Well, I have a piece written on US and Ukrainian visions of airpower, and through that an analysis of the Ukrainian campaign on the Russian company Wildberries, but that now must wait until later in the week. The developments over the weekend about how (and even if) the US can exert military power in the Western Pacific have opened up the question of whether the American Age in this most vital of areas is now over—with no chance of resuscitation. This actually comes not long after this piece on the end of the American Age in the Middle East—or at least the Persian Gulf.

US power in the western Pacific has rested on three main pillars for the last 80+ years: US military might, US allies, underpinned by US economic power.

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This update will focus on the role of allies in the Russo-Ukraine War (which was the fascinating and distressing story of the last week). Ukraine’s allies (I use that word knowing it is loaded) should have helped Ukraine win the war by now. They are much richer, more technologically advanced, and, one would think, actually invested in Ukrainian victory—at least from a European perspective. And yet Ukraine’s allies have always tried to finesse their help, to limit it in certain perplexing ways that have forced Ukraine to fight a war that it did not wish to fight, and right now have left Ukraine extremely vulnerable in one area.

Russia’s allies, on the other hand, have actually offered Russia support that has allowed Russia to fight the war that Russia has wanted to fight. They have offered things such as Iranian drone technology (the Shahed which is the foundation of the Russian Geran), massive Chinese purchases of Russian oil and increasingly critical component supplies, and of course North Korean mass supplies of artillery shells, front line soldiers and now ballistic missile forces. These North Korean forces show that one does not have to have a large economy or wide technological base to be an extremely helpful ally. North Korea is providing effective forces to actually fight for Russia—which is far more than any of Ukraine’s partners have done.

Note: I am sending out on Saturday as I am nearing the end of my holiday and still recovering from a little illness. I will be back to more normal service on Monday and start taking part in the comment section discussions again. Thanks for the forbearance over the previous week.

This brings up the question of what exactly is the USA in this war? This week we got a very clear answer to that question. The US is using its leverage over Ukraine to help Russia. It does not have to do this, it chooses to.

Finally, the Ukrainians made a specific announcement about how much territory they have liberated over the last few months, and it is worthy of note, even as the reporting of the war has gone back to being quite pessimistic about Ukraine.

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Russia’s Allies Are More Helpful Than Ukraine’s

Over the last 10 days, reports have increasingly come in about North Korea’s plan to help Russia by deploying a significant ballistic missile strike force to aid Russia in its ranged bombardment of Ukraine. Ukrainian intelligence was most specific about the plan on August 5, when they named the location of the unit and the type of missiles that were being sent. Their specific claim was that the first North Korean ballistic missile forces being sent would deploy near Voronezh and contain 120 ballistic missiles and six launchers.

President Zelensky from that point on added more to that discussion and expanded on what the Russians were expecting from the North Koreans—saying that in the end 30,000 or even 50,000 additional North Korean troops and their supplies could be on their way to help Russia.

Note—Zelensky did not provide a source for these latter claims or a list of the kinds of units that would be sent.

Then, the next day, Zelensky was more explicit when he actually ascribed a specific ballistic missile attack to North Korean forces. He said that the previous day’s Russian missile assault on Zaporizhzhia had been at least partially undertaken by North Korean missile forces. This attack killed 9 people.

The Ukrainians are a little stupefied at how their partners, particularly in Europe but also in Asia, are trying not to engage in this story. To them it is an extraordinary development that serving North Korean units and their North Korean missiles will now take part in an assault on Ukrainian cities and civilians. They were hoping that this would lead to a major European response.

When it comes to Asian countries, specifically South Korea and Japan—who are the ones most threatened by North Korea—the Ukrainians were hoping that they would get more support. Zelensky indeed tied up together what he saw as the European and Asian interest in helping Ukraine oppose this move, during his evening address on August 10 of last week. Apologies for the long excerpt.

This is the first time in Russia’s history that they no longer have a secure strategic rear. For the first time, they cannot wage war without reinforcements from North Korea. They are now preparing to deploy an additional North Korean contingent on their territory. They have received, just imagine, additional ballistic missiles from North Korea. And everyone around the world must understand what this means. This is not only about the lives of people in Ukraine, and not only about the threats we face. North Korea’s ballistic missiles and their other weapons are being improved through its collaboration with Russia. The more North Korean strikes there are here in Ukraine, in Europe, the more their missiles and soldiers are used, the more they correct their shortcomings and blind spots, the greater the danger will later be for Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and other countries in the region.

Depressingly, of course, the response by Ukraine’s partners has been to downplay or even not engage at all with this question. South Korea had one official who (reportedly) said that this would be an illegal move by North Korea—but who also made no concrete pledges of aid. Everyone else just remained quiet.

In some ways, of course, this should not be a surprise. North Korea, like Iran, provides Russia what it can in direct military aid with no strings attached. Russia’s allies want it to win and believe that their military support should be used how Russia wants it to be used. That has extended to the thousands of North Korean forces who actually fought and died under Russian command retaking parts of Kursk Oblast.

And, in exchange, such allies get a great deal back. Russia has been a major support to Iran during its war with the USA (helping Iranian targeting of US forces) and Russia has, reportedly, provided a great deal of technological help to North Korea to improve its missile forces.

You can see the horrible benefits in such an alliance. North Korea helps Russia by sending troops in 2024, Russia helps North Korea improve its missiles. North Korea deploys some of those improved missile forces to Russia to attack Ukraine.

Rinse and repeat.

We can also say that Russia has accrued great benefit from all its support for Iran—in helping waste amazing amounts of US ordnance, force US forces to pull back from the Persian Gulf, and overall weaken the US presence in the Middle East.

The contrast with what Ukraine’s allies do could not be more stark. They have constantly tried to limit what Ukraine gets and even how they use what they have (more on that). They have used aid not only to help, but also to try and control and limit Ukraine. In doing this, they have helped transform this war into a longer, bloodier affair than it needed to be.

And they have done this by completely misreading the situation. They always wonder whether Russia will get hurt too much, whether what they give might actually be so effective that Putin will get angry, that arming Ukraine effectively might, weirdly, make reaching a “peace” deal more difficult.

Russia’s allies, on the other hand, give what they can and get what they can and let Russia fight its war. It has been brutally effective.

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Actually, The USA Is Quite A Good Ally For Russia

When I write, as I often do, that Trump has aligned the USA with Putin and is helping the Russian war effort, one of the regular retorts is that this cannot be true because the USA is still selling (very small) amounts of weapons to Ukraine through PURL. How could the USA allow any weapons to go to Ukraine, it was said, if it was more set on helping Putin?

This week, I hope, the answer to that question was made very, very clear—even to the greatest of skeptics. The USA has kept dribbling small amounts of military support for Ukraine because it gives the USA a great deal of leverage, the ability to both shape how Ukraine fights its war and even how European states prepare.

For instance, by continuing to provide a small number of Patriot interceptors to Ukraine through Europe, the Trump administration forces the Ukrainians to dance more to the US tune (and regrettably has slowed down the process of European states developing a European-only advanced air defense system). As long as there is no replacement, Ukraine will bend over backwards for even the prospect of more Patriots.

And we just had a brutally efficient example of what the US can do with that leverage. The Ukrainians for much of the last year have waged a ranged air-sea campaign against Russia’s ability to export oil through the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk (also the main Russian naval base on the Black Sea now that the Ukrainians have isolated Sevastopol). The USA, however, decided that they wanted that campaign weakened. At the start of August, according to the FT, VP JD Vance asked Zelensky to halt all Ukrainian campaigns on non-Russian tankers using the port and much of the infrastructure. Here was how another story summarized the move.

Washington was concerned that Ukraine could further destabilise oil markets and harm US companies by striking tankers carrying oil transported by pipeline from Kazakhstan to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal at the Russian port of Novorossiysk.

Vance asked President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to halt the attacks during a phone call on 31 July.

Since then, Ukraine has not struck tankers near the CPC terminal.

The officials said Ukraine has agreed not to strike CPC infrastructure facilities or non-Russian vessels, provided that the vessels are not subject to Ukrainian sanctions and are not carrying Russian oil or other Russian cargo.

The “non-Russian” designation is meaningless, as the shadow tanker fleet that the Russians are using to move their oil is deliberately non Russian-flagged, to avoid sanctions. So, the USA was basically telling the Ukrainians to stop what had been a very effective campaign to help Russia.

The oil price argument is also really unconvincing. The US could have done this before had they really cared about the price of oil. They are doing it now, imho, because Putin desperately needs money.

And the Ukrainians clearly felt that there was no alternative but to agree to this very pro-Putin request by the US Government. You can even see the way Patriot supplies might have been part of this process. On August 8, Zelensky made his announcement that Ukraine had been offered a very small monthly supply of Patriot interceptors going forward—while admitting that the number was grossly insufficient for Ukrainian needs.

The USA keeping Ukraine dependent on Patriots means that even a small number gives the US leverage, and in this case that leverage can be used to do a massive favor for Vladimir Putin—a favor that the Ukrainians were sadly forced to start giving right away.

If the US really cared about the global price of commodities, it might urge the Russians to stop attacking Ukrainian grain shipments in and out of Odesa, which is an effective and growing Russian campaign. As the New York Times, recently reported, this campaign could affect food prices worldwide very soon—leading to a real cost spike to consumers.

Coming at the start of the harvest season, the Russian campaign in Ukraine, which is a major producer of grains like wheat, corn and barley, could throw global food supply chains into turmoil. In 2022, during the first months of the full-scale war, Russia established a blockade of Ukrainian ports, causing a spike in global food prices and placing an estimated 70 million people at increased risk of acute food insecurity.

Thus Russian caused inflation seems fine for the USA these days, however, Ukrainian caused inflation gets an official request for a Ukrainian retreat.

Too often the Trump administration can be dismissed as bumbling incompetents. However, when it comes to helping Russia they can be brutally effective—as we have seen over the last few days. The US has achieved major leverage over Ukraine through a brutal rationing of access to Patriot interceptors. If they cut that off entirely—it would actually have been worse for Russia.

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Ukraine Is Slowly But Steadily Liberating Territory

We are now more than halfway through the summer season, and in the past this is often when reports about the successes of Russia’s summer offensive would be heating up in the western press. This was, for instance, when the stories about the imminent fall of Pokrovsk started circulating in 2024 (it actually took the Russians another year to take the city) and last summer at this time the reporting was all about the manpower crisis that Ukraine was facing which was going to lead to even greater Russian advances.

I say that because this year, the reports are not about steady Russian advances, but actually of some Ukrainian ones. Three days ago, the Ukrainian high command gave an update on its offensive actions so far in 2026. Zelensky summarized these in his evening address on August 12.

The offensive operation, which lasted from January through August of this year, was carried out by warriors of the Airborne Assault Forces and other units involved. Its main objective was to disrupt the Russian occupiers’ plans for further advances and push Russian forces beyond the administrative border of the Dnipro region.

Thanks to the active operations of Ukrainian defenders, significant losses were inflicted on the occupation contingent. Russian losses amount to at least 9,550 killed and more than 6,600 wounded. Ukraine’s “exchange fund” was also replenished.

Over the course of the operation, 745 square kilometers of territory were liberated, and 26 villages in the Dnipro, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia regions were returned to Ukrainian control.

Note: The Institute for The Study of War claims using a very conservative estimate that Ukraine has liberated between 600-700 square kilometres—which is not that much lower.

How Ukraine has done this will only be made completely clear later—but it seems a sign that their growth of using highly trained and motivated soldiers in small numbers, with strong technological support, is working. They can find short windows when Russian drones are either disabled or not in an area. They can provide their own soldiers with constant support and intelligence updates so that they will not be surprised or caught unprepared. And they can methodically work their way into Russian lines, take small amounts of territory, and remain safe.

