How one might judge the importance of a 'battle'
Reflections on the Ukrainian attacks on Russian airfields
Just thought it might be interesting for you to understand how I, at least, tend to judge the importance or not of an engagement in a war and why I point out which events I think are important and which are not. Its arisen because of the really rather dramatic reporting that has appeared over the previous 24 hours, when news came out of the (almost certainly Ukrainian) attack on Russia’s Engels Airfield and other bases. These bases are hundreds of miles from Ukraine and are where Russia bases much of its strategic bombing force—thus making them very eye-catching targets.


I chose not to take part in the detailed discussion yesterday about these operations, as they did not strike me as terribly important in the course of the war. I don’t see how they brought defeat any closer for Russia (or victory closer to Ukraine). It seemed an example of an operation that was daring and headline-grabbing, but I wasn’t sure that they mattered—so I stayed quiet and let others speak about them. Then this morning saw a New York Times story that this attack was ‘escalatory’ and could lead to an upward spiral in war fighting between Russia and Ukraine. That struck me as equally an overreaction—and I even put together a short tweet thread about it.


Why I tend to think these operations are not going to be terribly important is that I don’t see how it will materially affect the ability of Russia to prosecute the war or how they will give Ukraine a great advantage in continuing to fight. Yes a small number of very expensive aircraft were damaged, but not so many (even with probably understated Russian losses) to affect how the Russians are prosecuting their war.


By the way, Im entirely open to persuasion on this. If someone can come up for reasons why damaging these aircraft can affect the course of the fighting, I would be very open to persuasion.
In other words, when looking at this engagement, at least in my view, its importance can only be understood in looking at how important/difficult to replace the equipment is that is lost and how this affects the trajectory of force generation on either side. What is less important (almost always) is the ground won or lost. The territory of much of battlefields in this war is not strategically valuable—in that is doesn’t affect the ability of either side to generate or support their military forces. There are not easily accessible raw materials available in many of these areas, materials that can be turned into war-fighting material. Moreover, there are not large enough populations of fighting age individuals left in them to seemingly materially increase the size of either army.
If that is true, and neither the resources in material and manpower available on the land being fought over is not crucial to the force generation on either side, then the key thing becomes the damage done to the forces of either side and how this affects force regeneration/replacement. In a basic way, it’s a calculation between the cost of forces deployed versus cost of forces destroyed. An engagement therefore is only of value if the losses inflicted on the other side are worth the cost to inflict those losses. If its not, it’s a real problem.
That’s why the Bakhmut offensives for the Russians have struck me as very strange since June. There have been regular bloody attacks for months to seize a town/area of no strategic importance. Yet to take Bakhmut (so far unsuccessfully) the Russians have launched attacks for months and seem to have suffered significant losses. Unless for some reason Ukrainian losses are as significant (which would be unlikely considering they are on the defensive and the Russians have to come to them), then I don’t see what Russia gains for these losses.
Another thing I am generally skeptical about is seeing something as a ‘political’ success. Yes politics matters, but the taking of a small town, or indeed the launching of some drones on Engels airfield, are unlikely to make a significant difference to the political calculation of the war. Only something that would affect the political willingness of the two sides to keep fighting—or (and this really is important) the political willingness of outside powers such as the USA or China to aid either side to keep fighting, really matters. That kind of major political success/failure in war is rare. Its important when it happens, but too often small events are described as politically important when they are not.
Which brings me back to the attacks on the Russian airfields. Ultimately I think they are only important if they deprive Russia of the force needed to attack Ukraine (unlikely), if they divert Russian resources to now defend those airfields thus distorting the way the Russians fight in the future (maybe a small amount) or politically make a difference in how the Putin government prosecutes the war (doubtful).
I realize this is a rather matter of fact way of describing an event that has received a great deal of coverage—but it’s the way I would argue one needs to understand the real importance of a military engagement. Hope that makes sense!
1. I agree that the New York Times often has been disappointing in this war. My analogy was: "Royal Navy attacks Italian Fleet at Taranto, escalating the war."
2. It will be good for Ukrainian morale, and they needed some good news. Conversely, it will cause some yelling and screaming and dissension in Russian lines. It also provides good international PR for Ukraine with their plucky ingenuity.
3. But, overall, I agree with you that this will not significantly, materially affect the war. If these were, indeed, modified TU-161s, then Ukraine doesn't have enough of them nor are they accurate enough to cause major damage. However, the mission/task verb I'd ascribe to this operation would be "disrupt". If the Ukrainians could cause enough disruption to either reduce the size of the attacks, or their frequency, they would further reduce the potential damage in Ukraine. As you mentioned in one of your recent articles, maintaining a high operational tempo is key to success in this kind of sustained campaign. Anything the Ukrainians can do to reduce the tempo would be of help.
Doesn't this increase the pressure on Russia's air defence network? The discussions I've seen suggest a lack of air defence at these airfields; IF this is correct we can presume that the Russians believed them safely out of striking distance. Now they must re-evaluate that and decide whether they need to allocate resources to protecting not just these 2 bases but all similar facilities which have been stripped of air defences (we have seen images of empty S300 sites round St Petersburg already I recall, suggesting this is happening), which would likely only be possible by withdrawing assets from Ukraine. Even if it turns out Ukraine hasn't got any more of these drones/missiles, Russia won't know that for certain and must weigh the possibility that they do. That can create an oversized reaction.