Misunderstanding Soviet Power in WW2 and Russian power today
Part 2--why thinking the USSR won the wars makes you overrate the Russians today.
Here is the long-promised part 2 to the substack that started discussing why there seems to be an overlap between those who argue that the USSR was the most important power in the defeat of Nazi Germany and those who did and continue to over-rate Russian power since the war in Ukraine. The first part of the substack can be accessed here, and provides a summary of the reasons why I have argued that the Eastern Front was not nearly as important as some people think.
Its actually an issue that also emerged today in a brief twitter thread interaction with Paul Krugman.
The immediate impetus that gave me the focus to write this second part (sorry its been a really busy time) was this tweet thread by Elbridge Colby which basically repeated all the old tropes about the Eastern Front and the centrality of the USSR in defeating Nazi Germany. It was like reading a book from 10 years ago.
No what made it fascinating, was that Colby is one of those who has consistently argued that Ukraine should be forced to negotiate, that the US has other bigger concerns, etc—and that’s fine, though I disagree. What was particularly telling, however, was that the one historian who Colby mentioned was the popular historian Max Hastings (and this is not a knock on popular historians, but Hastings does not provide the best of analysis, though he can be a catchy writer). Now what is particularly interesting, is that Hastings, with his view of World War II which is based around the awesomeness of the German Army and therefore the importance of the USSR in defeating the Nazis, has consistently and dramatically overestimated Russian strength in this war, both before February 24 and after.
Hastings in January, even when arguing that Putin should be opposed, argued that if the Russian dictator attacked Ukraine, he could achieve his conquests at minimum military cost.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-01-26/max-hastings-appeasement-of-putin-isn-t-so-easy-to-denounce-on-ukraine
Even in June, once it was clear that Ukrainian resistance was far stronger than Hastings had foreseen (and Russian military incompetence far greater) he still argued that a full Ukrainian victory in the war was impossible—and Ukraine should then be forced to negotiate by its Allies.
Needless to say, the last few months have shown this view to be flawed. Furthermore, at the same time the Colby was basing his USSR won the war on Max Hastings, he was bigging up Niall Ferguson, who had also been arguing at the start of the war that Ukrainian resistance was all but doomed.
So it all came together and I thought I now have the arguments to show how these two views (USSR beat Hitler and Russia was strong and would definitely conquer Ukraine) have come together. In many ways, I can use the points in the Colby tweet and the Hastings speech he cites (which I have to say is a rather creepy homage to the German Army) to show why the two views are so toxic together. I will focus on three of Colby’s points.
1: Here is the first part of the text of his second tweet.
“Bear in mind that the Soviets were already in Poland by D-Day. The vast bulk of German military losses were sustained on the Eastern Front.”
This tweet shows the extraordinary misunderstanding of ‘military losses’ that has inflated our notion of Soviet/Russian power. The Germans lost more infantry on the Eastern Front, but they lost far, far more of their equipment (and best trained forces) fighting the British and Americans. This is because the German Army as I have pointed out, received relatively little German production compared to the Air Force/Navy. Basically, because the Germans could afford to send so little equipment to the Eastern Front, they tried to get by using unsupported soldiers. Actually, the ‘vast bulk’ of German losses were caused fighting the western Allies, and its not close.
This is where we get into the overrating of the Russian army. The idea of the Eastern Front being dominant is tied up in the big battle myth (as Krugman discusses as well). Ie, the USSR would pay whatever price it needed in the big battles to defeat the Nazis—and by extension today we have people arguing that Russia will pay whatever cost it needed to pay. That’s not true, the big battle destroyed very little German production. However, I would argue that the big battle ideology is well and truly alive, both in those who overstated Russian power before Feb 24, and those arguing that Russia cant be defeated now.
2. A lot of this builds into another one of Colby’s tweets. Here he talks about Soviet ‘sacrifice’ as important in the war—and having moral force (which is weirdly questionable—Stalin brutally and in many cases needlessly sacrificing his soldiers creates no moral imperative that I can see. Anyway, Colby writes.