This was something I went into in detail with General Havrylov in December 2025. Here is a podcast with us both:

And here is a written piece with a description of Ukrainian tactics to try and take the initiative—the ones that seem to have been working over the last few months.

Now, these areas being liberated are still relatively small. However, the Ukrainians seem to be able to do this now and not suffer the kinds of casualties that would have been incurred before. That is worth acknowledging.

Have a good rest of the weekend everyone.

Well, things are plodding along with Trump’s War, and in the end they will continue to do so based on a calculation that only Trump can make. This war long ago lost all strategic purpose for the USA. The Iranian regime was not overthrown (it has arguably been strengthened), US alliances in the region have been weakened, US forces have already been withdrawn from key military facilities, many of which have been so damaged that they might never be repaired.

In other words, the strategic results are pretty clear regardless of the text of any further MOU between the parties. However, that does not mean the war will end. That event will happen when Trump makes one major calculation—and so far he is not there.

Then there will be one other larger story about the state of the US military, which is worrying. A combination of great arrogance in its abilities and lately incompetence and corruption in how it has been run, has left the US military in the worst shape in its post-1945 existence. Considering the massive amounts of money that have been spent on it, the US military is arguably in its worst state ever. Sailors on the USS Abraham Lincoln for instance, seem to be paying the price for the incompetence and strategic failure of the US government (see below).

Can He Keep It Going Through The Election?

This is now quite a fascinating question that needs to be debated. I have been of the view, as regular readers will know, that Trump will have to find someway to extricate himself from the war he started, before the US midterm elections on November 3, 2026. My reasoning was that the war was so unpopular and the longer it goes on the longer gas prices remain high (and inflation overall remains higher), so that for political sake he would need to get out before the vote.

That was the whole premise of this piece written back in April—that Trump would need to do something to try and mitigate the effect of the war on the upcoming elections.

Well, it seems now that he might be willing to push the blockade for longer than I anticipated, even up until or through the midterms. There are now fewer than three months until the vote, and because of how ineptly the Trump administration has handled itself to this time, it seems the Iranians are the ones who believe that time is on their side. The US, with its extraordinary mixture of extreme bombast and open desperation, seems to have convinced the Iranians that they can wait and get the terms they want—even with the blockade going on.

The signs of that this week were pretty clear. Trump, having earlier tried to control himself a returned to bombast and nonexistent victory claims. He said at one point that the Iranians will now be expected to provide compensation payments to the USA, and repeated this threat to “keep” the control over the Strait of Hormuz.

The Iranians, otoh, using both official and unofficial channels, let it be known that they were happy to wait. And thus it will go on until Trump makes the calculation that accepting a deal that makes it very hard to claim victory (which is where we are at) is better than having a vote while the war is going on.

This is the rub. He thought earlier that he could get some kind of deal that would allow him to tell the American people that he had won—some kind of new nuclear statement or a clear Iranian commitment not to charge “tolls” on the Strait (these really are now the two issues that seem to be taking all his attention).

Recently, reports are that he no longer even cares about getting a nuclear deal, viewing that as unlikely, so he would settle for a deal on the Strait of Hormuz. However, clearly he cannot get anything close to what he needs to declare victory even in this one area, so would rather run the risk of keeping the war going than accept that reality. In other words—Iran is giving him nothing at all.

In some ways that is the exact same situation that he has been in since March—once it was clear that the quick victory he had assured himself was going to happen. I was amused to see the host of articles in the press this week about how Trump was desperate to get out of the war, but that Iran would not let him.

I wrote exactly that on April 1—with all the same reasons being given now in the press.

The one change since March is that Trump seems willing to press on closer until the election without a deal than seemed likely at the time—not that his basic position on wanting out has changed (he desperately wants out). That is fascinating. The change seems to be that he believes that if there is no fighting (more on that below) but that the blockade keeps going, he will not politically suffer any more than he has—that he can keep the price of gas from rising too much, that his base will support him no matter what.

Which is why the White House narrative pivoted hard this week to try and argue that Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz was, really, no big deal. Secretary of the Treasury Bessent claimed that workarounds are being implemented. The administration also started talking about 8-9 million barrels a day getting through the Strait.

Note: the reality has to be far far below this. Before the war about 130-140 tankers transited the Strait daily, now we are seeing fewer than 10.

Of course, one thing that Trump has going for him is that the oil markets have internalized his months of statements that a deal was imminent, and while the price is rising, it is below what people would have expected at this time. If the markets conclude, however, that he really will keep this going through the election, that will be another story.

So it is fascinating. Iran has decided to give Trump nothing with which he can politically claim victory and right now that is keeping this war going—maybe through the US elections (which I did not see happening).

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The State Of The US Military Is Pretty Distressing

A range of stories this week made it clear that the US military is, if anything, in worse shape than people understood. The rot that has set in for a while is, if anything, accelerating. When I wrote about the “rot” in both The Atlantic and this Substack right after Trump started his war, I received some real pushback.

I think one of the basic problems is that Americans have been conditioned to hold their military in such high regard, that admitting its shortfalls is seen almost as unpatriotic (when actually it is the most patriotic thing an American can do). Blindly supporting a military while it is visibly degrading is not patriotism, it is self harm.

This week there were a few painful examples

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Lately there has been a great deal of discussion of how the USA has run down its stocks of certain classes of advanced military equipment. I know, as I have been a part of that debate starting here, and also in the Atlantic. This expenditure of ammunition is indeed shocking, and even before the latest Trump escalation in July had led to dangerously low stockpiles in certain areas; stockpiles so low that, I for one, do not believe that the US military will be capable of fighting a major war for years.

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At first I wondered for a while why so many people started to read this Substack. I figured with all the newspapers and media outlets out there, that it would only generate interest from those with what might be called niche interests—logistics, military technology, hardcore military history, etc. However, what I have discovered, which is not enlightening, is that the actual reporting of war and politics these days in most media outlets can be incredibly weak. The system often seems broken—reporting White House inspired narratives that have no basis in fact as actual events, and replacing rigor with herd behavior.

The latest batch of stories, in many of the major outlets, about Trump now pivoting to support Ukraine and of him definitely agreeing to give Ukraine a license to build Patriot interceptors (or indeed whole Patriot systems), showed better than anything how this process worked. The White House and MAGA supporters of Ukraine (who actually constantly betray the Ukrainians) want to get this narrative out for certain politically beneficial reasons. They started spreading the story and the press ran with it. The result was a dishonest narrative spread far and fast—and it actually became the common wisdom, when it was not true.

The White House could also use the press to spread such stories because they have understood just how weak and pliant much of the media is. Doing what I have done over the last few years has been learning experience (and not it a good way) about how much of the media (and much of the think-tank community) works. The key thing in both worlds is not being accurate or truthful as much as it is gaining access to power and being seen to be smart. Access and perceived intelligence—usually drastically greater than real intelligence—is the currency of these worlds.

Thus to maintain access, some reporters and commentators will say exactly what the White House wants, time and again, even after the White House narrative has been shown to be nonsense (many times). When it comes to think tanks, many are not interested in attempting even-handed or rigorous research; instead, they want to impress funders and also maintain access, and thus they publish crap to appeal to power and maintain their perceived viability (in most cases they have none). This means that much of what is produced in think-tanks is of laughable quality, meant to signal access and support, not to actually analyze a problem or policy.

In other words, the output is often weak, shallow and even deceptive at times. And we have seen that in spades over the last few weeks. The output also hurts. Last week I showed how listening to that narrative has hurt Ukraine—how having hope that the narrative about Trump changing his mind and aiding them has helped Putin bombard their cities. This week I thought it would be worthwhile to talk about how such a con takes place and can be so widely amplified.

Also, a quick note for subscribers. I have not replied to messages in the last two Substacks because I am both supposed to be on holiday and I have come down with a bug of a sort which has wiped me out. It means that once I write a piece and send it out, I’m quite shattered. Apologies.

Anatomy Of A Con

Donald Trump has known from the moment that he became president again that Ukraine was desperate for Patriot missiles. Indeed, he knew it so well that he used that information to both boast about his own power and also to abuse the Ukrainians as supplicants. Remember, he loves things that make him seem powerful, and knowing that the Ukrainians were desperate for Patriot interceptors as the Russians were bombarding their cities and people, is exactly the kind of thing that turns him on.

How can I say that? Well, he went to great lengths to tell the world—not in a way that somehow politically helped him, but just because he could. Lets start with examples from very early into his second term:

Examples of Trump Knowing How Desperately Ukraine Needs Patriots

14 April 2025 — Oval Office

Just before Trump was down to meet with El Salvadoran president Bukele, he was asked whether he had spoken to Zelensky about his offer to purchase more Patriot batteries, Trump replied:

“Oh, I don’t know. He’s always looking to purchase missiles. You know? He’s against—listen, when you start a war, you got to know that you can win the war, right?”

He continued on to insult Ukraine by saying that you don’t start a war against somebody twenty times your size and then hope that people give you some missiles—implying that Ukraine decided to start the war.

25 June 2025 — NATO summit press conference

The clearest “I know what they want” statement by Trump about Ukraine’s desperate need for Patriots, and crucially it is an unprompted elaboration rather than a yes/no answer. Asked by a Ukrainian reporter, whose husband was serving in the Ukrainian army, about giving Ukraine Patriots, Trump responded:

Good. So let me just tell you, they do want to have the anti-missile missiles. Okay. As they call them, the Patriots. And we're going to see if we can make some available. They're very hard to get. We need them too. We were supplying them to Israel and they're very effective, 100% effective. Hard to believe how effective. And they do want that more than any other thing, as you probably know.

13 July 2025 — Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland

Asked whether he would still send ten entire Patriot systems, which had supposedly been promised, Trump said he hadn’t agreed on the number yet but that he understood that Ukraine “desperately” needed them.

Btw, this exact time was part of the con when Trump was acting all angry at Putin, and talking about getting tough on Russia—only to turn around and roll out the Red Carpet in Alaska a few weeks later.

In other words, it is clear that Trump knows how much Ukraine desperately needs Patriots and how much leverage that gives him—and he is enjoying it.

However what the US actually does in 2025 and 2026 is regularly slow down and even stop Ukraine from getting promised Patriots. Here are some examples.

Examples Of The Administration Cutting Patriot Supplies To Ukraine

March 2025 — blanket aid suspension

After the ambush of Zelensky in the Oval Office, the administration paused all aid to Ukraine, including Patriots in transit or already in Poland, until Ukrainian leaders showed more “appreciation”, with a White House official saying they were “pausing and reviewing our aid to ensure that it is contributing to a solution.” Intelligence sharing was cut too.

July 2025 — the DOD halt

Dozens of Patriot interceptors, (as well as thousands of 155mm rounds, 100+ Hellfires, 250+ GMLRS, plus Stingers, AIMs and grenade launchers) were halted on their way to Ukraine. Note the timing just before Trump goes to great lengths to say how much he knows Ukraine needs Patriots.

This kind of cat and mouse game with the administration tormenting Ukraine over Patriots continues for the entire year. And then Trump’s War with Iran breaks out and Patriot deliveries practically stop. For all of 2026, according to Zelensky, deliveries of Patriots to Ukraine were running at a paltry one-third level of the reduced flow of 2025.

It is important to understand the timeline—as it shows that the Patriot shortage was known in the administration from the start, was used to damage Ukraine multiple times, and in the end resulted in far fewer Patriots for Ukraine than was promised.

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Trump Promises A Patriot License As Part Of The Con

Now, move back to exactly one month ago. On July 9, Trump promised Zelensky, surprisingly to some, that he would allow Ukraine to have a license to make its own Patriot interceptors (or indeed whole Patriot systems). Now this was a big part of the con—and it was a con.

First, there had been no preparation for this move at all—the defense companies involved had not been informed and allowed to prepare. In other words, the promise was not substantial, it was a tactic.

