The more that this war goes on, the more I’ve been struck by how the US administration seems to think it can control events—to (possibly) direct the outcome of the Russo-Ukraine War in the way that it sees fit. This was really brought home during the weird twists and turns of the Vilnius Summit, but has been there for a while and can be seen in how the US has gone to great lengths to try and control how the war develops by providing clear limits on the military aid that is given to Ukraine. It was an idea that was the subject of my most recent piece in the Atlantic, but I thought it is such an important idea that it is worthy of a development. It shows how much, I would argue, that the US needs to understand that it cannot control events. This is a lesson that you would think the US would have learned by now (Afghanistan should have been a blaring red light with a piercing siren)—but it clearly has not.
If you want to read the Atlantic piece, here is a link.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/07/ukraine-war-us-aid-nato/674747/
In fact, if you are interested, what I can do is attach the first draft of the piece at the end here—it is very different from the finished piece (and is even more full of typos) than the finished piece, but will give you some idea of what I was thinking. Indeed, going forward if you want, Id be happy to put up more first drafts, as they are so different (rougher and usually not as coherent) as the final versions—though they will allow those who dont have subscriptions to see the genesis of the ideas.
The Limits of Control
I was hopeful early in the conflict that the US was looking at what was happening in Ukraine and understanding that it represented an important milestone in how the US should involve itself in wars. In fact I was so interested in that, that I wrote another Atlantic article on the subject in late 2022.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/11/us-military-intervention-afghanistan-ukraine-war/672265/
The purpose of the article was to say that the US needed to understand better its limitations. It should not, unless the US faced an existential threat, make itself too central to the conduct of wars. In particular it should avoid the participation directly of US forces if at all possible. This avoidance means that the US would rely on aid for states (such as Ukraine) but that it would avoid US boots on the ground.
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