Weekend Update #100: Rather Hard to Believe TBH
The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure; Zelensky’s Strategy for Victory a Reluctant Biden—a More Supportive Harris
Hello All,
I cant believe that this is the 100th weekend update that I have produced on Substack. When I started this in November of 2022, I has no idea what it would become. It was a way to move the update out of twitter—and it became so much more. There are now more than 45,000 people subscribed to this Substack (which is a number I really cant fathom). And the weekly readership for the update is now 40,000+. Its been both an honor and a privilege to be able to play this role.
I would also like to pay a particular thanks to the paying subscribers of this Substack. As I’ve promised, these weekend updates will always be free—Im doing it as a public service and that wont change. However, having the paying subscribers has allowed me to devote the rather significant time every weekend for the last 100 weekends in writing this. It has also allowed me to make some very substantial donations to Come Back Alive—and for that I am really grateful. I dont think I could have kept this going otherwise, to be honest.
The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure
Also, this week to thank paying subscribers, I will be having my first live chat session. Its to coincide with the release earlier this week of the report I released with Eliot Cohen, The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure
This report—which you can download in its entirety though the link above, is the culmination of the (first phase) of a research project we started just after the Russian full-scale invasion. We both felt that we needed to study and understand the reasons behind the failure of the analytical communities (both inside and outside of government) to understand what the Russian Army was capable of doing, what the Ukrainian Army was capable of doing, and how wars develop.
The chat session, which will start next Friday evening at 10pm Ukraine time, 8pm UK time, 3pm East Coast USA time and noon West Coast USA time, will be your chance to ask questions about the report, and the war in general, and I will do my best to answer them. I will be speaking for myself at this—not for both of us. I thought I would have the session because a number of subscribers have already sent me questions—and I will try to answer two of them now to give you an idea of what the chat will be like.
Q. All analysts make mistakes, so why is it worth examining this case?
A. That is entirely true—all analysts do make mistakes. Certainly I am no exception. However in this case the mistakes were so grave and had such significant policy implications that they require particular study. This was not a case of just a normal error. As part of the report, I went back and looked at strategic analysis throughout the 20th century, to see what happened before. Earlier analysis was actually far more measured and even-handed—and usually (but not always) avoided the kinds of lopsided analyses we saw in 2021-2022.
So the analysis for Russia and Ukraine was not only off, it represented the greatest strategic failure in analysis in modern history. If you don’t believe me—try and find a worse case. The war as presented by the analytical community as a consensus bore no resemblance to the war that occurred. This is something that requires real consideration. We have constructed networks of think tanks, research centres, Intelligence Communities of all stripes—and the quality of the strategic analysis has gotten worse.
So yes, all analysts make mistake—but this was more than that.
Q. Are you saying that experts or expertise is to be distrusted?
A. Not in the slightest. I’ve seen this being said in other places as well—but nothing can be further from the truth. What the report argues is that very narrowly defined expertise needs to be broadened and filtered by expertise in many other areas. For instance, the expertise that studied the Russian and Ukrainian military was actually quite limited, and focussed in a small group of analysts of the Russian military. The report argues that a far greater range of expertise needs to be consulted in such cases—from economists, to weather/terrain experts, to military historians, to scholars of Ukraine. The paper is strongly against making broad assumptions based on a very limited base of expertise—it wants more and varied expertise, not no expertise.
Actually—I will try to be less long-winded than this!
So I hope these answers help. If you have any more—hope to see you next Friday in the chat room.
Btw, if you want to find out even more about the report—we did a launch event live, during which we were joined by Kim Kagan of the Institute for the Study of War, and Gian Gentile of Rand. You can watch that all here.
Zelensky in the USA
Part 1: Zelensky’s Strategy for Victory a Reluctant Biden—a More Supportive Harris
The most important event this week in the war was President Zelensky’s visit to the United States. He toured an armaments factory (which caused a ridiculous political storm in a tea cup—more below) met with political leaders of both parties (eventually) and addressed the United Nations.
However the issue that will make or break the trip was what he brought his strategy for victory to the Biden administration to try and get US support. He had not shared many of the details publicly, but clearly part of the plan is for the US to help the Ukrainians fight a true ranged campaign against Russian military assets.
The Biden administration reaction so far has been disappointing. Basically they have said no so far—but not a definitive no—so they are leaving the Ukrainians twisting in the wind on it. Clearly the Biden administration has been briefing the press furiously about why they dont want to support the Ukrainian plan. Basically the administration makes a few arguments. First they say Ukraine doesn;t have the ammunition for enough ranged strikes to make a difference—so a ranged campaign by Ukraine wont be effective. Second they say that Russia might retaliate—though not by going nuclear, but by striking back at NATO countries in some unexpected way. To some of Ukraine’s European backers, this position is nonsensical—but so be it.
The upshot is that Zelensky left Washington without approval for the plan—though interestingly I have heard from some people in Ukraine that discussions between the Ukrainian and US governments are ongoing. The Biden administration, particularly Secretary of State Blinken, does not want to close off all possibility for US support for the strategy.
Certainly Zelensky when he left Washington tried to put as upbeat a face as possible on things. He said the plan had been presented and discussions were ongoing. He tweeted this out late Friday.
As planned, today we are heading home after completing all the necessary talks. Every discussion went exactly as needed. The Victory Plan has been presented to America, and we explained each point in detail. Now, our teams will work to implement every step and decision. Strong positions for Ukraine mean a quicker path to peace.