Second, Trump was feeling pressure because all of his boasting about Russia being powerful and crushing Ukraine was looking decidedly silly as Ukraine was striking back.

Third, Trump did not want to give Ukraine Patriots interceptors at that moment, because he knew that Ukraine was basically out—and this gave Putin an opportunity to bombard Ukraine with impunity. So he could dangle the license idea and keep Ukraine from getting the interceptors it needed at that moment.

In other words, it was an empty promise, with no substance behind it, the upshot of which was to delay any help for Ukraine for a considerable period. It was a political maneuver to serve Trump’s needs and help Putin while making it seem like the US was about to help Ukraine. It was a con.

The Press Goes Wild About Trump Now Siding With Ukraine

If you look back at the reporting about Trump and Ukraine from July 9 until just a few days ago, you will see the real political advantages Trump accrued from the con. Even though he had no intention of allowing Ukraine to build Patriots, this move, fed by anonymous White House sources, as always, was that this move was part of Trump pivoting to Ukraine, of Trump being “wowed” by Ukrainian achievements or even, most hysterically, of Trump being finally frustrated enough with Putin to be willing to hurt Russia (this btw was about the fourth time that Trump had “finally” been so frustrated by Putin). The stories appeared in almost all the major press, and they were so shockingly similar in tone and content that you can only see how a certain narrative was being pushed.

This is what I mean about being cynical about the level of reporting that is being sent out. It is parroting lines, not rigorous analysis.

Here are three examples from major outlets from the last four days of July—and what is particularly freaky is that all the headlines have almost exactly the same phrasing. That is a lot of warming.

Wall Street Journal

The Economist

Semafor

Thankfully for it, the New York Times adopted the same narrative language, but did at least present the warming as a question, not a definite.

So, overall, the con had worked a charm.

The Con Culminates And The Patriot License Is Shown To Be Nonsense

Of course all good things must come to an end—and all good cons too. On July 31, 2026, after this final rush of press stories about how pro-Ukraine Trump was becoming, Trump pulled the rug out completely from under Ukraine. He started musing publicly about how he might not, after all that, give Ukraine a Patriot license.

Moreover, it turned out that Trump, precisely when we were told that he was warming towards Ukraine, had nixed an emergency request from Zelensky for interceptors as the Ukrainians basically had none.

So not only was Ukraine not going to get the license, it was being strung along on getting any new missiles. This has left the Ukrainians desperate, as they really are defenseless against Russian ballistic missiles. Zelensky is now left trying to sell the idea of Ukraine eventually receiving a tiny number of new interceptors, maybe just old PURL ones, as something.

He was conned.

Conclusion

The power of a Trump con is that people want to believe it, and because the press is so supine and willing to spread White House stories uncritically, they amplify it. Yes, Ukrainians really did believe that Trump was warming to them—not just because they wanted to (and they did) but because they were being told this constantly by the American press. There was nothing but hot air and dreams (and a desperate desire to retain access to Washington sources) behind all the stories about Trump moving over to Ukraine’s side.

The con worked a charm—though if there was a press with the willingness to confront White House narratives and point out that repeatedly Trump had served Putin’s interests, it might not have been so damaging.

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The Overreaction In the Press: Ukraine Has Not Gone From Winning To Losing

The con anatomy was rather long (and I am rather unwell) so this update will have only one other story. However, later in this week I will have a piece on the Ukrainian strategic bombing strategy, particularly the wildberries campaign (of which I have rather mixed feelings as I have made clear). So that is coming.

However, I did want to remark on another narrative shift. With Trump having maneuvered so effectively that Ukraine is now defenceless against ballistic missiles, there have been arguments that the whole idea that Ukraine was taking some of the initiative in the war was somehow flawed, and that Putin was regaining the initiative. There was this piece in the Spectator, for instance.

This is an overreaction. On the battlefield, the basics of the situation still favor the Ukrainian strategy of causing massive Russian casualties while saving their own lives (which hopefully is even gaining ground under General Drapatyi). And the data supports this. ISW’s most recent update on the Russian summer offensive (it is already into August—so much of the summer is gone) shows Russian advances are miniscule, far below the small advances of 2025, and Russian casualties are now more than 40,000 a month. It is Russia that is still struggling to generate soldiers to replace losses—and that means that the idea of Russia having a societal wide mobilization is being discussed more and more.

Ukrainian mid-range strike continues to hammer Russian logistics in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainians seem to have “fire control” now on the highway into Crimea. So the Russian army is struggling, suffering massive losses and its logistic situation is getting worse, not better.

In long range strike, when Ukraine focusses on refineries, they can still do great damage. That means that Russia is still going to generate less income going forward and that will hurt the Russian war machine.

So yes, Ukraine is going to suffer a great deal in the coming months through civilian losses and some successful Russian strategic attacks—thanks in part to how the USA has conned the Ukrainians. That is undeniable. However, the Russian military is still failing badly this summer—and that will not change.

Keep that in mind.

Have a good rest of the weekend everyone. I am back to bed.

I felt the need to write this piece because of the extraordinary strategic failure of the USA in its war against Iran. I gave an interview about this to NPR’s All Things Considered, yesterday on precisely this topic. You can listen to it here. In the interview, I said I did not think people quite understood the gravity of what we had seen in Trump’s War with Iran. The USA, reportedly a superpower and the technologically dominant force of its day, had lost the war in record time, had exhausted supplies of vital munitions that it could not replace for many years, and was now haggling over the terms of its own defeat.

Though I did not have time to go into it then, it also made the early Pentagon boasts about how the US was fighting amongst the most ill-considered statements in history. We heard for months about how the US was imposing itself, obliterating Iranian military power, crushing Iran’s industrial base, etc,.

All of it was nonsense. I thought, therefore, it would be good to visit one area where such boasts were being made just a little while ago, both about the US bombing of Iran and also the Ukrainian attacks on Russia. A while back we were hearing about how AI was being decisive for both—when actually it was not. AI, or Autonomous systems, is I would argue absolutely the future of war, but it will require investment, planning and sober heads. For now, beware the extreme boasts.

AI Failed Against Iran

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Well as Trump’s War with Iran has now gone on for almost six months, certain realities are obvious. These realities mean the USA has lost the war, that Iran will emerge, in the short term at least, in a stronger position and that, most likely, the wider Persian Gulf region will be altered strategically, perhaps forever. I say these “realities” because even though the negotiations (of some sort) are still going on, the war has already caused some dramatic changes that cannot be undone quickly—if at all. And those changes are heralds of what is to come, not roadblocks on the way back to what was.

This is momentous. Since the end of World War II, or at least since the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the USA has become the dominant outside security player in the region. It overthrew governments, it made massive military sales (more on that below), it established military bases and it also fought shorter wars (First Gulf War) and decades-long wars (War on Terror/Afghanistan) to impose its influence.

The USA even had one of its most important, if less well-known, foreign policy doctrines aimed precisely at the region: the Carter Doctrine. Announced in the State of the Union address in 1980, the Carter Doctrine made it American policy to resist any other power interfering with trade into and out of the Persian Gulf and stated that the USA would use military force to keep the Gulf open.

It is ironic, then, that the USA, in using military force, caused another power to close the Gulf and led to the demise of its own doctrine.

For the states of the region, this is also a transformational development that will (or at least should) lead to massive changes in their security architecture. For many decades, as I laid out in this Atlantic article from a few days ago (gift link here), they based their security on making vast and expensive purchases of military equipment from the USA, housing US military forces, and acting as US allies. That entire paradigm is gone.

What we are seeing is that relying on the USA (or really any other power) for your security is a mug’s game. You cannot buy security in the modern world, you have to have some ability to make it for yourself. Here is a short excerpt from the piece.

I will write more about how states might go forward from here, but this update will be on already what has happened: how the American Age is already drawing to an end in the Persian Gulf. It will do that through a few points, which added together show a reality that I do not see changing, regardless of how the US and Iran eventually end Trump’s War.

The US Is Running Out Of Advanced Munitions: It Will Take Years To Recover

The most terrifying logistics percentage of Trump’s War came out this week. It was claimed that the USA had already used up nearly “80%” of its advanced missile interceptor stockpiles. This is shocking. It not only makes a mockery of all of Trump’s threats to escalate—it means that the US cannot defend its friends and allies in the region (if it has any left).

This was part of a cascading series of stories about the sorry state of US military supplies—which are not hitting systems no one was talking about previously. One of these was that the US was almost out of the well known ATACMS long-range rocket artillery system (which was of vital importance to Ukraine in 2022 and 2023). Reuters broke that story on August 4, and here was how one outlet summarized it.

The U.S. Army has used up much of its stockpile of highly accurate long-range missiles during its five-month war with Iran, according to three people familiar ⁠with the data, raising concerns about the military’s readiness for future conflicts.

The missiles are principally the Army’s surface-to-surface weapons, known as Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM). The U.S. has used “virtually all” of these weapons, according to two of the sources.

The fact that the US is blowing through its ATACMs stocks is doubly indicative of the crisis America is facing. ATACMs was going to be phased out in favor of newer weapons. However, the US was so desperate for long-range precision strike against Iran that they had to turn to them. Now they are gone (which further hurts Ukraine too it should be noted.

Btw, if it helps, here is a list of all the systems that the US is running very short on. Its extraordinary how the country has destroyed its strategic position in fewer than six months.

Air and missile defence

• Patriot (PAC-3 / PAC-3 MSE Interceptors) — Ground-launched interceptor against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft.

• THAAD — Ground-launched interceptor for ballistic missiles at higher altitudes and longer ranges than Patriot, and the system with no substitute below it.

• SM-3 — Ship-launched (Aegis) interceptor for ballistic missiles, hitting them outside the atmosphere.

• SM-6 — Ship-launched interceptor used mainly against aircraft and cruise missiles, with secondary anti-ship and terminal ballistic-missile roles.

Long-range strike

• Tomahawk (TLAM) — Ship- and submarine-launched cruise missile for hitting fixed ground targets.

• JASSM-ER — Stealthy air-launched cruise missile with a 1,000-lb payload, fired from bombers and fighters at standoff range.

• PrSM — The Army’s new ground-launched ballistic missile fired from HIMARS/MLRS, range beyond 500 km. The one replacing ATACMS.

• ATACMS — The older, shorter-range (300 km) predecessor to PrSM, fired from the same launchers, and the system supplied to Ukraine for strikes into Russia.

These, btw, are the systems for which the reports are strong. There are rumors that there are worrying shortages across the board.

It will take years, maybe more than a decade, to make up for this extraordinary shortfall. The US has neutered itself as a strategic force already in this war. That will have global ramifications.

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The US Is Already Withdrawing Forces From The Region: It Just Does Not Want To Talk About It

The USA cannot protect its forces against Iranian strike, as cheap and less advanced as that strike is compared to American capabilities. The upshot of this weakness (and indicative of why the US is running out of anti-air systems) is that the USA is already pulling its forces out of the Persian Gulf—in some cases precipitously.

The Wall Street Journal five days ago wrote a detailed story about how this is effecting Kuwait. The US has made Kuwait a major base for its influence in the region since the First Gulf War in 1991, but the results of Trump’s War (if you remember the first mass casualty hit by the Iranians was on a US facility in Kuwait) has caused the US to pull many of its forces out of the country already.

Trying to sugarcoat the pill, the WSJ says the USA is “rethinking” its defensive posture in the region, but the truth is that is has been forced to pull out precipitously because it cannot protect its forces and it is struggling to protect the Kuwaitis.

This recent report comes after months of reports of withdrawals from other facilities—leaving many US bases in the Gulf supposedly empty. There was this story from March in the New York Times for instance.

So what are the states in the region seeing? They see that the US is unable to protect its own troops, let alone them. And what does that do? It makes those states understand that being too close to the US could actually be a strategic liability.

