Misunderstanding Soviet Power in WW2 and Russian power today
How these concepts are linked and why it matters: Part 1
Confusing Soviet Power in World War II and Russian power today, and why that matters. (Part 1)
There has been a regular chorus by certain people which seems to conflate one vision of World War II with the view of Russian power today. In short, it is those who argue that it was the Soviet Union that played the dominant role in defeating Nazi Germany, which also maintained that Russia was a powerful great power (before February 24) and no keep maintaining that Russian power will lead to victory of some sorts over Ukraine in the end.
Not surprisingly, John Mearsheimer, who talked endlessly about Russia being a ‘great power’ before the Ukraine invasion has regularly expoused one of the most extreme the most extreme version of Soviet power in World War II. Ive cut a pasted a paragraph from one of his works that makes the case in rather breathless form.
https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/A0024.pdf
In Mearsheimer’s view, it was the ‘mighty Red Army’ which ‘crushed the vaunted Wehrmacht.’ Morevoer, this Red Army was so strong that only the USA could hope to contain it. Mearsheimer and others, tend to overwhelmingly point to one metric to make their case—the number of casualties the Red Army inflicted on the German Army. see: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/01/why-john-j-mearsheimer-is-right-about-some-things/308839/
In other words, its human casualties that are the indicator of German effort. Its very much the view of war from a simple metric, adding up infantry and arguing that shows effort. Its one of the reasons that Mearsheimer, and many others, got the Russian Army so wrong before Feb 24.
Infantry was actually one of the least indicative examples of effort in World War II. Actually, where the powers deployed their military equipment was far more an example of where they wanted to put their effort and what theaters they actually prioritized. Advanced equipment, particularly aircraft and naval vessels (including submarines) were easily the most valuable strategic assets the powers had (particularly aircraft), and the powers deployed this equipment to the most valuable theatres.
If you look at the war from the point of view of equipment deployment and destruction (as opposed to infantry) you will get an entirely different view of the world. In this view the Eastern Front was a much less important war for Nazi Germany than the war against the British and the Americans. Ive written a great deal about this—will include a few charts here from How the War was Won.[2] Basically at least 55% of the German war economy went to building and arming aircraft. By way of comparison, for most of the war around 5-7% of the German economy was spent building and arming tanks and other AFV. When you add up all German war production, see where it was deployed and how it was destroyed, it becomes clear that the Eastern Front was not only a minority front for German national effort—it was increasingly so as the war went on.
Let me give two examples of how this worked. By 1944, easily the largest area of German war effort was the building of fighter aircraft (Germany basically abandoned building bombers after 1943 to build fighters to protect Germany itself from bombing). The fighters that Germany built were not sent to the Eastern Front to try and protect the Germany army fighting the Russians (who were desperately in need of air cover) but instead were deployed to fight the Americans and British. Here is chart of their deployment by theatre.[1]
And where were these German fighters being destroyed? Overwhelmingly in the fighting over Germany itself. The number of German fighters destroyed fighting the Allied bombing campaign dwarfed those killed fighting against the land armies on all fronts—by many times.
Even a great deal of armaments production presumably devoted to the land war, and the Eastern Front, actually ended up in the air war fighting the US and British. Maybe the best example of this was German flak, including the famous 88mm gun. Often a great deal of stress is put on the use of 88mm guns on the Eastern Front against Russian tanks. The truth is that the Eastern Front received only a tiny fraction of German anti-air weaponry and ammunition. In 1943, for instance, when the only western allied land forces on the European continent were fighting in Southern Italy, and the Eastern Front still had by far the largest share of the German Army, 80% of German anti-air weaponry was fighting the western Allies.
Long story short, those who put stress on the engagements of the land armies on the Eastern Front miss the fundamental reality of World War II. German land armies received much less production than people assume. Basically the Germany Army on the Eastern Front was left to hold the line with older, less advanced equipment, while the war in the west received increasingly more production. Moreover, this struggle in the west, also led to the distortion of the German war economy, to such a degree that overall German munitions was significantly reduced, and massive losses started occurring in deployment. Overall, the war on the Eastern Front was not the focus of German strength by a long measure, and German strength was not defeated by the Red Army, but far more by the struggle it was forced to wage against the western allies.
In other words if you look at World War II in Europe from basically every other metric other than the location of where German soldiers were killed, German power was destroyed far from the Eastern Front.
Why does it matter? Its because a flawed vision of power in World War II. I would argue, led directly to a flawed vision of Russian power before February 24 and to this day leads to a flawed understanding of the ability of Russia to triumph in the end.
That will be in part II tomorrow.
Great post. Look forward to the next one.
I remember reading Andrew Cockburn’s “Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine” - a book which I reread recently and which has aged rather well in light of recent experience - which made a similar point. Too much Western thinking about the soviets was shaped by the German perspective (and, in particular the German Army’s perspective) without critically examining the Soviet’s alleged strength. The Soviets who stormed Berlin rode in American trucks, wore American boots, ate American food, relied on supplies pulled by American locomotives, on rails supplied by US factories, and equipment and munition produced relying on western materiel (all extravagantly hauled by Western Navies through u-boat infested seas). Soviet “strength” relied extensively on the wealth and resources of their western allies that were not apparent to the Wehrmacht soldiers facing them. Only with the massive material advantage afforded by Western wealth (and the uniquely Western ability to project power across oceans) did the Soviets “crush” the Germans (a point which even Soviet leaders - Zhukov, Khrushchev - acknowledged).
His point (well, one of many) was that post-WWII Soviet armies facing Western opponents - or in the current conflict, Ukraine - couldn’t expect to rely on that kind of support. So, for instance, trying to mobilize the Soviet Army would involve stripping trucks and rail resources that were essential for its civilian economy. Nor could it afford to stockpile the resources need to wage an all-out war with a peer power. So, yes, a Soviet army backed by the industrial wealth of the west, as in WWII, was formidable - but that didn’t describe the post WW-II Soviet Army.
And so here we are in 2022 watching a Soviet style army which looks an awful lot like the WWII Soviet army (with many of the same doctrinal, training and leadership flaws, albeit much smaller) stripped of all its western support. It lacks the logistical resources to keep its armies moving, it’s having trouble supplying its mobilized hordes with basic equipment (boots, food, socks, and guns), and it can’t manufacturer the replacement weapons it needs to subdue the Ukrainians. By contrast, the Ukrainians have the advantages that the Soviets had in WWII - more, in fact, having embraced Western style military training and doctrine. They have access to the vast resources of western industry and the western ability to support supply lines across the globe. No wonder they’re more than holding their own against the Russians.
I just want to say I value your analysis and I like the move of location.