Thoughts on the Ukrainian Counteroffensive

It might not be what you think

Once again, I’m starting this mid-week update with an apology. I have been thinking a great deal about the issue of how society and politics interact with economics to create national power (militaries), that I’ve actually ended up drafting a substantial article on the subject. Its rather too long for Substack—and I’ve received some strong indications that it will be published something ideal, so that is what is going to happen. When that comes out, hopefully soon, I will actually be able to expand on it in substack, by including parts that I could not get into the finished article. Yes, Iam that wordy!

So once again the mid-week update turns back to the Russo-Ukraine War, and in this case it is some thoughts on the coming Ukrainian counteroffensive.

There is so much being hypothesized about the Ukrainian counteroffensive that it almost makes the head swim. Certainly, I’m getting approached multiple times a day about what the Ukrainians might do, when they might do it, how they might do it—etc. This article that came out in the Wall Street Journal is just one example.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-offensive-before-the-offensive-ukraine-strikes-behind-russian-lines-cea9320f

The key thing, of course, is that nobody knows what the Ukrainians will do and when. With that in mind, I thought I might offer some thoughts, much of which came out of my trip to Ukraine, of what is governing Ukrainian thinking. Basically they boil down to three questions

1. When Might Ukraine Strike?

2. Where Might Ukraine Strike?

3. How Might Ukraine Strike?

When Might Ukraine Strike?

For a while now I’ve been saying that Ukraine is in no rush to launch this counter-offensive, and I still hold to that. It could still be weeks away. That is because the Ukrainians have a number of considerations. The first is that this is probably a one-shot operation for the whole Spring-Summer-Fall. It is not like Ukraine will be able to regenerate another force with this size and capabilities this year. Right now they seem to be mobilizing many of their best forces and much of the most advanced new equipment to take part in the counter-offensive.

They will almost certainly use up a considerable amount of the equipment and ammunition that they have put aside for the operation and therefore going again in 2023 would be exceedingly difficult. So, when this force is sent into action, the Ukrainians will be taking a major risk, and its one that cannot be repeated in anything like this strength until next year (if at all).

Just as important, the Russians have little prospect, at least in the next few weeks and months, of generating a large number of new forces. Instead of sensibly building up and preparing defensive forces with the new army that Russia raised last Fall, many of their forces were drip-fed into battles up and down the Donbas. This was a major strategic mistake, which has left the Russian army with no easy option for reinforcement. At least when I was in Ukraine (admittedly 5 weeks ago) I was told that there was little sign then that the Russians were preparing a large new force to go to Ukraine this Spring. As such, Ukraine is under no pressure to try and pre-empt a large, Russian reinforcement. The Ukrainians can keep doing what they are doing, attrit Russian forces down, weakening the ability of Russia to hold its vast defensive line, knowing that it will be difficult in the short term for Russia to strengthen much. As such if you are Ukraine, you should only attack when you feel they have reached a moment which provides the optimum chance of success.

Finally, the longer Ukraine waits, the better trained their attack troops will be and the more equipment they will have at their disposal. We have seen grisly evidence of what happens to untrained soldiers on the battlefields of Bakhmut by looking at the Russians over the last few months—training really matters.

So add it altogether—the fact that this is a one shot deal, the fact that the Russians don’t seem to be generating a major new army quickly, and the fact that the Ukrainians will want to train more—and you have the reason why they are not rushing. I originally estimated that the counteroffensive would start in the second half of May (ie around now). It might even be later.

Where Might Ukraine Strike?