Jordan is an interesting case in that regard. Supposedly some of the US forces that were withdrawn from the Gulf have been redeployed to Jordan—and lo and behold Iran starts attacking Jordan regularly as it did last week. Now Jordanians are starting to question the role of the USA in their lives.

The USA Is Already Losing The Faith Of The State’s In The Region

As I mentioned above, the entire security architecture that was constructed by the states in the Persian Gulf and wider Middle East, will have to be entirely remade. There are signs that they already know that. The US, is showing its weakness so dramatically and in adding to that its unreliability and fickleness, is compelling the states to think more regionally.

For the last few months there have been reports of states, such as Saudi Arabia, “hedging” on their previous strategic calculations. This is a polite way of saying “losing confidence” in the USA and rethinking their position. For decades the Saudis spent eye watering sums building up their military with US equipment and relying on the US as the ultimate guarantor of its security. Now it can see the US not only cant protect it from Iran, it can barely help fight the Houthis in Yemen.

Other states are starting to think more regionally as well when it comes to the future (which is btw, no bad thing at all). Look, we need to be honest about what we have seen here. The US is already running out of weapons, it is already pulling forces back, it is already discrediting itself. The states in the region are only acting rationally in looking at a very different future, one that relies as little as possible on the whims of a declining and fickle USA.

Expect a lot more on this going forward.

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Note On The Negotiations For Paying Subscribers

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Hi All,

People love to talk about war: how militaries behave, what weapons and tactics they use, how they are being commanded, and how the battles are progressing. However, the central question of war is usually/often ignored as boring or indecipherable. And that is: how do you pay for a war?

Wars are obscenely expensive, usually costing far more money than people can imagine before they start. Finding such funds usually requires a combination of hard work and brute force. Even then it is a struggle. Russia, for instance, has spent most of its sovereign wealth fund and liquidated the vast majority of its gold holdings to fight Ukraine, in what was supposed to be a week-long war.

I was struck by this question because the cost of Trump’s War is usually overlooked in the strategic discussion of whether Trump can or should escalate, and whether such a decision might turn Trump’s war into a longer-term conflict. In actuality, the question of how this war can or should be financed needs to be addressed first. One of the determining facts which will determine the length of this war could be that the USA is far more under the gun financially than it was at the start of any war in its history. That alone might prevent the US from escalating or lengthening the war—even if Trump wanted to do both.

If I may, I would like to go back to one of my favorite pieces of the year so far, which struck some people as a little out of left field. It was how in geopolitical and economic terms, we may have forgotten what it was like to deal with a real financial crisis.

The argument in the piece was that over the last 20 years we have had one way to deal with any crisis, be it the 2007-8 financial meltdown, the Covid pandemic, etc., and that was through massive deficit spending. We could, and did, throw masses of money at any problem. At the same time, the US fought its long War on Terror, which lasted through the American withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. All of this borrowing helped get the USA (and the rest of the world) through these crises, but of course it came with a time limit. We have been incredibly lucky (in the short term) over the last twenty years in that for much of the time interest rates were exceptionally low. At some point the borrowing has to stop, and I do not believe people understand this and are prepared for it.

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Note: Paul Krugman wrote an important Substack on a related theme four days ago entitled: The Bond Market Doesn’t Like Bullshit. It’s worth a look.

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Before I start, I have two announcements. First, I did a Substack Live on Thursday with Ivanna Ryzhkova of Come Back Alive. Ivanna was a combat medic in the Ukrainian Army starting right after the full-scale invasion and now works as part of CBA’s program which assists in the training of this much needed group of professionals (who save lives as their very job). It was fascinating to hear from Ivanna how the evolution in the shape of the battlefield has changed how the Ukrainian military undertakes the process of evacuating and treating wounded soldiers. You can watch/listen here.

And if you want to support CBA’s initiative in this or any other area, here is a link that you can use to make a donation. Please consider doing this now.

Also, this Tuesday, 4 August, I will be doing a Substack Live at 13:15 ET/18:15 BST/19:15 CEST, with Fabian Hoffmann who writes Missile Matters. Fabian has established himself as one of the best technical analysts of missile technology and strategy anywhere on the planet. We will discuss not just missile technology and the Russo-Japanese War, but also developments in missile technology worldwide. It will be fascinating, I hope, if not for the faint of heart.

One of the reasons understanding missile technology is so important now is that Russia, with the help of the USA, can now attack Ukraine with ballistic missiles and the Ukrainians are practically defenseless to stop them once they are launched. It is a tragedy, but it is no accident. This has happened partly because the US, led by President Trump, has deliberately starved Ukraine of Patriot anti-air missiles, while at the same time deceiving Ukraine that there was a possibility that the US might change position. Sadly for Ukrainian government, it maintained enough hope in the Trump administration, and this week that hope came back to bite the Ukrainians—hard.

Also, the contrasting fortunes of General Drapatyi and Mykhailo Fedorov were on display this week. They both approach this war from what I would say is exactly the right perspective—but only one is now in the position to help. This is a problem.

Finally, a brief update on the situation in the ports/shipping war for both sides. It is not good for either.

The Week When Hope Killed, Literally

I already have a pretty good idea of one of my big mistakes of the year, which will figure in my annual column of screw-ups. That was when I wrote, in April, that the Ukrainian government now understood that the US was not on their side and was strategically moving on. That argument was made most prominently in this Atlantic piece.

I believe now that I significantly misread Ukrainian perceptions. Actually, the Ukrainian government’s hope in the USA was not extinguished at all, and in the last few weeks it had come roaring back with a vengeance. Recently the Ukrainian government even crafted a strategy going forward that was based on active US assistance. It was something that I started hearing about approximately two weeks ago, but which became public knowledge in this Atlantic piece, which was excellently sourced and seems entirely accurate.

That piece discussed Zelensky’s meeting with Trump as part of the Lindsey Graham funeral and focused on a major strategic favor that the Ukrainians asked for at that time. Basically, Zelensky asked Trump to tell Elon Musk to allow the Ukrainians to have access to Starlink over Russia in certain specified ways. This access would allow for far more effective and accurate Ukrainian strikes on Russian ballistic missile capacity (both production and launching). Here was how that article started:

During closed-door talks at the White House on Tuesday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky laid out a plan for his country to survive another winter of war with Russia. For it to work, President Trump would need to call in a big favor from his ally Elon Musk. But according to two officials familiar with the conversation, Trump was noncommittal, leaving the future of the plan in doubt.

The new proposal, which has not been previously reported, offered the United States a way around sending Ukraine advanced air-defense missiles, known as Patriot interceptors, which the war in Iran has dramatically depleted. Instead, Ukraine would expand its use of another American technology: the Starlink satellite-communications network, which Musk controls.

Trump was, in response, supposedly “non-committal”.

Maybe it was desperation, maybe it was strategic miscalculation, maybe it was just human optimism, but once again the Ukrainian government was basing its strategic future (or at least one of them) on the hope of getting support from the USA.

I honestly, sincerely, desperately hope I am wrong on this, but I fear the Ukrainians were naïve and fell into a deliberate trap that Trump set in early July. This was when Trump started talking about letting Ukraine have a license to build Patriot Anti-Aircraft systems/interceptors (discussed in this weekend update), of how Ukraine was doing better than expected, of how he would now back Graham-Blumenthal sanctions etc., etc., the Ukrainians (led by a chorus of pro-Trump morons and dissemblers it must always be said) seemed to take this change at face value and believe that they now had an opening to convince the American president to allow them to do something that would actually hurt the Russians.

Certainly, from that moment both the public and private narrative that Trump was changing sides exploded. Stories seemed to deliberately mis-state vague and indefinite Trump statements as strong commitments and examples of changing perceptionst. Here are just some examples from the moment when Trump’s lies were taken as truth:

“In shift, Trump praises Zelensky, will let Ukraine build Patriot missiles” — Washington Post, July 8, 2026

“Trump Says Ukraine Can Make Patriot Missiles, Praising Zelenskyy” — Bloomberg, July 8, 2026

“Trump Tells Zelensky Ukraine Will Be Allowed to Manufacture Patriot Missile Interceptors” — TIME, July 8, 2026

“Bipartisan senators announce agreement with Trump administration on Russia sanctions” — CNN, July 10, 2026

“Patriot missile deal and Trump’s praise for Zelensky put pressure on Russia” — Washington Post, July 10, 2026

“Trump Backs Graham’s Russia Sanctions Bill, Boosting Pressure on Kremlin” — Bloomberg, July 13, 2026

The constant mistake was to take as definite things that Trump had not actually said done. Thus, Trump “will let Ukraine” build Patriots, “backs Graham’s Russia Sanctions Bill”, “put pressure on Russia”. None of this was true.

He never actually agreed to a license with Ukraine to let them build Patriots, he never agreed to the Graham Sanctions Bill, and he never actually put any pressure on Russia. It was all lies—or wildly optimistic and deceptive framing.

The truth of the last few days put paid to that. This is what has happened.

Trump said he might not let Ukraine have a license for Patriots, on the grounds that the Ukrainians cannot be trusted with the technology and might even use it against the USA.

Trump allowed a preliminary, procedural vote in the Senate on a bastardized Graham bill that did not sanction Russia, but is really about increasing his tariff powers.

Trump went back to his public alignment with Putin, even re-stating a few hours ago that Russia should have won the war in “one day” in early 2022, but Russian tanks got stuck in the mud.

Now, lets delve deeper into this development as there are only two ways to understand what we have seen.

• 1. If you listen to the mainstream press, one way to understand what we saw was that Trump honestly started pivoting to Ukraine in early July, was serious about helping the Ukrainians militarily, wanted them to have Patriots, really wanted to sanction Russia and hurt Putin, etc., etc.,. However, after this honest change, in just the last few days he had another extraordinary change of heart and reverted back to all of his earlier positions.

• 2. Trump never actually changed any of his fundamental beliefs on Ukraine, Russia and Putin, but maneuvered for his own political benefit and to help Putin. Sadly he did this very effectively and the press, official Washington with its sheep-like deference to Trump, and regrettably the Ukrainians—all fell for it.

Btw, number 2 is almost certainly right.

And in doing this, the US has engaged in another round of actively helping Putin kill Ukrainians. Another month has been wasted trying to persuade Trump to be something he is not and do something he will not. And Putin has received even more time to bombard the Ukrainians by air while Ukraine has no ability to shoot down Russian ballistic missiles.

Two days ago, tragically, at least 10 Ukrainians were killed in a Russian ballistic missile attack across Ukraine. The night after there was another blitz and 9 more Ukrainians were killed. The reason was pretty clear—the Ukrainians were able to intercept only one of the 27 ballistic missiles the Russians fired at them.

I do not blame the Ukrainians for having hope in Trump. However, I really wish they would stop. They waste so much time planning and scheming about how to win Trump over to their side—when what they are doing is losing time planning for real-world scenarios. At the same time, any hope given to Europeans is destructive, as it puts off the changes that need to happen in Europe and lessen the immediacy of their efforts to aid Ukraine.

However, I am most angry at the sloppy, delusional, and frankly moronic western press and analytical community that refuses to admit what Trump is and is doing. Maybe they are afraid to speak the truth because the truth reveals them to be accomplices in Trump’s actions.

However the reality is that hope kills, literally as this week has shown.

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Drapatyi and Fedorov Update

This week the good news/bad news cycle of Ukrainian military and defense developments continued apace. The good news was that the new chief of the Ukrainian General Staff, Mykhailo Drapatyi, has immediately introduced new policies to try and (further) reduce Ukrainian casualties. The two most notable of these changes were a new manpower audit and a freeze on the ability of specialized assault units (which were prioritized by General Syrskyi) to get more manpower for their attacks. Here are quick summaries of them.