Everything crucial for Ukraine is on the table with our partners and under consideration—long-range capabilities, defense packages, sanctions against Russia, and measures regarding Russian assets. We have covered all these topics.
So we will see. I think we can say a few things. First, the Biden administration really doesn’t want to support the ranged strike strategy. However, they also don’t want to say no to Ukraine. Remember, support for Ukraine remains very strong, particularly for Democratic voters. This we can see in the other really interesting political development this week—the more aggressively pro-Ukraine rhetoric being used by Kamala Harris.
One thing that should give Ukraine’s supporters a small amount of hope is that Kamala Harris seems to be doubling down on her public support for Ukraine. This week Harris and Zelensky met, and actually Harris distanced herself openly from voices calling for Ukraine to cede territory to cut a deal with Russia. She referred to any such calls as “dangerous and unacceptable” and went out of her way to associate herself with Ukrainian victory.
Harris also used Ukraine to go after Trump—calling his plans for Ukraine a “proposals for surrender”. Certainly the body language between Harris and Zelensky was extremely positive.
Again, we need to be careful to say what if anything all of this means. However the reality is that there is significant political pressure on the administration to support Ukraine. In the past, even when they have desperately wanted not to—they have relented and (admittedly too late) given Ukraine things they first said they never would. Look, I have no idea which way they will go in the end—but at least there is some chance that Washington will support the Ukrainian plan (even if its a minority chance).
Part 2: Trump and Zelensky
I wrote about this a little in my election update this week. The GOP overplayed its hand earlier this week. They seemed to think they found a great chance to appeal to their base when Zelensky toured an ammunition factory in Pennsylvania and was accompanied by the state’s governor—Democrat Josh Shapiro.
The GOP started adopting some of its most anti-Ukraine positions so far in the campaign. Speaker Johnson released a public letter asking for Zelensky to fire the Ukrainian ambassador to the USA and then Trump piled in the next day saying that Ukraine was doomed and Russia was an awesome military power. It almost certainly worked with their base—but it would have had a negative impact on the rest of the voting public. And so, Trump pivoted and accepted a meeting with Zelensky (who has not fired the Ukrainian ambassador.
The meeting between Trump and Zelensky was rather different of the meeting Zelensky had with Harris. I think the best thing you can do is watch the press conference the two did after they met. Its not long (5 minutes) but its very illuminating and the whole thing was filmed by C-Span.
Zelensky talks early on about the need to “stop Putin” and how important the USA is for that goal. Trump clearly didnt like framing the war in that way, and tried to reframe the discussion about how he will work with “both parties” to work out a deal. Then, after praising Zelensky for supposedly helping him with the impeachment proceedings—Trump turns and talks about his good relationship with Putin. (Once again—Trump never, never criticizes Putin).
I think in the end there are two things to take from this. The first is that for all the theatrics of the meeting, Trump will do what Putin wants when the time comes. Second, that in the meantime, he actually doesn’t want to seem to aggressively anti-Ukraine. I just hope that those voters who support Ukraine and think they can also vote for Trump, dont get fooled.
A Week (Really Year) of Relatively Little Movement.
Ok, the front line moved less this week than the week before. Yes, the situation in Vuhledar is not great (so its now being described, inevitably as strategic). Yet. early in the week there was discussion of the Russians overwhelming the Ukrainians, and forming cauldrons of Ukrainian forces. There were also stories of significant Russian improvements and signficant Ukrainian shortcomings.
All I can say, is by the standards of modern military history—none of this extreme reporting about the present situation—or all of 2024—makes the slightest sense. In 2024, only very tiny amounts of ground have changed hands. Here is a map of the front line on 1 January 2024.
And here is today’s map.
The Russians have gained a tiny bulge of land north of Donetsk and the Ukrainians have taken a tiny slice of land in Kursk. And the Russians though they have been trying for months, still havent taken Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove and Vulhledar—and we are almost in October. Maybe they will take one or a few of these places before the end of the year—but its hard to see a great Russian breakthrough and seizure territory before the fighting becomes restricted by winter.
By any historical measure what we have seen is extreme Russian losses for small gains. We have also not seen any major Ukrainian successes. However Ukraine was cut off entirely from US aid for the first third of the year.
If in early May, when the Russians launched their supposedly strategically brilliant Kharkiv Offensive, you had said this was going to be the map on 1 October—I think it would be said that it represented a Russian failure.
I will leave it at that.
Have a good rest of the weekend everyone.
The whole narrative of “giving Ukraine a long range striking capability won’t make any difference” is nonsense. If it makes no difference, why not giving it to Ukraine anyway? Not like US needs these capabilities for another war?
The truth is that it does make a huge difference and they know it.
The problem is that Biden now has to say no to Ukraine directly post Zelenskyy visit (which is a genius move to do it during the election campaign when a general public is more tuned in and listening).
The map comparison shocked me tbh. As Ukrainian who is monitoring the war development daily, reading the reports from DeepState channel about Russian taking over villages one by one, and now seeing that it has translated into a small bulge on the map!! And I’m ignoring the astronomical cost to Russians and it’s their choice in the end of the day. I’m just looking at the results only and it’s negligible. Also, it’s not like they took over actual settlements/towns with buildings relatively intact, they flatten those towns with glide bombs so they get ruins in the end.
Nonsensical stuff
One person the commentariat has not been able to discourage is Zelensky. After my initial surprise, I thought it was gutsy and very smart to come to the US with a Victory Plan.