Small State Power: Be Like Denmark

In this week’s Europe Dispatch, Minna Ålander writes about how Denmark is showing that even small states can punch far above their weight and lead by example.

If you want to cure your depression, there is one simple but effective method: start reading Danish news. For starters, just scrolling the news section of the Danish MoD will deliver a jaw-dropping list of announcements. Denmark is currently punching far above its weight in terms of support for Ukraine and investment into its own military capability and announces more good news at a steady 2-3 days pace. Despite a population of only about 6 million, Denmark’s solid public finances allow it more space to spend money on defence without immediately getting into a guns vs. butter debate that most other European countries cannot afford in the same way.

Yours,
Minna

Danish infantry in an exercise in Germany. Photo: Heidie Mulder/ Armed Forces of the Netherlands

Small State Power: Be Like Denmark

Denmark is a fascinating example of what Trump has triggered in Europe. A staunchly transatlantic small European state, Denmark has been one of America’s most reliable allies on the continent. The Danish NATO policy used to be, in a caricaturized nutshell: send a small but fiery Viking squad to fight along the Americans in all US wars, and make sure that Americans remember their Danish brothers in arms, so that you can then skip investing more in your own military capability. Indeed, Denmark had the highest killed in action ration in Afghanistan after the US – something that has made the Danes feel extra bitter about Trump’s audacious suggestions to take Greenland by military means if necessary. In a recent Europe-wide poll by ECFR, Danes were unsurprisingly the most critical toward the Trump administration. It was also no surprise that one of the first big investments Denmark announced this year was its Arctic capabilities – including 750 000 pairs of woollen socks from a Finnish producer.

A second pillar of the Danish NATO policy used to be, again in a caricaturized nutshell (I expect a lot of angry messages from Danes after publishing this): look at what Germany promises to do but does not implement and then also don’t do the same thing. However, what comes to Ukraine, Denmark has chosen a radically different approach than Germany – despite also having a Social Democrat as leader, like Germany did in the previous government. But Mette Frederiksen and Olaf Scholz are from quite different planets.

Denmark has been a strong supporter of Ukraine from the very beginning of the Russian full-scale invasion, donating its entire artillery (that consisted of, erm, 19 Caesar howitzers – but if you don’t go into details it sounds really impressive) to Ukraine in 2022. Since then, Danish support to Ukraine has reached a volume of $10.5 billion, not only in relative but also in absolute terms more than many larger countries’ total support. Denmark has also been a leading innovator in terms of finding new ways to support Ukraine in more sustainable ways than simply donating equipment (that Denmark run out of pretty fast): it coined the “Danish model” of financing directly Ukraine’s own defence industry, which has been adopted on the EU level now, and was the first European country to sign an agreement with Ukraine to host parts of Ukrainian companies’ production lines. Denmark also recently signed a defence cooperation agreement with Moldova, including a DKK 50 million ($7.8 million) investment into strengthening Moldovan military capability.

Denmark’s commitment to Ukraine is exceptional and if more European countries matched Denmark’s contribution, Ukraine would be in a very different place. But Denmark is nevertheless also a good case in point what comes to past mistakes. It baffles me deeply how come Denmark started seriously investing into its own defence capability only this year, and not in 2022 the very latest. Denmark initially tried to stick to its usual approach: throwing everything it has and a lot of money at Ukraine, hoping that the war will stay far away from Denmark – and it seems that Danes did feel at a sufficiently safe distance. Like so many Western European countries, only Donald Trump’s return to the White House jolted Denmark into action. Being so late to the party means that Denmark is in a great hurry to improve its military capability.

The pressure to get equipment as fast as possible, at almost any cost, has led to an impressive stream of announcements emanating from Denmark lately: it increased its defence budget by 50 billion DKK ($7.8 billion) this spring, bringing defence spending to over 3 percent of GDP, is expanding the conscription system to apply to both genders and extending the duration of the military service from 4 to 11 months, and is buying everything and anything that is available on the market.

Most of all, Denmark is buying European. When the EU said, “Buy European”, Denmark answered: “Take my money and give me every system available!”. The latest astonishing announcement was that Denmark did not opt for one, but three (3) European-made short range ground-based air defence systems: NASAMS, IRIS-T and MICA (with a leasing agreement for the NASAMS from Norway). Amusingly, the Danish Ministry of Defence admitted an element of panic buying by describing this quick fix for Denmark’s lack of air defence as an “urgent acquisition” (“hasteanskaffelse”). The urgency comes from the decision 20 years ago to decommission ground-based air defence. I would not have thought that operating a myriad versions of the same system is the lesson European countries will want to learn from Ukraine, but hey, Denmark is serious about its efforts to integrate with Ukraine...

On a more serious note, Denmark’s recent procurement announcements include some joint procurement and production between the Nordic countries that is the smart way to go about this in Europe: in December 2024, Denmark and Sweden jointly made an order for Swedish-made CV-90 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) – 115 for Denmark, 50 for Sweden, and 40 for Ukraine, and Denmark recently announced a deal for 129 Finnish-made Patria 6x6 vehicles from the Common Armoured Vehicle System (CAVS) cooperation programme. The other participants in the programme are as of now Finland, Latvia, Sweden, and Germany.

Denmark is by no means alone in Europe with its insufficiently small armed forces as a result of the peace dividend decades focused on expeditionary warfare. But Denmark is certainly leading by example in how to fix the situation. In the past 2 months alone (since 18 May 2025), the news section of the Danish MoD’s website lists the following procurement announcements:

• A new threat simulation system for the F-35 fighter jets to more effectively train for adversarial radar disturbance

• More Evolved Sea Sparrow air defence missiles for the Danish navy’s frigates

• More off-road person vehicles and engineering vehicles

• New agreement on intensified defence cooperation with Norway

• Investments in a heavy brigade are prioritised for fastest possible buildup, including ammunition, IFVs, and main battle tanks

• Special operations forces (SOF) are significantly strengthened: both Frömanskorpset (Frogman Corps) and Jaeger Corps get a third squadron

• The Danish state becomes co-owner of NAMMO Demark A/S, an ammunition producer, to set up increased production capacity as soon as possible and improve security of supply

• New Nordic NATO cooperation agreement with Sweden on building Multi Role Tanker Transport Fleet capability

• New Canadian-German-Danish-Norwegian partnership agreement for security in the North Atlantic

• Denmark offers to host a new regional NATO SOF headquarters

• Danish political parties reach agreement on the ambition to establish shipbuilding capacity for larger ships

• DKK 200 million ($31 million) investment in the Home Guard to deal faster and more effectively with the increased amount of volunteer interest in the Home Guard, among other things

The list is long and impressive but it also gives an idea of all the capabilities Denmark is lacking as a result of 30 years of downscaling and a slow awakening to the new reality post-2014. Finland, for example, is not under such pressure to build up capacity because it never downgraded to the same extent. In Europe, late is nevertheless better than never, so my advice to all European countries is: if you can’t be like Finland, then be like Denmark.