• The Manpower Audit

  On 29 July the Ukrainian General Staff announced an audit of combat-unit staffing and personnel allocation covering brigades, regiments and corps, with the stated goal to “assess the actual state of manning in brigades, regiments, and corps, analyze the effectiveness of personnel distribution among units, and identify ways to improve personnel management…” That is military speak for increasing combat effectiveness by using soldiers more efficiently and not losing so many. Here is a Kyiv Independent article about this audit.

• The Assault-Regiment Freeze

  On 31 July, Ukrainska Pravda cited officers in four assault regiments saying that Drapatyi on July 26 ordered a suspension of personnel replenishment to assault regiments. The regiments, which were prized by General Syrskyi, had the ability to take men from other parts of the army to keep their numbers high. They also suffered high losses. They were part of Syrskyi’s desire to hold all land, even at a high cost.

These first two steps by Drapatyi were heartening, and indicate that he is transitioning even more dramatically to a low casualty way of fighting. Manpower matters more than fields at this time in the war, and the key thing is to let the Russians exhaust themselves through casualties while maintaining Ukrainian forces. And, btw, Russian casualties are reaching extraordinary levels, almost 43,000 according to the Ukrainian general staff. Here are the figures for 2026 so far.

Someone who is entirely on the same page as Drapatyi is Fedorov. Indeed, Fedorov gave two important interviews this week which touched on different aspects of his views on war and technology. One, in the New York Times, was extremely direct on the question of casualties and technology. According to him, machines and robots must do the fighting whenever possible—not human beings. Here is a gift link to the article, as I think it is so important.

“I am absolutely convinced that robots and drones should be doing the fighting wherever possible,” he said. “That is how we preserve the lives of our soldiers.” In his view, only armies equipped with cheap, smart and mass-produced weapons will survive in a new era of warfare.

During his six months as minister of defense, Mr. Fedorov promoted that philosophy, helping turn the tide in the war against Russia, and in turn causing his own popularity to soar.

Read the whole thing if you have the time.

The other interview was with Ukrainska Pravda. This one was more about why he was removed from office, though intellectually the two points are linked. Fedorov believes (with strong evidence) that the entire government reshuffle was done to get him out of his job, and the reason behind this was the power of the older military firms and officers such as Syrskyi, who did not like his changes and the fact that he might be threatening their profits. Here is one excerpt from that interview which is about Fedorov’s views on his removal.

The issue we face is that Zelensky seems determined to stick with Fedorov’s dismissal. The Ukrainian president is acting like it is a done deal and people around him are spreading the story that there is no chance that Fedorov will be back in post. And so far, even with large protests continuing, Zelensky is getting his way.

It is a mistake, and I hope not a self-destructive one. The key thing about Drapatyi and Fedorov that stands out is that they are on the same page when it comes to how modern wars should be fought. They both favor the machine-intensive, low human loss, method, and both want to construct a military around those principles.

The problem that Ukraine faces is that you need both a military head of the army and a defense minister to make this happen. Fedorov could not fully get his way as long as Syrskyi was head of the army, and Drapatyi will struggle as long as the old-defense brigade holds sway over the ministry of defense.

Ukraine has in place what could be a war winning team—it would be heartening to think that both elements could have power.

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Ports/Shipping Update

A number of people have asked about what is happening at the Ukrainian port of Odesa and other Ukrainian ports (which are all in the same area—see map below).

There are lots of reports of Ukrainian attacks on Russian shipping, but not so many about Russian attacks on Ukrainian ships. That is a fair point. Over the last few months the Russians have been waging their own campaign to try and destroy shipping in and out of Ukrainian ports (which is vital to ship out Ukrainian food for sale) operating.

We have some data on this. From June 20-July 20 (a month) the Russians supposedly hit 28 merchant vessels around Odesa, killing 21 sailors. The largest of these, not surprisingly, was a corn-laden vessel flying under a Guinea-Bissau flag, in which 10 sailors died.

I have had reports from people who were recently in Odesa, and they are worried that the situation is not good. On July 22 not a single merchant ship entered Ukrainian waters to load up with grain, and we are getting into peak season for agricultural production. That was notable enough that the Ukrainian Foreign Minister tweeted about it.

Since then, its not clear if any vessels have made it in to get grain.

Watch this story as part of the wider war on ports. Shipping in and out is vital to Russia and Ukraine, particularly in terms of income generation. Russia makes it money selling oil; Ukraine makes it money selling grain. Both commodities need to go out by sea.

Russia has suffered significant income losses through the campaign on its port/shipping (and refineries of course). That has led to Russia having to import certain fuels, such as gasoline, diesel and jet fuel, that it used to be able to provide itself, which along with reduced outward flows is depriving Russia of a great deal of income.

Now, if Ukraine’s partners in Europe are willing to back Ukraine, the Ukrainians should be able to deal with this disruption a little better than their enemies—though that does not mean at all it will be easy. Russian shipping/port/refinery losses mean that if they cannot ship, not only will they lose money, they actually will not have enough fuel for the domestic economy. That will have spillover effects. The Ukrainians are just losing money (they will have enough to eat).

Overall it is a pretty intense war—and one that matters a great deal to the outcome of the war.

Just a quick note on the piece on how the Russo-Ukraine War might end. That is almost done; however I am waiting to see if we hear definitely about the Ukrainian request for Starlink access over Russia. If it happens, it could make a significant difference to what happens in the next few months, so it is worth waiting a few days to let the dust settle.

Note: I am overwhelmingly convinced this will not happen, the reasons for which I will outline tomorrow in the weekend update.

If the end of the Russo-Ukraine War is more up in the air, I think we are witnessing the death throes of Donald Trump’s war of choice against Iran (which I really think historians should call “Trump’s War”). Unless he really plans to blow through the November elections still waging the most unpopular war in US history, the end will have to happen in the next few weeks or months. The elections are 94 days away as I write.

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Is China Going In For The Kill?

Another reason we might be seeing the death throes of this ludicrous war is that the Chinese, if reports are to be believed, might be going in for the kill. They certainly seem to understand the weakness of the US, the sad state of the US military under Trump, and the (regrettable) resilience of the Iranian state. The upshot is that to a large degree they hold America’s military fate in their hands, and they seem to be about to use that terrible leverage.

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This update will have two parts, one a news analysis that I will keep open for all, but then a more speculative, analytical piece on how the US-Iran War might end that will be for paying subscribers. I’ve been thinking a great deal about how wars end since I started writing this piece last week. The framework that it lays out has, I believe, some interesting things to say about how the two leaderships might agree on an eventual end to this war. As part of this, there will be an even more speculative section on Iranian strategy: speculative in that I have no real idea of what their strategy is, and will describe what it might be simply from observing what is happening.

In the end, it is not a pretty picture for the USA and a depressingly adept one from Iran.

Iran Is Toying With The USA

On July 23rd, the USA launched its last day of direct attacks on Iran during its latest phase of kinetic attacks in Trump’s War. This phase lasted for 13 days, as the USA continued to throw away valuable weapons systems, further depleting its stocks, for no strategic gain.

How do we know this? Well, the White House was briefing it to the press. In their desperation to provide arguments about why they needed to stop the bombing (which they never should have started) White House sources provided confirmation for the worst kept secret of the war. The US had not prepared and soon would struggle to protect its own troops, to say nothing of its allies (more on that below).

Things reached a tragi-comic level when America’s UN Ambassador, Mike Waltz, went on Meet The Press. In a series of wonderfully contradictory statements, he first said that the shortfall in US munitions existed because of the Biden administration, then he said it was not true and the US military had “everything that it needs”. Then he pivoted again and admitted that the shortfall exists by saying those leaking the information should go to jail. That of course was a great dodge, as it means many people in the White House, including Trump, should probably be jailed.

If you want to watch the whole Waltz interview, here it is:

The shortfall is very real, btw. US stocks are not a mystery as there are annual appropriations that can be accessed and provide a pretty good idea of the numbers.

As I tried to say last week, re-upping this bombing campaign for 13 days only left the USA weaker every day. There is also stockpile info in this piece if you want to read it:

The US administration, not quite grasping how weak it has made itself, even did its usual trick of threatening to escalate wildly against Iran, and stories started circulating of a large number of reinforcements being flown from the USA into the theater in preparation for a ground assault.

However, this was always bluff. The US has weakened itself so dramatically that it has taken a very unpalatable proposition from March and turned it into a political impossibility. If it inserted US ground forces into Iran, say in the Strait area or around Kharg, it would blow through what remains of its stockpiles of advanced air defense weapons in a very short time. Then it would have to either withdraw or suffer increasing casualties.

Adam Kinzinger made a very good point about how Trump’s casualty fear has neutered his escalation threats. He has used up massive numbers of the most advanced systems because they can be fired from a distance, and thus put US soldiers in a safer position. Of course, this means that they are being used at an unsustainable rate, which means if he did escalate, US casualties would be much higher.

All of this came together on July 23 when, after the last of the 13 days of strikes, Trump lied about Iran saying it had been so badly mauled that it had begged for more negotiations.

The actuality was that he was, once again, throwing in the towel as Iran was making a mockery of his operations.

How do we know this was the case? It is pretty straightforward, actually. Once Trump stopped military operations, Iran continued to attack either directly or through its proxies. Here is what has happened since Trump’s latest humiliation.

1. Iranian attacks on US bases — Friday 24 July
Iran’s army said it used Arash one-way attack drones against fuel tanks, equipment warehouses and barracks at Isa (Sheikh Isa) Air Base in Bahrain, and against aircraft hangars, maintenance hangars and barracks at Al-Azraq / Muwaffaq Salti in Jordan. Jordan’s military said it intercepted seven missiles and six drones, so we can say this attack definitely happened.

2. Houthi strikes on Aramco at Jizan and Yanbu — Saturday 25 July
Iran’s allies, the Houthis, claimed dozens of ballistic and cruise missiles and drones were fired against Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia issued alerts in both cities. AFP-verified footage and NASA FIRMS thermal data showed fire at the Jizan refinery. Aramco shut the refinery, at least temporarily, on 27 July.

3. Attack on crude transit infrastructure / Abqaiq — Monday 27 July (attribution disputed)
Iran-backed groups in Iraq attacked “targets and sensitive points” for moving crude from eastern Saudi Arabia to Yanbu, in response to alleged Saudi drone incursions into Yemeni airspace. Saudi Arabia’s defence ministry said it intercepted drones aimed at Eastern Province petroleum facilities and at Riyadh, and said they were launched from Iraqi airspace by Iran-backed groups.

4. The US and Saudi Arabia Attack Iraq (not Iran) and Iran Attacks Jordan — 28-29 July

Last night the US responded to Iranian actions, but only by attacking targets in Iraq (Iran’s proxies) to try and keep the fiction going that there was a ceasefire. Iran attacked targets in Jordan, to show that it was not. Details are starting to emerge.

In other words, the US tried to get out of the war (again) this week, and Iran told the US to stuff it. Pointedly, Iran continued to attack US allies throughout the region, which puts the Trump administration in a terrible dilemma.

This is what I mean by Iran “toying” with the USA. Trump wants out, desperately, and Iran will not let him. They seem to understand that they have a significant strategic advantage by keeping the fight going. I hate to admit it, but from a strategic point of view they seem to grasp the true weakness of the US position, and are heading now for as complete a victory as possible. To understand that, the next section will be a description of what Iranian strategy might be.

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Iranian Strategy: Squeezing Trump Until He Cracks

This section will be divided into two parts: what we know about Iran is doing and, second, what these actions indicate about Iranian strategy.

What Is Iran Doing?

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Note: This piece started as a section of the weekend update about Laura Loomer’s visit to Ukraine. However, it grew and became a separate and I believe important point that needs to be made in a standalone article. This is it, and I will make it free to everyone. For paying subscribers, as recompense, I will make this midweek update just for you, and will include a section on how the US-Iran War might end, based on the reasoning from last Friday’s piece. I hope that is OK.

