The Russian Campaign Against Ukrainian Infrastructure: Military Learning in Action?
Using Historical Reflection to Assess Learning and Assess Campaign Effectivenes
Hi Everyone. Here is the first of what will be a two part piece on military learning and how to judge the Russian campaign(s) against Ukrainian infrastructure (transport and power generation). This is the kind of writing I will be doing for the subscription service—more detailed and historically grounded. I hope you won’t find them dull, as they might get somewhat granular at times. If so, apologies. I’m sending it to everyone (with a paywall) so that you can have some idea of what they will be like.
This piece been inspired by two things in particular. The first is that I believe these Russian infrastructure campaigns might be the two most important campaigns that the Russians have/are attempting in the war. The second is that is has been argued that they are signs of military learning by the Russians—which I would say is contentious.
This kind of paper is what I will be producing for those who subscribe. It will be more grounded in historical experience and more detailed than other posts.
Background to the Campaigns
It would first off be useful to say what campaigns I’m talking about, to try and understand just how important they are. The first is/was the campaign against the Ukrainian transportation system.
This was a campaign that the Russians waged mostly in the first six months of the war (from April through June/July seemed to be its most intense period). It involved a series of air/missile attacks against the Ukrainian transport net. In particular against Ukraine’s extensive rail network (one of the largest in Europe) and a number of major Ukrainian bridges.[i] Rail transport was something that I started talking about very early in the war, as its functioning would be vital to Ukrainian resistance.
The power campaign ramped up later in the year, as winter settled in and Russia gained access to new technologies, particularly the Iranian-built Shaheed drones. It was a campaign that involved attacking the Ukrainian power generations system (hitting generators, transformers, etc), to basically try and cut as much power as possible to large Ukrainian cities and through that its whole infrastructure for waging war. At times this would be a very extensive campaign with multiple attacks across the whole breadth of the country on the same day.
This campaign against Ukrainian power generation had multiple purposes—four in particular it could be argued. Now I have no idea if Russian planners actually considered all of these in detail, perhaps not. However all matter, and reveal why such campaigns could have huge impact if waged successfully. All of these were aimed at weakening Ukraine’s ability to wage war, from the battlefield to the home front.
First, one thing that was clear was that it was a Russian campaign against the Ukrainian population, to try and weaken their resolve. It was launched as winter was setting in, and was clearly an attempt to plunge the Ukrainian population into a miserable dark and cold. Russian propagandists even liked to boast during the campaign about the deprivation the Ukrainians would be suffering without power, contrasting it to the situation in Russia itself. Of course, people with historical knowledge might be understanding that this was probably the least important, even counterproductive element of the campaign. That I will discuss later, but regardless of its efficacy, it certainly was part of Russian strategic calculation.
Second it deprived Ukrainian land forces at the front of some very important anti-air assets. The campaigns, especially the campaign against power generation, forced the Ukrainians to devote a great deal of anti-air effort to protect Ukrainian cities. Indeed, Ukraine had to developed relatively quickly a layered and detailed air defense systems that could handle a range of different technologies—from cruise missiles to drones. This seems to have operated very effectively at times, but remember that every system deployed protecting cities cannot be used at the front.
Third, by attempting to shut down Ukrainian power, the Russians were potentially aiming a blow at Ukrainian production. Ukraine is trying to develop, in some cases quite successfully, a home grown and diversified war industry. It will never make everything it needs, but it is trying to manufacture more and more. (Btw, no one ever manufactures everything that they need in a war—even the USA in WWII, which by some measures had half the world’s production, benefited by certain British war production and technologies, from Merlin engines to radar). Obviously this Ukrainian attempt to grown domestic war production requires power—and without a working electrical system, it could have been significantly crippled.
Fourth, the Russian campaign against Ukrainian power was also a campaign against Ukrainian rail transport. The most important rail lines in Ukraine are electrified, and these allow for the most efficient transport of heavy freight and large numbers of passengers. Destroying Ukraine’s power generation severely hampers Ukrainian rail transport at the same time. The Russians would force more transport to go onto trucks, which can carry much smaller loads than trains and are therefore considerably less efficient and more costly to use.
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