrovsk was down to Zelensky. Now, the Russians were only 8kms away because of Zelensky’s incompetence.

Russian forces are closing in on the strategically important city of Pokrovsk taking several nearby towns this week and forcing undermanned Ukrainian units to retreat from prepared defensive positions.

Pokrovsk is one of two key rail and road junctions in the Donetsk region and its loss would threaten the entire region’s logistics for Ukraine’s military, according to Frontelligence Insight, a Ukrainian analytical group.

Satellite imagery analysed by open-source investigators at the Finland-based Black Bird Group shows Russian forces now just 8km from Pokrovsk. In response, local authorities have ordered the evacuation of residents in the area.

Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military analyst at the Kyiv-based Information Resistance group, called the situation on the eastern edge of Pokrovsk “a complete defensive failure”.

And yet, Ukrainian incompetence did not seem to be enough to have the city fall. So in September, the Financial Times pivoted and said it was Russian overwhelming strength that was about to lead to the capture of Pokrovsk. Russian advances were now down to sheer Russian might and their brilliant adaptability.

With a combined pre-war population of 100,000, Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad are vital for Ukraine’s defence of the eastern front. If they fall, it would endanger the larger cities of Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk and significantly boost Russia’s strategic position in the region, Ukrainian commanders warned.

Capturing these two hubs would also hurt Ukrainian morale, which had just received a boost from the Kursk incursion, said commanders and soldiers.

Russia’s main strategy has remained the same since the start of its full-scale invasion in 2022: overpowering Ukrainian forces with sheer might and resource advantages, Phoenix and commanders from four other Ukrainian brigades told the Financial Times this month. They all complained their soldiers were sometimes outnumbered at a ratio of 1:8 and that for every shell fired, Russians were firing 10 or more.

But the Russian forces had also adapted, the commanders said, learning from earlier mistakes and avoiding large assaults with tanks and armoured vehicles. Their new tactics have led to recent successes in Ukraine’s Donetsk region, forcing Ukrainian troops to retreat and bringing Moscow closer to its goal of controlling the entire area.

And yet, no matter what the Financial Times has written about Ukrainian incompetence, Russian might and adaptability, and its vital strategic importance, the Ukrainians still control Pokrovsk. Russian advances have actually been very small before the first story quoted and the last. The Russians have advanced maybe 10 kilometres closer to Pokrovsk since that first story was written—and at huge cost. Will the Russians take it? Possibly. But the drumbeat focus on Russian strength and Ukrainian failure tells a very one-sided version of the Pokrovsk story.

One of the reasons the change in narrative is so important.

Have a good rest of the weekend everyone.