So it turns out that Laura Loomer is now a good thing. Yep, she is. Loomer went to Ukraine, said how bad Russia was, how she had been misled by Russian propaganda, and how she now supported Ukraine. She is finally on the side of the angels. At least this is what we are being told.

Actually, I can think of nothing more destructive. The praise people are putting on Loomer, and the publicity she is garnering from it, is a disaster. Let me explain:

Loomer is a racist, conspiracy-spreading, anti-democrat who worships Trump.

While Loomer was in Ukraine, preaching about now seeing the light, she also revealed (once again) where her true and deep devotions have and always will lie. She remains a racist, conspiratorial and destructive Trumpist, calling for disenfranchisement of people she does not like, gross discrimination, and the prosecution and imprisonment of enemies. Indeed, she continued espousing all of these stances the entire time she was in Ukraine. Her ignorance and hatred were so intense, she also insulted Ukraine’s Muslim population as she was getting ready to leave.

There are hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian Muslims still living in Crimea who are suffering greatly for their loyalty to Ukraine, and at the same time many who also now live in Kyiv—it is just that Loomer was too hate-filled to see that.

Nor was this one outburst an outlier. A few days earlier (while she was on her way to Ukraine), she called for Muslims to be banned from holding any office in the USA.

Loomer’s racism is deeply embedded in a hate-filled, conspiratorial, error-strewn view of the world, which she constantly broadcasts. She is, for instance, one of the greatest supporters of the dangerous and destructive myth that the 2020 election was stolen from Trump and regularly calls for people to be arrested and imprisoned for taking part in that non-existent conspiracy. This was her reaction after Trump gave his speech a week ago that claimed, without evidence, that the 2020 election had been stolen. I have put a highlight box around her calls to arrest people.

Again, this is no odd exception. A month before the above claim, she actually called for the specific arrest of Facebook boss Mark Zuckerberg, who supposedly played a role in stealing the 2020 election from Trump. In another claim, it was not Facebook, but Microsoft that supposedly worked with the Chinese in pursuit of this non-existent conspiracy.

And she does not want to just arrest Trump’s supposed enemies. She wants to weaken the USA in pursuit of her conspiracies. She has called on Trump to further gut the US intelligence agencies because of them. She used the lie that the 2020 election was stolen from Trump to spread another lie that this led to an explosion of illegal immigration.

Moreover, in Ukraine, while she was supposedly having this Damascene moment, she was still airing conspiracies, some of which are deeply harmful to Ukraine. In her televised conversation with Zelensky, she asked him about the Russian propaganda claim that he and President Macron of France had snorted cocaine together. Indeed, she spent much of her time in that interview (which I believe Zelensky will live to regret) trying to get the Ukrainian president to state that Trump was the greatest president in US history. Here is a transcript of their exchange, which reveals her sycophancy to Trump and the dilemma Zelensky faced in meeting her.

LAURA LOOMER: I mean, I think President Trump. Who do you think is a better president, Donald Trump or Joe Biden?

VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY: Had great results, 70-70. The best president is, first of all, the president for your country.

LAURA LOOMER: I—

VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY: Donald Trump for today.

LAURA LOOMER: Donald Trump, you believe he’s the best president?

VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY: The best president of the United States?

LAURA LOOMER: Yeah.

VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY: Now history will answer, because I think that Lincoln.

LAURA LOOMER: Yeah, he freed the slaves. But after Lincoln, who do you think is the best?

VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY: Ah, you, I know a lot.

LAURA LOOMER: President Trump is going to watch this interview.

VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY: No, Trump is good. He gave you a MAGA hat.

I could go on and on, but hopefully you get the point by now. Loomer is not the kind of friend Ukraine needs or should have. The price of her support is publicizing everything that is destructive in US and European politics and society today.

Her most recent tweet was how Tommy Robinson, whom Loomer has long praised as a “hero” needs now to go to Ukraine. Huzzah!

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It Is All One Fight

Loomer, Robinson, Trump (plus Viktor Orban, Robert Fico, Nigel Farage, Tucker Carlson) etc., are all together in one thing—even if they disagree over an occasional issue. They are trying to destroy civil society in the USA and Europe and replace it with some authoritarian, anti-liberal, discriminatory state, which uses state power to harass and imprison its enemies and denies citizens their rights.

These similarities far outweigh any differences that they have on a specific issue. And that is the point that needs to be understood. Praising one small element of one of their positions provides validation, or at least normalization, to the rest of their plans. Loomer now can broadcast herself far and wide as a friend of Ukraine, and that means people will praise her, spread her presence (which is the key thing and means that they are actually helping spread her messages and gain followers in other areas), and increase her popularity.

It is, actually, how Trump operates and why he has been able to normalize many of his terrible policies. Every once in a while, for tactical purposes, he will take a position (maybe he will help Ukraine, maybe he will have a health-care bill, maybe he will reduce US wars) that appeals to different crowds and different outlooks. They gain him praise, or at least hope, in unlikely quarters, and this is of huge advantage to him.

To remind you, here are just some examples of Trump saying pro-Ukraine/anti-Russian things between January and October 2025.

• 22 Jan 2025 — Trump threatened Russia with “high levels of Taxes, Tariffs, and Sanctions on anything being sold by Russia” if Putin did not agree to a deal.

• 7 Mar 2025 — A week after the famous Oval Office confrontation with Zelensky, to lessen the political fallout of his blunder, Trump pretended to get tough with Russia: “I am strongly considering large scale Banking Sanctions, Sanctions, and Tariffs on Russia.”

• 8 Jul 2025 — A month before Trump welcomed Putin to Anchorage, he pretended he was angry with the Russian dictator. “We get a lot of bullshit from Putin”, he declared.

• 13 Jul 2025 —A few days later Trump continued play-acting that he was mad at Putin: “He (Putin) talks nice, and then he bombs everybody in the evening”. Fox News

• 14 Jul 2025 — While meeting with Mark Rutte, Trump claimed that the US would put “very severe tariffs on Russia if we don’t have a deal in 50 days”.

• 28 Jul – 6 Aug 2025 — The deadline for the very serious tariffs to be placed on Russia was cut from 50 days to 10–12 days.

• 13 Sep 2025 — Trump offered “major Sanctions on Russia” contingent on all NATO states doing the same and halting all Russian oil purchases (which he knew would never happen as Orban was always going to buy Russian oil).

• 23 Sep 2025, after meeting with Zelensky, Trump called Russia a “paper tiger”.

• 12–15 Oct 2025 Maybe the most outrageous lie; Trump claimed “If this war doesn’t get settled, I may send Tomahawks” to Ukraine.

Every time Trump made one of his verbal pivots, it very effectively gave him time and breathing space. It lessened the pressure that he actually help Ukraine, and allowed Putin flexibility to escalate and expand the war, etc. And here we are, more than a year and a half into Trump’s second term: all US aid to Ukraine has been stopped, Ukraine is basically running out of Patriots, Russia is selling whatever oil it can ship, and Ukraine has no effective defense from Russian ballistic missiles.

So, stop trying to find the one good thing that somehow validates the positions of the Trumps, Loomers, et al. That is what they want and it serves their interests. Ultimately what they want is fundamentally wrong and destructive.

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It Is Also Bound To Fail

This is the key point to wrap this up. All these attempts to find good in Loomer’s conversion to a Ukraine backer seem based on the idea that she might somehow talk Trump into changing his mind on Ukraine; as if she can unlock the humanitarian, democracy-loving side of his nature and let Trump float effortlessly into the Ukraine camp while providing masses of weapons to the Ukrainian military.

What we have seen over the last 18 months (actually 80 years) is that this is nonsense. Trump is entirely self-interested and only adjusts because he understands it is in his interest to adjust. For instance, his recent rhetorical changes on Ukraine are not some change in outlook; they came about because he finally understood that Ukraine is doing much better militarily than he expected and that Russia is struggling. In other words, he finally understood that Ukraine has cards, and he does not want to be left with no influence or options over Ukraine as Russia continues to strategically falter on the battlefield.

Even then, we need to be very careful not to overrate this change. Maybe there will be a vote on Graham-Blumenthal this week, but maybe not. And even if the bill passes Congress (who knows what happens in the House), Trump is under no obligation to bring in the sanctions. He can do what he wants. The passage of the bill without Trump choosing to actually bring in the sanctions is just a further delaying tactic.

This issue of the sanctions bill is a particularly pernicious example of where Loomer deceives people. Trump made a public suggestion that Iran be added to the bill (as if he needs a bill to sanction Iran or Russia). It was actually a suggestion to muddy the waters and slow the process down. Loomer, however, put it forward as a sign that Trump was more committed to helping Ukraine and hurting Russia—which is nonsensical.

How many times do we need the Mark Ruttes of this world embarrassing themselves by trying to appeal to Trump before we realize that this is a strategy that is bound to fail. Europe has gained more by disregarding the USA and helping Ukraine fight its war than it ever gained by flattering, praising or trying to appeal to Trump’s supposed better nature.

Conclusion

A rather personal note here. I believe there are not a host of disconnected, smaller struggles these days, but that there is one fundamental divide—and that is the same divide in Ukraine, the USA, Europe, etc. That is the struggle between those who still believe in a democratic system, civil liberties, the rule of law, curbing the power of the state to abuse and kill, and curbing the powers of massive amounts of capital to control that state.

When the USA was at its best, it was because it stood for such beliefs and put its money where its mouth was in the struggle. While it did not always succeed, or always live up to its ideals—it did at times try. When it did actually live up to its ideas, it made a difference.

The world will be a much darker place if Ukraine wins and the US devolves into a state of permanent Trumpist self-loathing and international isolation. Likewise, the world will be far bleaker if the USA regains its senses, but in the meantime Ukraine is abandoned and severely damaged by Russia. In the end, the struggle in Ukraine and the USA is one combined fight with lots of separate battles.

Laura Loomer knows which side she fundamentally stands on. Do you?

Btw, if you want to hear more about how the replacement of Syrskyi by General Drapatyi was viewed in Ukraine, Shaun Pinner and I held a substack live on the question the day after the announcement.

The decision making in Ukraine will be the focus of the first two parts of this update. First will be what happened last week in terms of overall command (and what did not), and where we go from here. Note, this is far from being settled.

Next, there will be a section on General Drapatyi himself, as I am sure he will be unknown to many of you. The last section is a quick rundown of the Ukrainian strike campaigns this week, with particular mentions about the attacks on Wildberries warehouse and in the Sea of Azov, both of which are ongoing.

Finally, I just wanted to give you a heads up that the next Substack Live with Come Back Alive will happen this Thursday at 16:30 Ukraine Time/14:30 UK time and 9:30 US East Coast time. The focus will be on the human experience of this war, training and morale. I will be talking with Ivanna Ryzhkova, a combat medic who has experienced the worst of this war and now works with CBA’s training centers.

Ok, let’s get to the main event.

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The Worst Week Becomes Much Better (But Not The Best)

Sometimes we forget that democracies have certain inbuilt advantages in war. They often screw up badly, start slowly, prepare inefficiently, etc, but democracies can also be better at adapting and channelling societal abilities and commitment. This week we saw the benefits of a democracy. Pressure from Ukrainian civil society told on Ukraine’s political leadership.

President Zelensky clearly did not expect the reaction he received after the removal of Fedorov. There were protests across Ukraine that actually grew in intensity up until last weekend, and they were directed not just towards bringing back Fedorov but also towards replacing General Syrkyi as chief of the General Staff.

Now, Syrskyi divides opinion like no one in Ukraine I have heard discussed—and I mean that. Someone like Yermak does not divide opinion, he is generally distrusted and was believed to be a problem. Syrskyi, otoh, has always had his strong defenders as well as his critics. I summarized both views when he was appointed to replace General Zaluzhny in early 2024.