“Victory took a total societal sacrifice that the Western Allies - fortunately for their descendants - did not have to undergo. But that was only in light of the unutterable depth of sacrifice in the East”
Why this is so problematic, is it stresses, as many have done, the depth of Soviet losses and assumes these losses were a key part of USSR defeating Nazi Germany. This view should be particularly perplexing to anyone studying modern war. You want to know the sign of a well trained, equipped, motivated and modern force—It is when you suffer the fewer casualties. Indeed the more advanced a military is, the fewer casualties it suffers. To properly understand the real power of a modern military, you should look at the casualties it suffers compared to those its inflicts in killed, wounded, captured and missing—the more modern will come in far lower. And guess what—that’s the western Allies not the USSR. The USSR actually had one of the most primitive militaries in the war, based on casualty ratios, and that was because it could not operate true modern complex operations (such as advanced air-power) that the Allies could do. However those who miss this and naturally overlook the ability of the USSR to execute real complex operations in the war, would naturally and have consistently failed to engage with the inability of the Russian Army to engage in complex operations against Ukraine. It remains the more primitive of the two armies—even if it has some fancy weapons. Actually, the Ukrainian Army has consistently been the more creative and complex of the two, and pulled off the kinds of operations that the Russians find impossible.
3. To take one more really problematic point from Colby, it was this line at the end of second tweet (based on his talisman Hastings again).
“Meantime, as Max Hastings points out in Armageddon, the Western Allies were running out of troops less than a year after D-Day.” Again, its weird that Hastings, a popular historian, becomes the voice of all facts for Colby. Actually, the Allies never had too few soldiers to do the job, they just prioritized the building of machines over having soldiers, precisely because they were more modern and successful and didn’t want to unnecessarily lose their own citizenry. It meant at times they had to move soldiers around (as opposed to needlessly sacrifice them like Stalin) but what soldiers they did have were always excellently equipped and supported. Relying on machines over manpower again was a sign of modernity and success—not weakness. You can see, once again, how someone who stresses the primitive as being successful over the modern might think the Russian Army would be great today.
The final point to bring up is the way that Colby uses a Hastings speech to make his point.
This is a truly weird speech by Hastings, basically a homage to the greatness of the German Army. Indeed, even in defeat, Hasting’s goes on to praise the extraordinary greatness of Hitler’s army.
https://www.maxhastings.com/2011/09/22/arma-speech/
“The truth was that Hitler’s army, even in the last months of the war, was the most formidable fighting force the world had ever seen.”
This is just weird. The US and UK Air Force’s in the war were easily more formidable and effective fighting forces than the Germany army ever was. Hastings for some reasons, believes that democracies create less good armies. All I would say is that there is no evidence of this. It would be nice also, if Colby bothered to consult alot of the more professional history of the war, which has a far less starry-eyed view of the German Army. His hero worshipping of a historian who hero worships the German Army is odd, shall we say.
However, once again, you can see how someone who believes that a dictator named Hitler created the greatest army the world has ever seen would also believe that another dictator named Putin created another formidable fighting army.
So add it up together, you can see why those who believe that the Eastern Front was the dominant front and the USSR was the dominant power in the defeat of Germany would later overrate the Russian army today and misunderstand the war we are seeing. In short, they overrate the ability of dictatorships to create good armies, overrate the primitive variables such as infantry casualties, and underrate the importance of truly modern forces to undertake complex operations.
Thanks, another good piece. I'd just add a few points. First, those who argue that the Soviets won the war by defeating the Germans tend to focus on D-Day and after. They overlook the damage that the western allies did to the Germans in North Africa, Italy and, of course, the Atlantic. Second, democracies want to minimize casualties, dictatorships and autocracies don't care. Another reason why the west prioritized equipment. Finally, I don't buy the moral debt argument. It is what Germany used to justify its Russia policy. It overlooks that Russia is not the sole inheritor of that legacy: all former Soviet countries are. The Soviet Army had millions of non-Russians in it.
The Soviets were not in Poland on D-Day. At least not in Poland within post-war borders. One might as well reverse this argument and point out that when the US Army entered Germany (on September 11, 1944), the Soviets were still in the Leningrad Region (preparing to advance into Estonia). And the Soviet claims based on body counts are self-contradictory. While I believe the argument about the decisive Soviet role because of over two thirds of German KIA and MIA being on the Eastern Front is wrong (not only because of the materiel considerations, but also because a large proportion of those casualties happened only thanks to US and UK providing massive material aid and forcing Germany to divert a lot of airpower away from the Eastern Front), at least it is not an unserious argument (unlike, say, the famous photo of the red banner over the Reichstag buidling). However the proponents of that argument often (always if they are Russian) don't stop there and further claim that the Soviets had already defeated Germany before D-Day. And that is outright wrong even within their own logic, because a majority of German irretrievable casualties on the Easter Front happened AFTER D-Day.