As overall commander, Syrskyi continued to divide opinion—maybe even more strongly. While he continued to have his backers, there was also a great deal of disquiet with his overall command, his tendency to micromanage, his “Soviet” military outlook, his focus on tactical gains over strategic success, and his willingness (especially before 2026) to tolerate very high casualties.

I am summarizing here.

And clearly he and Fedorov had a very rocky relationship. In the fascinating press conference that Fedorov gave after his dismissal, he accused Syrskyi of “splitting the country”.

Fedorov basically said Syrskyi was dividing not just the country, but the military. Units the general liked were favored while others were discriminated against and deprived of life-saving equipment. This seems to be particularly the case when it came to the supply of drones, and Fedorov went into detail about that—note the word “loyal”.

Supplies do not flow through the corps. The supply problem is fundamental. Over the past five months, we procured more drones than in the whole of last year, yet most units did not feel the difference because distribution is handled manually. If you are loyal, you receive supplies; if you are not, you receive nothing. As a result, units cannot plan their future.

Later in the press conference, Fedorov went into detail about his personal, working replacement with Syrskyi. Apologies for the length of the excerpt, but the detail is important.

It might be said that Syrskyi had overplayed his hand. When Zelensky was confronted with a binary choice (Syrskyi or Fedorov) and chose the General, Syrskyi actually found his position weakened. While Fedorov was in the defense ministry, no one wanted to rock the boat. However with Fedorov out, Syrskyi became the focus of popular anger.

Things were made even worse when Syrskyi tried to pretend that he was surprised people were saying he and Fedorov were not getting along. As the tide turned against him, Syrksyi gave an interview saying that he was “surprised to learn that we have a conflict”. In the end, however, Zelensky decided Syrskyi had to go, and on Tuesday the General was out and Drapatyi was in.

Of course, that was only part, and in some ways the lesser part, of what many Ukrainians wanted. This started with the dismissal of Fedorov and getting Fedorov back as Defense Minister remained a key priority. That, for now, seems a far greater ask than changing military command.

What we know is this. Zelensky and Fedorov have communicated multiple times over the last week, and Fedorov has been offered some grand-sounding, but primarily advisory, positions. The most prominent of these was “Deputy Prime Minister” with a remit to advise on military/technical matters. Fedorov, however, will have none of it. His experience over the last few years has convinced him that: “only three positions in the state - in addition to soldiers on the battlefield - which determine the course of the war: president, defence minister and commander-in-chief.”

So we are left with this stand-off. Zelensky for now wants to stick with his new choice for Defense Minister, Evgeniy Khmara. As Khmara has not yet been approved by parliament, he is listed as “acting” defense minister at present—so that gives everyone some wiggle room.

Fwiw, I have heard positive things about Khmara. He has a great deal of military experience and before being appointed to this job, had been serving as Budanov’s replacement at the head of Ukrainian strategic services. It is also worth noting that he is being touted as more similar to Fedorov than Syrskyi.

How this will play out is still up in the air. One reason Zelensky seems determined not to have Fedorov as Defense Minister might be political. Fedorov has, partly because of the controversy of the last few weeks, become one of the most trusted and respected political figures in the country. This week a new poll was released which rated the top Ukrainian political figures on trust—Fedorov was second to Zaluzhny (though more people had strong trust in Fedorov than anyone else), while Zelensky was fourth. Here are the poll results—the top four candidates are Zaluzhny, Fedorov, Budanov and Zelensky. Syrskyi was second from bottom. To make sense of the poll, dark blue is strongly trusted, light blue is trusted, the orange bars are the corresponding ratings for “not trusted”.

More directly political as a consideration, Fedorov came in third (just behind Zaluzhny) as voters preferred first choice if there were a presidential vote. That would mean he would be a very strong candidate to get into a run off with Zelensky, were he to run. Here were the headline figures on that part of the poll.

• The top three in terms of electoral support are Volodymyr Zelensky (22.3%), Valery Zaluzhny (14.9%), and Mykhailo Fedorov (13.4%).

• This is followed by Kyrylo Budanov (7.2%), Oleksandr Usyk (5.9%), Petro Poroshenko (4.6%), Ihor Terekhov (4.3%), Dmytro Razumkov (3.7%) and Andriy Biletsky (2.3%).

Btw, it is also worth noting that removing Syrskyi was very popular with 55% of the respondents approving the choice and only 15% opposing the move.

What does this mean? Well, it does seem that Zelensky is going to try and ride out the change for now. This is no knock on Khmara, but if this is how we end up, the worst week for Ukraine has not transformed into the best. We must still wait and see.

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Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi

In Fedorov’s press conference, it is worth noting that he spoke about Drapatyi as a comrade in arms against Syrskyi. He was one of the few people given an actual name-check, and it was personal and showed that he believed Drapatyi, like himself, had been punished for being too independent.

Well done. Now off to the sidelines. Drapatyi — a third reprimand, goodbye. Forgive me, Drapatyi; I suspect you will receive a fourth reprimand after this.

And then, a few days later, Drapatyi was in and Syrskyi was out. This move, btw, was as mentioned above, greeted by universal acclaim by the Ukrainians to whom I speak. I have heard no criticism at all and lots of praise. Old friend and trusted adviser Mykola Bielieskov reached out immediately and wrote “Best choice of Zelensky”. When I asked Mykola if I could quote him explicitly on this, he agreed.

Drapatyi is one of those figures who was well-known in Ukraine but hardly known outside of it. And he is also rare in that he is universally respected and admired from practically all parts of society. He is a career soldier who has experienced the fighting since the Russians first invaded Ukraine in 2014. That year, when pro-Russian separatists tried to take control of Mariupol, it was reporedly Drapatyi who commanded the BMP who broke through the Russian barricades—and we have a video of that.

Though he has been around for the whole war, Drapatyi is still relatively young. He is only 43 (born in November 1982), making him 17 years younger than Syrskyi and leaving him with no Soviet military experience. That matters in Ukraine, where there is always a generational divide to consider.

Note: You can see the toll the war has had on him. He looks an old 43 years.

Here are a few other points about his career.

• Graduated from the Kharkiv Tank Troops Institute; commissioned as a lieutenant in 2004, serving with the 72nd Separate Mechanised Brigade at Bila Tserkva.

• Made his name in 2014 at Mariupol, leading an armoured push through a Russian barricade to relieve surrounded Ukrainian police, and later extracting an encircled force through Russian-held territory (see above).

• Became Ukraine’s youngest commander of the Ground Forces in 2024. Resigned in 2025 after a Russian strike on an army training centre killed recruits — “an army in which no one is held accountable is dying from within” — which cemented his reputation with the rank and file.

• Most recently commanded the Joint Forces, covering the Kharkiv-area front.

• Associated with reform of recruitment and training, delegating initiative to front-line commanders, and the “Drone Line” project: a 10–15 km drone kill zone behind the line of contact.

The decision to resign and take responsibility for the 2025 strike which killed soldiers under his command is a sign of the kind of officer he is reported to be. He cares about his soldiers, accepts responsibility for his actions, and tries to act with the highest integrity. He reinforced that reputation after his appointment, when only releasing a very short statement in which he said he would offer “no loud promises”.

He has generally avoided the spotlight before. One of the very few interviews he ever gave previously, in 2023, revealed him to be pretty hard-core. He said that Russia as an imperial “nation” had no right to exist (which is different than saying that Russians had no right to exist—which is how his words have been twisted). The whole quote was:

"At the beginning, to be honest, there may have been some fear because everything was so uncertain... But in the end, we've seen the result. You can't even call them a neighbour. This is a nation, along with its leadership, that has no right to exist. Nothing civilized has changed there over millennia, neither in their mentality nor in their imperial ambitions."

Here is a story with that interview, all dubbed into English. It is worth watching if you have the time.

It is obviously early days and much needs to be done—but it is heartening to see the reception to his selection. The Ukrainian army needs a leader who will continue to head down the road of professionalization, fair treatment and no favoritism, and the integration of new technologies. In all these areas, he is at least poised to be a success.

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Wildberries And Azov

People have asked about these two campaigns, so I thought I would give a quick update here at the end.

This week the Ukrainian long-range attacks on Russian Wildberries warehouses and infrastructure (think a Russian version of Amazon) very much continued apace. Indeed, since the campaign started on July 18, and it definitely is a campaign at this point, there have been up to 10 different strikes reported. These are, as far as I can tell (most from this Meduza report):

18 July — Elektrostal (Moscow Oblast) and Kotovsk (Tambov Oblast), two in one night. The Elektrostal fire burned for four days. Kotovsk partially resumed operations within two days.

20 July — Koledino (Moscow Oblast). Reportedly the warehouse kept working.

22 July — Krasnodar and Nevinnomyssk (Stavropol Krai). Neither had resumed as of the 24th.

23 July — Voronezh. Reportedly lighter damage.

24 July — Shushary (St Petersburg), Novosaratovka (Leningrad Oblast), and Simferopol (occupied Crimea). Both Petersburg-area sites caught fire; no detail on the Crimean sorting centre.

25 July — a warehouse in the Urals, per the Moscow Times; NPR’s Moscow correspondent called that overnight strike the tenth of the week.

This campaign causes some mixed emotions in me. If it distracts from the oil campaign, that is definitely not what I would say is an efficient use of Ukrainian resources. It seems that there have been only 5 strikes on refineries since the Wildberries campaign started. With oil prices back on the rise, I personally believe that efforts against the refineries remain top priority.

As for the benefits of the Wildberries campaign—I can see the argument that they will possess dual use components (though what percentage of their possessions are dual use is unknown and I would imagine small). I also understand the idea that it will disperse Russian air defense. So it can have some strategic advantages.

However, my guess is that this is really aimed at Putin’s political standing. It’s a way of undermining the basic “deal” of his regime with the Russian people—I will provide you goodies if you give me power. That bargain looks dicey if all your goodies are blowing up.

Such campaigns often do not work as expected, so this might be hopeful. Certainly, if it means that striking these warehouses distracts from the campaign against refineries, I find that an odd choice. However, it could be that the Ukrainians believe that Putin’s political standing is in trouble and this is a way to seriously undermine it.

The Ukrainian campaign in the Sea of Azov remains ongoing, though reliable data is scarce due to limited shipping reports. This last week the Ukrainians claimed to have continued to damage shipping at a very high clip. Most of the information comes from Robert Brovdi, the experienced Ukrainian UAV commander who is overseeing the campaign. On July 20-21, for instance, he claimed that the Ukrainians hit another 13 Russian ships. Here was how the Kyiv Independent story on the claims started.

Ukrainian drone strikes have hit another 13 Russian shadow fleet vessels in the Azov Sea and the Black Sea over the last two days, Commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces Robert Brovdi, known as “Madyar,” said on July 22.

The vessels struck on July 21-22 included 10 dry cargo ships, two tugboats, and a tanker, according to Brovdi. The Kyiv Independent couldn’t independently verify the Ukrainian claim.

“(Russia’s) shadow fleet vessels were warned by fire over a 48-hour period on July 21–22 that it was inadvisable to navigate the waters of the Azov and Black Seas in the interests of the aggressor country,” Brovdi said in his Telegram post.

The most important reality that I can find is that the Russians, who suspended official shipping on around July 10, have not formally changed that status, and the Russians are encouraging people to find other means of shipping grain, such as by rail.

So the campaign is ongoing and so far the Russians have yet to find an effective counter. Of course this is a campaign that will take time. It’s directed at cutting off Crimea and stopping Russian grain shipments (depriving Russia of money). Those seem to be happening, but their impact will take time.

Have a good rest of the weekend everyone!

It is now time to write the piece on how the Russo-Ukraine War may end. People wanted speculation on that question, and here you will get it. However, before I get to speculation, there will be a section on the process by which wars end historically, which will highlight considerations informing the different scenarios. This will hopefully provide a comprehensive framework which will inform the speculation.

To start, wars do not end because of the results of “battles” in the way that the analytical community often assumes and portrays it to the public. One of the reasons so much strategic analysis is flawed is because it draws straight lines from military operations to the results of wars. Thus we have had an analytical community writing off Ukraine in 2021-2022 because it was assumed that Ukraine could not operationally resist the Russian military and would lose the opening battles of any full-scale war. Or we had something similar just a few months ago when it was said that overwhelming US force would devastate Iran and lead to a war-ending settlement along American lines.

Actually, the relationship between military operations (battles) and the ends of wars is extremely unstable, with military matters often mattering far less and operating more indirectly than people believe. In fact, instead of starting with the military operations and moving to the end of wars, it is better to start with the actual end of wars and then move backwards to how that phenomenon occurred. In doing so, you will see military operations are just one consideration in the process, and often a secondary one. Here is a framework to help you understand what really happens when a war ends.

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Leadership Will Decide

I will start by making a point I have made a few times before—because for this issue it is doubly important. International Relations theories have had only limited value over the last decades because they often downplay the material differences of different leaderships (let alone political systems).

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Before I get into the midweek update and what is happening in the US-Iran War (or Trump’s War as it should be known by historians), I just wanted to bring to your attention the appointment of a new Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff last night. Mykhailo Drapatyi was promoted from Joint Forces Commander to replace Oleksandr Syrskyi as Commander in Chief of Ukrainian forces, a move that was widely hailed. I turned to good friend Mykola Bielieskov as soon as I heard the news and he responded “Best choice of Zelensky”.

As this is such an important change, the Substack Live I had scheduled with Shaun Pinner for later in the week will be moved up to today. We will do it at 17:30 Ukraine time, 15:30 UK time, and 10:30 US East Coast time. Shaun, being a long-time member of the Ukrainian armed forces, is an excellent person with whom to discuss this change. In the meantime, there might even be a definite decision about the future of Mykhailo Fedorov for us to discuss.

If Ukraine is moving forward in its war, the US is moving backwards and on a daily basis. It is painful as a student of strategy to watch the US weaken itself relentlessly like this. These attacks on Iran, in their latest phase of the war, have been going on for 11 straight nights now. The USA keeps hammering away against an Iranian military that Trump claimed months ago to have “obliterated”. Yet, the Iranians continue to fight back, with what might be called a sideways strategy which is distressingly effective. Indeed as the USA weakens itself, the Iranians seem to be improving their position.

The upshot is a decline in America’s global position, a decline which the USA is aiding and abetting with its present strategy. When it comes to the Asia-Pacific, that degradation has reached a stage where the US might never recover. There will be a section at the end for PS that will go into this.

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Each Day The US Weakens Itself

The US has now spent 11 straight nights attacking targets across Iran. The purpose behind these attacks seems to be Trump’s hope that if he does something, anything, to damage Iran, that the Iranian regime will get the message and give him peace terms that he can sell as “not a catastrophic loss”. These terms remain what they have been since March, some kind of concession on the nuclear question and a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz without tolls. The amazing and depressing thing is that each night of these attacks is making things worse for the USA. It is bringing the US further away from achieving anything material and actually putting Iran in a stronger position. It reaffirms the pointlessness of the use of military force in this (and most) situations.

The USA is engaged in a war of choice to defeat itself. It certainly is a special moment. Maybe the best way to understand what is happening is to break it down into a series of points. The first is that the US has no actual military operation to achieve what it wants, beyond a full invasion and deposition of the Iranian regime.

The One (Bad) Military Option

What could the US achieve here? The answer would be even with the whole might of the US military, it is not clear. The US is trying to damage the Iranian regime to such a degree that it will give in, to coerce it. However that is practically impossible to imagine without a change in that regime. So, the only way Trump can reasonably hope to achieve his political goals is to overthrow the Iranian regime and replace it with a new and compliant one. That will not happen with air strikes for a number of reasons. So the only way for Trump to “win” the war is for a full-scale invasion, and that means taking Tehran and installing a new government. Taking Kharg Island (mooted again this week as a possible target for US invasion) achieves nothing towards this but puts US forces in vulnerable positions. If the US cannot protect its troops from air attacks in Jordan, there is no way it can do so in Kharg.

The problem with any full scale invasion is that we are talking about using hundreds of thousands of troops, masses of munitions (it is not clear that the US even has enough left at this point) and has no end-date in mind. General Barry McCaffrey estimates it would take 600,000 US troops and would take a year. I would say even longer. However it is irrelevant, because it is not happening.

That Means Every Day Of Operations Weakens The USA

This process of weakening is happening in a number of ways. First, the US is simply further depleting its stockpiles of vital weapons and doing so in efforts that can achieve nothing political. The reality behind this depletion seems to be causing panic in the Pentagon. Let me start with this quote from an anonymous official about what is happening, which was given to the Washington Post.

"We do not have enough to safely sustain operations, and I don't think the White House is aware of that."

This is extremely serious. The USA had already run down its stockpile of THAAD (advanced anti-air) missiles before it started the latest round of war. Stocks were so low it would take years to get back to the (too low) condition on February 27, 2026. Here is a CSIS chart on the subject:

The US is doing multiple attacks every night and having to defend multiple attacks from Iran at the same time, so the situation is deteriorating every day. I actually do think the Pentagon and White House know, but they are unwilling to do the right thing as that will admit that they have failed. Instead, they are desperately hoping that Congress gives them billions and billions to keep this going.

Beyond directly weakening the US military, the war is also further hollowing out US institutions. Congress sits there, inert and passive, as the administration continues to wage a war that started 144 days ago. The War Powers Act should have been invoked months ago, or at the very least Congress should have been asked to express its assent. The very opposite has happened, and the administration is waging a war, hiding the true losses and expense, and having no press conferences. CNN wrote this very depressing story about this phenomenon.

Add it up and the US is weakening its military and its institutions.

It is also undermining its international relations.

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At the Same Time, The US Is Strengthening Iran

How can this be, you ask? For the simple reason that the attacks Iran is doing in response to US operations are, I hate to say it, far strategically superior to what the US is doing to it. The Iranians realize that they cannot defeat the US military outright as an institution, but moreover that they do not need to do that. What they need to do is make the war so politically costly for the US that Iran emerges from the war in a stronger position.

The key to this, from the Iranian perspective, might be called a form of “sideways” escalation. Many of Iran’s attacks over the previous ten days have focussed not on US forces, but on the resources of US allies in the region.

Here are just some of Iran’s sideways escalation attacks—all with sources so you can check. I am not even including Iranian attacks on US-backed Kurdish forces.

July 12 — Iran launched simultaneous missile and drone strikes on Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and Oman in retaliation for US strikes on southern Iran. Notable strikes: explosive drones targeted a Patriot air defense battery, ammo depot, and radar site at a US base in Kuwait; the IRGC hit logistics/refueling facilities used by US carriers at the port of Duqm, Oman; shrapnel from intercepted munitions injured three people, including a child, in Qatar.

July 13–14 — An Iranian missile targeting Bahrain reportedly may have carried a cluster munition warhead.

July 14-15 — IRGC conducted further retaliatory strikes against targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan.

July 16–17 — Iran struck Kuwait’s power-generation and desalination infrastructure, sparking a fire at the plant; broader strikes across Gulf states continued as US attacks intensified.

July 17–18 — Iran hit Jordan’s Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Azraq (killing at least two US service members), and a ballistic missile struck a US base in Saudi Arabia — the first Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia in over three months.

July 19 — Iran attacked Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain again, striking the Kuwaiti desalination plant for a second time and firing ballistic missiles at Jordan’s port city of Aqaba, near Eilat, Israel.

July 20 — Iran struck two oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz plus US military assets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain; the IRGC also claimed to have hit an Amazon data center in Bahrain. This report is still awaiting verification.

July 21 — Iran claimed to have destroyed US radar and air defense systems in Muharraq and Riffa, Bahrain; Bahraini officials said air defenses countered multiple attacks that day.

These attacks by Iran are having multiple areas of strategic effect. They are not just running down US munitions (but they are doing that as well, note the attacks on Patriot batteries and other US bases), they are showing that they can strike US allies regardless of US protection, and they are also empowering their allies. Note the Houthis in Yemen just announced that they will start targeting tankers carrying Saudi oil.

This is causing some real worry amongst US partners. Only the UAE seems to have doubled down on US support. The rest are having serious doubts about US reliability, not just now but going forward. I have been chatting with a US businessperson and investor who does extensive work in the Gulf States and was there recently. They said:

“There are two long-term political consequences of the US-Iran War: The exacerbation of pre-existing political fissures in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the dilution of US influence as it becomes clear that America’s security guarantee is weaker than once thought. The strategic fallout is stark. A divided GCC only strengthens Iran, and China is positioned to capitalize on the erosion of US credibility”.

And believe me, each day of Iran doing this sideways escalation that the US cannot stop, makes these problems more acute. The Trump administration, for example, is now making major concessions to Saudi Arabia on the question of nuclear power development, which could result in a Saudi nuclear weapon. This story just dropped a few hours ago.

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What It Means For US-China Relations: Can The US Even Fight A Battle, Let Alone A War?

In War and Power: Who Wins Wars And Why, I judged that the US had put itself in a dangerous position vis-a-vis China.

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First, a promise. I will get to all the questions I was asked for the AMA. The beast was rather unleashed with that piece and hundreds of questions have come in (and continue to come in). I was simply not prepared for so many. I am trying to answer a certain amount per day, but it still will take a while to get through them all—so bear with me. Also, for clarity’s sake, I will only answer the first question in a thread. Certain threads have taken on a life of their own, and I simply cannot keep up.

Also, in some cases, people have asked versions of the same questions, ones which would require a longer, essay type response. I will try to answer some of those in the coming weeks and months as standalone pieces. The ones that stand out are (I’m paraphrasing here):

How do you see the Russo-Ukraine War developing/ending?

The shape of a possible war in the Pacific.

The future shape of the US military.

The books I have found most influential and why.

An update on the likelihood (or not) of nuclear weapons being used by Russia.

The first one of these about war-ending scenarios will be tackled soon as many people asked that—maybe the end of this week.

Do the rest sound appealing to the rest of you?

Also, just a heads up that I will be doing a Substack Live this week with Shaun Pinner—who you might remember from this Substack Live in 2025. Shaun was a long-time member of the Ukrainian military, a Russian prisoner of war, and still lives in Ukraine where he comments powerfully and perceptively about the state of the war. I thought he would be the perfect person to talk about the controversy now involving Fedorov and Syrskyi. If there is a big development in the next day or so, we could move it up, but for now, plan on that on Thursday or Friday.

Now for the piece.

Bravery Does Not Win Wars

Did you know that the United States attacked Iran last night in “honor” of the three US servicemen killed in an Iranian strike the day before? That’s right, the president who unleashed this war said exactly that when speaking to reporters last night.

“We hit them very hard again tonight, and we did that in honor of the, probably three, it’s probably three great patriots,”

This kind of faux testimonial came just a few days after Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced that the US, in search of some optimal, musclebound warrior, would start screening soldiers for testosterone levels annually—and offering enhancements for those who want them. In a surreal announcement on Twitter, which was entitled “The High-T Department of War”, Hegseth equated “world class…war fighters” with testosterone levels. Hegseth said:

“Under the supervision of our world-class medical professionals, war fighters age 30 and older are going to be tested annually as part of their periodic health assessment,”

Btw, testosterone boosting is strongly linked to infertility—so in encouraging testosterone boosting, Hegseth might be killing off the possibility of more US soldiers in the future.

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I have had many requests to discuss the removal of Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, not least in this week’s AMA. However, I wanted to hold off until this update to see how issues were developing. This is still a fast-moving and chaotic story, and the fallout will only be known in a few days/weeks. For instance, it seems that the comm…

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